DISSENT

THE "AFFLUENT SOCIETY"

How Fair Is It?

"Bastard" Capitalism — RALPH SAMUEL

How Affluent Is It?

Poverty in the United States — H. BRAND

How Free Is It?

Concentration and Control — JAMES O'CONNOR

On "Socialist Realism" — CZESLAW MILOSZ

Some Proposals for the Sixties — MICHAEL REAGAN

Private Mailer Re-enlists — ROBERT A. BONE

Political Economy of Growth — HENRY PACHTER

A Discussion: The Politics of Non-violent Resistance

1. The Idea of Resistance — MICHAEL WALZER
2. On the New Pacifism — STEPHAN THERNSTROM

AUTUMN 1960 75c

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DEAR FRIENDS: AN APPEAL

We should like to speak to you.

DISSENT *is now seven years old. It was begun at the nadir of the McCarthyite period, when the political atmosphere was bleak and many American intellectuals were in sad retreat.* DISSENT *—to the delight of some, the irritation of others—made its mark by reasserting the tradition of independent radicalism.*

From year to year the circulation of DISSENT *has risen, but so, at a faster rate, have our expenses. The magazine has become a respected voice in American intellectual life: a rallying center for those who wish to revive the spirit of democratic radicalism.*

During the last two years DISSENT *has suffered some growing pains and some middle-of-the-journey troubles. We have felt the need to reorient ourselves to a new situation in American life—with what success, you may best judge. But there are some notable achievements to record:*

- *A special trade-union issue which sold out entirely, and elicited many orders we could not fill. This issue, we know, was widely discussed among thoughtful trade unionists.*
- *Two printings of our book* Voices of Dissent, *which brought together the best articles from the first five years.*
- *Extended coverage—first-hand, sympathetic—of the Southern Negro movement, including two full reports by one of our editors.*
- *The first printing in the United States of the remarkable Russian document "On Socialist Realism" (soon to come out as a book).*

We know that our impact has widened and deepened. Orders keep coming in regularly for full files of the magazine, more than

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we can satisfy. A DISSENT *editor recently on tour in Europe and Asia reports to us that the magazine is known, read and respected among many people in England, France and India. We have received a goodly number of new subscriptions from the South, obviously in response to the articles we printed about the Negro student movement. And the response of readers to our recent survey of their views concerning* DISSENT *has been so overwhelming —over 30% replied, often with long comments—that we still have not succeeded in collating the results.*

We have plans for improvement and expansion.

- *In the next issue, a full first-hand report by a* DISSENT *editor who recently took a tour as a guest of the Indian socialist movement.*
- *A special enlarged issue in the Spring on New York City, which will also appear as a book.*
- *Further first-hand coverage of major national events, as well as discussions of fundamental political and intellectual questions.*

During the years of our existence, we have survived through the help of readers who generously responded to our biannual appeals for help. The time has come to ask again. Obviously, this kind of project can't be self-supporting. For us, who issue the magazine, it has often been a hard row. Everyone contributes his services free, sometimes at personal sacrifice. Editors have already pledged heavily for the next fund drive, often sums of hundreds of dollars. We therefore feel free to say to you—you who share our values and our hopes—that you must contribute heavily.

If we are to survive, we need to raise in this biannual fund drive the sum of

$8,000.

This is somewhat more than we have asked for in the past, but the growth of our expenses, despite fanatical penny-pinching, forces us to. It means that you should dig in a little deeper. Remember that it is for a two-year period, that you can pay off your pledge in two years, but that it would be most helpful to pay as large a portion as you can in cash.

We await your reply with confidence, in the hope that you will allow us to continue our work. THE EDITORS

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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One of the most interesting and, in many ways, encouraging political trends in contemporary England is the emergence of a group of young writers and intellectuals known as the "New Left." This group first came to attention in the journal Universities and Left Review, *which has since become* New Left Review. *It has also begun to publish a series of "New Left Books," of which the first is* Out of Apathy, *a collection of essays. The article which appears below has been adapted for* DISSENT *by its author from its original appearance in* Out of Apathy. *For permission to use this version we are grateful to the English publisher of the book, Stevens and Sons. A review of* Out of Apathy *is planned for the next issue of* DISSENT.—EDITORS

"BASTARD" CAPITALISM

Ralph Samuel

Scarcely twenty years ago the capitalist system was, to all appearances, disintegrating—in England its symbol was Jarrow, "the town that was murdered," its representative figure Montagu Norman, the sinister governor of the Bank of England who engineered the rise of unemployment and the fall of governments. Business was in disgrace, businessmen suspect, and business values held in almost universal contempt. "Profits," complained Lord Chandos, "are without honor in our country."

The upper classes shared in the disgrace. Frightened leaders of a contracting Empire, they had shown themselves, over two decades, astonishingly incompetent in the very functions—Diplomacy, Finance and Defense—where even their critics had credited them with a certain traditional "flair." It was a sorry record and people concluded that the capitalist system could no longer work, nor the governing classes continue to govern. Their verdict, in the 1945 elections, seemed decisive:

> A vote of censure [wrote Cyril Connolly in Horizon] on the shrewd, city-agent *faux-bonhommes,* a blow struck against the religion of money, it has given us a government who are "we" and not "they."

The country, as Evelyn Waugh later remembered it, "seemed to be under enemy occupation."

How are the fallen mighty! By the end of the fifties business had regained and even reinforced its hold on the country. The corporations stood unchallenged at the center of the economy, and around them clustered privilege, in new forms and old, which circumvented and finally reversed the post-war effort at income redistribution. Corporate

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profits took precedence over public welfare (as much money was spent on advertising as on scientific and industrial research, on packaging as on the government's educational budget), and the machinery of government control—those parts which had not been dismantled—served to buttress rather than to diminish the power of the private sector. Profit was once more the dominant rationale of economic activity; competitive individualism—"getting on" and "getting ahead"—exalted again as the proper regulator of individual conduct and lever of social progress.

As THE WHOLE WAY of life took on an increasingly commercial tone, the upper classes came to look more confident than at any time since 1914. Once again they set the pace for society—objects of emulation, the "Top" towards which everyone was urged to aspire. The flourishing of conspicuous luxury—and its widespread celebration—showed how successfully they had defied the 1945 prophecies of their imminent destruction. What *The Queen* called the "Boom in Lavish Living" was rapidly gathering pace:

> Money doesn't chink these days, it crackles louder than a forest fire . . . Britain is the world's largest importer of Champagne, the drink that says Success . . . Shareholders have that lovely, lively, lyrical feeling as the rush of take-over bids mints them money.

The 1959 election gave political sanction to the ascendancy of business and class. With a "permanent Conservative majority" now so firmly established, the victory was celebrated in a way that would have been unseemly after the elections of 1951 and 1955. Reporters at Lord Camrose's party at the Savoy Hotel, picked their way among smiling Conservative ministers and exultant celebrities to find Mr. Nubar Gulbenkian ("The Tories seem to have done damn well") and the Duchess of Argyle ("gosh, isn't the news good"), while nearby the Bishop of Stepney tucked a crucifix into his great black cummerbund, and danced a jig, shouting "Great, great!" as the first results came through. "IT'S BUY, BUY, BUY DAY," the *Evening Standard* headline proclaimed:

> The Stock Exchange boom became the biggest zoom on the Tories' Glory. Businessmen must all be delighted, and investors large and small will surely be singing "Land of Hope and Tory."

Capitalism and Conservatism seemed finally and unchallengeably secure.

The business baronies

The revived capitalist system is not the same as the old, though it shares with it certain crucial features. There have been decisive changes, some of which have notably humanized the workings of the system—checking its excesses, controlling its operation, limiting its free play. At the same time there have been others which considerably increase the business hold on the nation. There is, in fact, a great deal of paradox in post-war Britain. The business revival has been matched by the great expansion of welfare, the growth of corporate power has

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gone alongside the extension of government intervention; salesmanship has become pervasive in a society which, in certain respects, genuinely resembles a "mixed economy." All this makes it difficult to see the system as a whole, and it may, perhaps, be easier to see the relationship between contemporary capitalism and the classic system of the nineteenth century if a comparison is drawn with the later Middle Ages.

Medieval historians give the name "bastard" feudalism to the English society of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—a society in which the classic feudal structures had been greatly weakened, but where the traditional feudal elites were able to maintain and even, in new forms, extend their domination. The individual baron lost his independent position and was drawn into the great baronial "connections." Feudal privilege became diversified in form and promiscuous in origin, depending upon office as much as ownership: government connections were manipulated to secure war contracts, exchequer loans and tax immunities, administration engrossed to secure franchises, jurisdictions and profitable offices. The peasant, his bondage ended, his dues commuted, was freer and more prosperous than under "high" feudalism, but at the same time the influence of feudalism on the nation's life was, in other directions, considerably extended. The "overmighty baron," at the head of his connection, enjoyed decisive powers altogether denied to his independent predecessors, and broke down the lines which previously separated the estates of the realm, to recruit into the service of his "indentured retinues" merchants, administrators and even clerics (Wycliffe was one of the army of men retained by John of Gaunt): groups who hitherto had been largely independent of the magnates' sway.

Capitalism, too, has undergone a "bastardization" of its classic forms, while yet retaining its fundamental social character. Within the business world, a remarkable movement of internal colonization has merged firm with firm, meshed banking and industry, and replaced the individual manufacturer by the corporate business leaders. With the disappearance of the individual entrepreneur, the sources of class privilege have been diversified, reposing now upon offices with access to corporate wealth quite as much as upon ownership itself. The free play of the market has been limited and circumscribed, yet business has moved into areas of national life which previously were barred to it, and taken into its service important social groups—the gentry, the professionals and the intellectuals—who formerly stood outside its orbit.

In Victorian England the characteristic firm was small, under-capitalized and vulnerable to the cyclical downturns of the economy. In an age of free competition and unincorporated enterprise the margin of success was narrow, security rare, and disasters a frequent occurrence (meteoric social descent was as constant a theme for Victorian novelists as upward nobility for contemporary writers). Staffordshire ironmaster or Lancashire millowner, the Victorian businessman was, typically, a small entrepreneur, owning no more than a single factory. Surrounded

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by numerous competitors, subject to the operation of blind market forces, he could neither control the price which his product commanded, nor influence the over-all direction of an industry in which his firm played a small and rather insignificant part.

Business, in Victorian England, was an estate apart, northern and provincial, separated by politics, religion and locality from the dominant elites. The businessman might be celebrated in his locality, but beyond the limits of his community his greatness went unrecognized, and the London center of social and political power escaped him altogether. The governing classes might pay him homage, praising his enterprise and removing the fetters upon his trade, but the actual conduct of government remained the preserve of the traditional elites—the gentry and the aristocracy, joined, towards the end of the nineteenth century, by the new professional upper middle classes.

TODAY THE FIRM has grown to be a mighty corporation, possessed of great reserves, and largely immune to the lesser fluctuations of the market. The scatter of small industrial units has been transformed into great business complexes, which obliterate the traditional lines dividing finance from industry and business from government. The Corporations are the "connections" of "bastard" capitalism, affording business leaders a range of genuine powers far beyond the reach of even the greatest Victorian captain of industry.

Britain's 500 leading firms employ between them one third of the nation's labor force, and account for half its capital investment. Unilever—a single firm covering multiple subsidiaries—employs as many workers as the engineering industry of the 1860s, and its advertising budget alone (£83m) is twice the amount spent by government on colonial development and welfare. Swollen in size where their predecessors were constricted, masterful where they were impotent, the modern corporations dominate their chosen spheres, claiming entire industries as their "franchise"—I.C.I. in chemicals, A.E.I. in electrical engineering —or, like Hedleys and Unilever, parcelling out the market in oligopolistic partition. Overmighty baronies, they respect none of the traditional demarcation lines, and reach out to engross every kind of commercial enterprise. A.E.I. make everything from nuclear power stations to Hotpoint washing machines; Mr. Clore supports his busines palatinate on Furness Shipbuilding and Bentley's Engineering, as well as by his more publicized "take-over" activities in building, property and shoes.

The boundaries between banking and industry have also broken down. The banks were formerly a separate estate within the business world, concentrating their activities on Empire, Land and Oversea Trade, and holding themselves aloof from manufacturing industry. Today they are everywhere, concerned with steel as much as oil, engineering and chemicals as well as shipping. The Merchant Banks, the Big Eight and the leading insurance houses are represented on the boards

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of almost all the major companies, and provide the chairman for half the fifty largest firms. Lord Kindersley takes time off from leading Lazards merchant bank to be Chairman of Rolls Royce and Governor of Royal Exchange Assurance. Lord Bicester combines his seat at the Court of the Bank of England with a directorship of A.E.I. The City, in fact, has become the hub of the business system, and interlocking directorships, multiple holdings and diversified investments now make up the pattern of the corporate business baronies.

External boundaries have gone the way of internal divisions. No line was more carefully drawn, in the age of *laissez-faire* capitalism, than that which separated business and government. Now they are overlapping in their spheres of action and intertwined in their interests. The new relationship is complex as well as close, and its balance has not always been the same. But in the fifties the edge of government control has been increasingly blunted, and it serves today rather to augment than to attenuate the power of corporate giants. Government action smooths the path of corporate expansion, eliminating the risks attending innovation and guaranteeing its profitability. Government money accounts for half the total cost of industry's scientific and technical research. Government subsidizes, in steel and aircraft, the major capital outlays; passes on, in atomic energy, the fruits of its own pioneering work; bales out, in coal and in cotton, capitalist interests which have ceased to prosper. Colvilles, the giant Scottish steel firm, receives a government loan of £50m for their new plant; Powell Duffryn evacuates the South Wales coalfield to find a new, and greater fortune, in oil.

Business now touches politics at critical points, and business leadership takes on an increasingly political character. The private boardrooms have become an annex to the Cabinet. If there is unemployment on Merseyside it is to Fords that the government must turn, and upon them that the location of industry will ultimately depend. When the coal industry is to be overhauled, it is the Chairman of I.C.I. who directs the reorganization, just as it is Lord Chandos who heads the government inquiry into subsidies for the new Cunard liners. There is, in fact, what Peter Shore has called a "vast twilight area" where government and industry mesh and interact, and where corporate influence is brought to bear on public policy quite as often as the other way round: as Sir Patrick Henessy, Chairman of Ford in Britain, declared when his negotiations with the government seemed likely to break down:

> I think everything will be all right, if only the government people behave themselves.

The business corporations, in fact, are the seat of great power. Indeed, so large have they grown, and so complex in organization, that sometimes, as in theories of the "managerial revolution," they are misleadingly compared to the great bureaucracies of the public service, and their power is said to be wielded by "faceless," hierarchically-graded

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managers. This concentration on the bureaucratic middle ignores the existence, at the top, of quite non-bureaucratic corporate élites: business leaders, drawn increasingly from the upper classes or assimilated to them, who exercise powers more extensive in range and political in character than those of the classical entrepreneur. They rule over imposing hierarchies, managing the managers and directing the directors; they straddle great industries and touch upon every interest in the business world. At the same time they act as politicians quite as often as businessmen, exerting pressures on government, serving on its committees, controlling its controllers. Company pluralists and industrial statesmen, they stand at the intersections of government and industry, business and politics. They are the "magnates" of the industrial baronies and business connections.

Business at the top

Prestige has followed power and business has been carried to the Top, enjoying, today, greater esteem than at any other time in English history.

In the nineeteenth century, new branches of business were often suspect and had to wait two or three generations before they acquired respectability. Today, however, they win immediate Establishment recognition. The "take-over" bid, the most revolutionary development in company finance since the war, has been accepted by even the most conservative City houses, and Hire purchase shares has now been bought up by the most respectable banking firms. A peer of the realm, Lord Luke, presides simultaneously over the Advertisers Association and the Packaging Institute. The designer of the Coronation Coat of Arms creates the Tate and Lyle "brand image," and lectures to packaging executives on "the personality of the pack," while a President of the Board of Trade compares the achievements of advertising to those of ecclesiastical art:

> Throughout history the Church has used artists to advertise religion: some of the greatest pictures of bygone centuries had been produced in this way . . . Commercial Television in the future would work in the same direction.

The businessman himself enjoys higher prestige than ever before. In Victorian England the risen man of business—condemned as "plutocrat" and "rich vulgarian"—could only gain *entree* into the traditional upper classes by distancing himself from the active commercial life. Today he is accepted for what he is, and indeed celebrated for his achievements. He no longer has to record public services to gain his knighthood or his peerage: it is enough that he has been successful in his trade. He is, in fact, rapidly becoming the favored hero of English society, a knight-errant whose exploits are chronicled in meticulous detail. His prowess is the favored subject of feature writers, and his personality becomes the inescapable subject of the gossip columns. Indeed, *The Observer,* finding that businessmen had crowded out its "Table Talk" column—they enjoyed a twenty-fold increase comparing

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1949 and 1959—were forced to start a new column (by "Mammon") to cope with the flood of boardroom "celebrities," while the *Sunday Times* opened the Sixties with "The Multi-Millionaires," a series (by the former principal of Bangor University College) which likened Mr. Onassis to Drake and to Ulysses ("his own life has been a kind of Odyssey into which the element of the fabulous enters almost as much as with Ulysses himself") and detailed the career of Mr. Charles Clore, the "take-over King," in a tone reserved, in the past, for the Empire Builder or the heroic explorer:

> "Find your opportunity and work hard," he has said. Film rights, ice rink, property deals, theatre management, gold mining shares, a highland estate, in these and in other deals Mr. Clore has acted as a pioneer, and perhaps the most polished exponent of the technique that has become familiar under the name of the "take-over" bid. Now with his new £6 million hotel in Park Lane . . . with its night club and restaurant overlooking Hyde Park from the top of a 25-storey building, he will have altered London's skyline . . . indeed it would seem reasonable to recognise him as one of those innovators and iconoclasts who are required, from time to time, in any society, if it is not to sink into stagnation.

One illustration of the new prestige of business is the changed pattern of the political career. In the past it was the failed politician who went into business—a "guinea-pig" directorship was a recognized compensation for the superfluous Cabinet Minister, affording him a life of relative indolence and considerable ease. Today, however, business has no place for the unsuccessful minister: Sir Thomas Dugdale is "kicked upstairs" to the House of Lords, after his failure at the Ministry of Agriculture; Sir Anthony Eden, after Suez, packed off on a Mediterranean cruise to write his *Memoirs*. It is the successful politician, the masterful men of power, who today "go on" from Whitehall and Westminster. Lord Monckton was the most successful Conservative minister when he resigned, Lord Chandos perhaps the strongest man in the Cabinet when he relinquished the Colonial Secretaryship. When they came to the City they did not find their power diminished. Their careers could never have been so comprehensive, nor their sway so ubiquitous, while enmeshed in the dreary routine of Committees and Debates which makes the "mere" politician seem almost provincial in comparison with the contemporary business leader.

Lord Chandos had no doubt about the importance of his new position. "If Britain is to succeed," he proclaimed, "then so must A.E.I." As Chairman of this £200 million industrial giant, he has found ample scope for the free play of his masterful personality: entering a price-cutting war with Callendar Cables, competing for a £40 million atomic power contract ("I like races," he declared, "that I am going to win"), making a victorious "take-over" bid for Elliott Automation, or reshaping the organization of Metro-Vickers and British Thompson Houston, A.E.I.'s mighty vassals. And there were the aggressive selling tours abroad—electric trains in South America, atomic stations in Canada, visiting Franco (accompanied by the Ambassador) one day, flying to

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Africa for banking talks on the next. Nor has his influence been confined to his corporate fief. Chairman of the Northern Ireland Development Council, a director of I.C.I. and Alliance Assurance, first President of the Manchester College of Science and Technology, Governor of Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, and of Churchill College, Cambridge (the new foundation for elite scientists), he touches the interests of businessmen great and small, and is in fact their premier statesman: Chairman of their Institute of Directors, leader of the 1959 campaign against nationalization, their spokesman on all those areas of life—including now culture and education—which fall increasingly within the range of corporate influence and business control.

Business and the upper classes

The career of Chandos is representative, for today the upper class man is most commonly seen in the "executive stance"; business, as well as providing the main source of privileged living, has now become the characteristic occupation of the upper classes.

It was not always so. Even when capitalism was at its apogee, business was not considered a fit occupation for the gentry. They inherited money, they bequeathed money and, traditionally, they married money, but they rarely engaged actively in business enterprise. The heir inherited the family estate, the younger son practiced at the Bar or entered the Church, the distant cousin worked in the Indian Civil Service. This code survived the collapse of land values in the 1870s. The rise of the larger company, both home and colonial, brought ample opportunity for absentee ownership and passive directorships, and for three generations upper class life came to depend on Burmah Oil and Kaffirs abroad, steel and shipbuilding at home.

The basis of *rentier* living, however, was debilitated in the twenties and thirties, and by 1945 it had collapsed. In postwar Britain business offered the only escape from the twin demons of inflation and taxation. Capital gains were more profitable than interim dividends, bond-washing more fruitful than absentee investment, and the panoply of corporate privileges the only means by which wealth could accumulate and privilege be secured. As the expense accounts grew longer, as the "fringe" benefits grew into the thick crop of company-financed privilege, the traditional upper classes were drawn, more and more, to enter active business life. With habitual adaptability to changed circumstances, they sacrificed the *rentiers*—leaving the retired governor to molder in the Surrey Hills and lament the decline of "independent means"—and shifted the basis of their wealth from shrinking Empire to the expanding companies of industry and finance. The Public Schoolboy deserted the older professions to become an energetic executive or bustling broker; the eminent administrator made a second career on the Company Board. Today, business draws its leadership from every section of the Establishment. General Templer returns from Malaya to a directorship of Royal Exchange Assurance; Lord Mancroft ex-

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changes a government Ministry for a position with Great Universal Stores; Commander Michael Parker, Personal Secretary to Prince Philip, leaves the Palace to become aide to Felix Fenston, the property millionaire.

BUSINESS, SINCE THE WAR, has grown steadily more aristocratic. The upper class settlement is most marked in banking and insurance—traditional enclaves of aristocratic influence, where, as the *Manchester School* study of ruling class "cousinhoods" shows, one-third of the directors of leading firms were educated at the six leading Public Schools.* But upper class influence has grown throughout the business world. G. H. Copeman's study of *The Directors* showed that 58% of 1,243 leading directors had received a Public School education (5% of them at Eton), and R. V. Clements *The Managers* showed a notable elite preponderance in the upper echelons of the managerial hierarchies even in so unfashionable an area as South Lancashire.

The Board of A.E.I. will serve to illustrate the marriage of business and the upper classes. Lord Chandos, its chairman, traces his ancestry to the fourteenth century (the first Chandos rose as a captain in the Hundred Years War); he was educated at Eton, married the daughter of the Tenth Duke of Leeds, and lives at Trafalgar House, the former seat of the Nelson family. Lord Weeks, before his recent retirement, was driven, like Lord Chandos, in one of the company's twin Rolls-Royce cars, and serves on the Board of Royal Exchange Assurance, Pilkington Brothers and the Public Schools Appointments Bureau. Lord Knollys (like Lord Chandos, his family fortunes originate with a Hundred Years War Captain), is chairman of Vickers and a director of Barclays Bank as well as three insurance houses; in his boyhood he was Page of Honor to both Edward VII and George V; Lord Bicester (Eton and Sandhurst; High Sheriff, County of Oxford), is Managing Director of Morgan Grenfell, the leading merchant bank, and a director of the Bank of England, as well as serving on the boards of both Vickers and A.E.I.

The traditional ruling class has, in fact, made as decisive a revival as business itself by taking up the active commercial career. The change is mirrored in the Public Schools. In the past their purpose was to fit the upper-class cadet to "serve God in Church and State." Of Winchester School leavers in the 1840s only 6% went into business, 34% into the Church. Since the war, however, the attractions of business have multiplied and all the old professions—with the predictable

* The "Public Schools" are fee-paying private schools. They have no real equivalent in the United States. Schools like Choate and Groton are, I believe, confined to a narrow segment of the Eastern upper middle classes whereas in England, from their reform in the mid-nineteenth century, the Public Schools have been the organizing center of the upper class style of life, transmitting upper class codes from one generation to the next, and acting as the principal agent in the acculturation of parvenus. They are attended by the entire upper, upper-middle, and lower-upper-middle classes, as well as by a large proportion of the ordinary middle classes. 72 of the 366 Conservative M.P.s were educated at Eton alone.

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exception of accountancy—have suffered a steep decline in Public School entrants. The executive suite is replacing the mitre, the sceptre and the sword as the magnet of upper-class aspiration, and business recruitment from the public school increases year by year: from 38% of all leaders in 1951 to 51% in 1956.

The corporations grow ever more ardent in their courtship: personal visits, a flow of literature, the provision of "transfer" scholarships and attractive training schemes—all are brought to bear on the Public School leaver, and their persuasiveness is increased by the direct role industry has now assumed in maintaining the Schools. More and more of the larger companies, following Rolls Royce's endowment of 500 Public School places in 1956, are financing the privileged education of the children of their managers and directors; and ninety of the largest corporations have set up the Industrial Fund for Scientific Education whose disbursements, *confined to the Public Schools,* equip them for the tasks business now demands. The I.C.I. Science Block at Eton stands as symbol for the consummated alliance of business and class.

If business now subsidizes élite education, it is not so that Public School leavers shall find their place in the Small Back Rooms of the New Technology—any more than the predominantly Classical education of a previous upper class generation was designed to produce compilers of Greek Lexicons and Latin Glossaries—but rather to fit them for the industrial leadership of a new type. For business, so powerful in scope, and political in character, is calling for the qualities a Public School training is designed to ensure: a Whig sense of élite mission, a Tory urge to personal command: "the Prefect and the Rugger captain," for Lord Chandos, "Colts who will be thoroughbreds" according to the Vice-Chairman of the British Institute of Management, when he called for a "better breed of recruits" to bear the "Management Burden":

> The burden of high office is no new conception. "Uneasy lies the head that wears a Crown" is a thought expressed by Shakespeare. Machiavelli wrote of the problem of princes as they appeared to him in relation to sixteenth-century Italy. So today there is the burden of management. . . . The manager must have a sublimated tenacity of purpose. An intensity of conviction accompanied by serene self-confidence . . . Such serenity is evidence of managerial greatness.

Thus the corporations assume an authority that was formerly the prerogative of the great national institutions, and their close link with the Public Schools ensures that the "confident assumption of effortless superiority"—attached in the past to rulers and dignitaries—is now carried over to support the ambitious pretensions of a business society.

Business and the Intellectuals

Business has recruited the service of the professionals and intellectuals at the same time as it has placed the upper classes in its command positions. The businessman has become a formidable presence in the lives of intellectuals. The graduate seeks his employment,

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the artist his patronage, the architect his contracts. The leader of the legal profession departs for the Board of Shell, the giant oil combine; the noted industrial correspondent writes copy for steel industry advertisements; the Principal of an Arts College judges the "Label of the Year" competition sponsored by the Society of Labelogists.

It is the most remarkable of the recent business conquests. For in the past, the intellectual was perhaps more distant from business than any other section of the population. Behind the anti-industrialism of Carlyle and Ruskin, or Matthew Arnold's contempt for bourgeois philistinism, was the firm tradition of the independency of the man of letters. And business, its leadership self-recruiting (from shop-floor or family dynasty) did not have occasion to demand his services: as late as the thirties it was virtually impossible for the intellectual to enter business, even had he wished to do so.

Since the war, however, both the attraction and the possibilities of business employment have dramatically increased, while the old professions have lost their attractions. Teaching has suffered a downgrading in status; the clergy are underpaid and the crisis at the Bar is the subject of prolonged controversy in the correspondence columns of *The Times.* Simultaneously business leaders have made strenuous efforts to attract university graduates, some to seek out technologists, like Lord Chandos who believes that "the young engineering graduate is today the most valuable commodity in the world—except perhaps a bar of gold"; others who are equally anxious to employ the arts graduate, like the Director of Shell who recently declared, "We like to take boys who have learnt Greek. We find they sell more oil."

The student finds the business offers are the most favorable he receives—and he receives them more often than any others. He may, of course, already be on one of industry's "sandwich courses"—whose number has multiplied five times in the last four years—but if not, he will be found in his first year lectures tentatively pencilling rings in the "Appointments" column of *The Economist* or *The Guardian,* introduced, in his second, to businessmen scouring their old College in search of recruits, and finding, as his last year draws to its close, that the P.R.O.'s await him with their strenuous persuasion and "personal messages."

"Worried about the future, Harry? Right now things are fine. A vintage car, a pretty girl with plenty of push. But at the end of the road there are cold, harsh realities of the future to be faced . . . if he is wise he will consider very carefully a career in plastics, especially with such go-ahead firms as B.I.P. Chemicals."

The English graduate starts life as a Sales Consultant before moving on into Public Relations. The Chairman of the University Labor Club becomes Industrial Relations Officer in a North-Eastern factory before stepping up into Personnel Management for a Home Counties firm. The economist disappears into the middle positions of the executive "team," graduating from Brand Manager or Chief Buyer, in charge

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of Sales Promotion or Carton Design, to become what the Hedley's career advertisement calls a "Bachelor of Industry."

It is not only those who become employees of industry who are affected. The older professions themselves are drawn more and more into the businessman's service. The accountant looks after the businessman's expense account living; the solicitor finds his company formations and property deals take up more time than litigation itself; the architect plans his showrooms and his prestige offices or works as consultant on one of his property companies. The artist may already work for him—styling his products, designing his advertising, his exhibition "stands," his "house" magazine; if not he will find that business has now become the principal patron of the arts, and its support more and more inescapable. At the same time advertising and packaging busily seek to raise their status from "trades" to "professions." In advertising there is the Advertisers Association and the Incorporated Society of Practitioners in Advertising. In packaging there is a Packaging Institute, a Packaging Centre, a Packaging Club and six packaging journals (including the *Journal of the Institute of Packaging*). The ambitious packaging man can even become an M. Inst. Pkg.

Even university staff are not untouched. Sociologists act as advisers to market research companies; historians are commissioned to write official histories of the major firms; economists act as consultants to investment houses and Unit Trusts. A professor of economics sits on the Board of the *Financial Times,* a lecturer takes charge of the Manchester branch of a stockbroking firm; the former Principal of a London College is a governor of Ashridge, the £175-a-month college for executive cadets. They are still isolated figures, and the Universities are far from taking after the American academic pattern where some colleges appear, at times, to be almost extra-mural departments for the big corporations, but the trend is in that direction.

Intellectuals come increasingly to accept what can no longer be avoided. The Royal College of Arts respectfully hears Lord Chandos call for more business patronage, if the arts are to survive "in this age of the common man and the sometimes even commoner woman." Royal Academician, James Fitton, pleases *The Director* by telling an assembled business audience that "the artist and the businessman had one essential gift in common—that of organization," and the Art Critic of the *Guardian* defends salesmanship from its detractors:

> Today salesmanship is almost a dirty word. Yet if Fra Angelico could sell Christianity, and Watteau could sell aristocracy . . . the difference is only one of degree.

Thus business makes a profession of the trades and a trade of the professions, a commerce of culture and a culture of commerce, and the intellectual becomes like the characteristic "retainer" of "bastard" capitalism indentured in the retinues of the business corporation.

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The business values

Business is thus no longer contained by a culture hostile, in certain respects, to the commercial spirit; some traditional resistances have disappeared, and there have been none to take their place. Nor is the business influence confined to those—in the upper and middle classes—who minister to its immediate needs. It has become, through salesmanship, pervasive in the society as a whole. In pursuit of the consumer, business seeks to associate with its products the qualities of the good life and is concerned, more and more, with the motivation of the individual, shaping his ambitions, defining his aspirations, and touching him in areas of life that previously were thought of as private. And this can be more easily accomplished because, with the introduction of Commercial Television, business now rejoices in a "captive audience," "relaxed" and "receptive," who receive the salesman's message in what A.B.C. Television terms "The Right Frame of Mind."

Salesmanship is often seen as standing rather apart from the mainstream of the business economy, a product of the "mass society" rather than of contemporary capitalism. In fact it is as representative of "bastard" capitalism as was coal and cotton for *laissez-faire,* or Empire-building for the capitalism of the turn of the Century. The industries of salesmanship have been the "growth" industries of the fifties, holding the inside track in the Conservative "dash for freedom." Packaging has corporate giants like Reed's and Metal Box at its heart, and in advertising it is the largest firms who are responsible for the higher irrationalities of salesmanship: Unilever's who proclaim their product "Whiter than White," Cortaulds who seek to persuade that "with Bri-Lon a new sweetness entered your life: a touch soft as a whispered confidence, gentle as butterfly kisses."

Salesmanship is not only the characteristic industry of "bastard" capitalism, it also popularizes its characteristic ethos, serving, in part, the function performed for Victorian capitalism by the Self-Help manual and the Methodist sermon. The images of advertising, in fact, reflect rather clearly the change that has taken place in our society since the war. Snobbery, excluded from public rhetoric in post-war Britain, has made a powerful return through the media of persuasion, where it is crossed with "status" anxieties, competitive striving and market promotion.

BUT IF THE BUSINESS influence has come, through salesmanship, to be greater than in the past, penetrating every home in the land, it is an influence of a different kind. For the business values, too, have been "bastardized." Nineteenth century bourgeois values, formed in opposition to the Anglican-gentry ethos of the governing classes, were individualist in emphasis and, at least in the first half of the century, anti-aristocratic in bias. Contemporary business, in contrast, has been stripped of its Nonconformist garb and has discarded the Puritan sobrieties in favor of newer styles of luxury which, increasingly, are built into the way of life of the firm. It destroys the individualism which

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previously it proclaimed, debasing it to the process of "getting on" and "going places," in which the quest for individual self-sufficiency gives way to the status anxieties of the managerial "staff" and "line," and the borrowed prestige, the personality projected, the taste successfully displayed, gain in importance over the more explicit standards of the past. The anti-aristocratic ethos, too, has disappeared. Business now appropriates the style of the traditional upper classes, and exploits their pretensions in the service of its sales. It combines the counterfeit egalitarianism of the Conservative "opportunity" state with the commercialization of deference, a combination which, through the success symbols of advertising is given currency in the society as a whole.

Of course people are not as the advertisers would like them to be, ridden by anxiety and driven by snobbery. Few people live in constant anxiety that their neighbors are outpacing them. Nevertheless the pressures are there. Impersonal objects gain in importance over personal qualities: for the New Town housewife, sitting alone among her new furnishings while her husband works the overtime that pays for their purchase; and for the Metropolitan intellectual who has come to identify the "cultured life" with the artifacts of gracious living. "Getting ahead" for most people means something more moral than submitting to the personality market—mastering a craft or learning a trade. But though there may be relatively few who willingly sacrifice their individuality for the newer styles of advancement, a distressingly high proportion of the new "opportunities" go to those who do, and it is they who set the pace for the rest of society.

Many others, immune to such direct persuasions, are powerfully affected in other ways by living in what is increasingly a "business society." Those working class people, for example, who in the October election accepted the Conservative's market definition of social responsibility—"spending the taxpayer's money"—and who cast a "deference vote" for the Conservatives because "they've got the money," "they're born to rule." "Deference voters" are a minority of working class people, just as the status anxious, "other-directed" are a minority of mainly middle class people. But their views illustrate the ways in which capitalism now secures its hold because, like the *status quo,* it is *there,* confidently established at the heart of the nation, generating acceptance of the business view of the nation's life: as a Stevenage engineer put it:

> The Conservatives do represent big business, and I think that makes them the more efficient party. Running the country, after all, is just the biggest business of them all.

A society self-divided

Business and class are not, of course, the only forces at work in Britain today. Much of our way of life is formed by quite different, frequently opposing principles. The welfare services stand in permanent rebuke to the spirit of capitalism, however inadequate they

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may at times appear. Many of our institutions have been steadily emancipated from the claims of oligarchy and privilege, even if they have not yet escaped the influence of the traditional governing classes. And beyond the formal freedoms and organizations of a democracy, there is the play of common decency: a general regard for the liberty of the individual that has been so thoroughly assimilated into the way of life that sometimes—in the urgency of protest—we forget that it exists. There are profound unities in the country, and though they may have been seen, latterly, at their least productive—blunting the edge of radical reform, muffling the voice of protest—they were responsible, in the past, for the spirit and the resistance of 1940, the mood of hope and aspiration in 1945, and the upsurge of genuine classlessness which accompanied it. To focus on business and class is not to ignore these strengths, nor to deny the extent of post-war change. It is to recognize that the growth of business—the values it purveys, the class it sustains, the priorities it once more decides—has been the most powerful trend of the fifties.

Britain may be a humane society, noted for its social cohesion; yet it is at the same time one of the most class-bound in the world. A country jealous of its traditions, its reticence, its stubborn common sense, which is yet given over more and more to the pressures of business and the persuasions of salesmanship. A democracy which yet allows many of the crucial decisions affecting its future to be made with scant reference to people, parliament and government.

The decade in which the Conservative Party has proclaimed the achievement of "one nation," and Labor theorists heralded the arrival of the "post-capitalist society," has seen a widening of the divisions between the "voiceless poor" and the powerful rich, the managers and the managed, Public Schools and Secondary Moderns. Behind the rhetoric of the Opportunity State, new inequalities are generated and old ones revived: there are two nations at work, two nations at school, two nations in old age. "Status" anxieties on the American model have been joined to the traditional divisions of the English class system, giving to society a tone more stridently snobbish and vulgarly commercial than would have seemed possible in 1945. The numbers of opportunities may have multiplied, but the scope of individual achievement is more and more distorted by the supremacy of commercial standards, and independence cramped by the sway of the corporate bureaucracies. Business, its power reinforced, its prestige enhanced, its privileges extended, encroaches increasingly on the life of the nation. It may have been tamed in important directions, but in others its power has rather been extended, shaping the character of the nation's future and coloring the quality of its life. Britain, at the beginning of the sixties, is a society divided against itself: a democratic society which yet has been unable to create for itself a genuinely democratic way of life.

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POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES

H. Brand

One fourth of the American people is poor or lives at the margin of poverty. The poverty from which they suffer is not a "case" problem, amenable to solution by social work, nor does it occur merely in "pockets" which can be eliminated by governmental action. Poverty in the United States remains a general social problem, a consequence of the way our economy operates. For poverty to be eradicated, the structure of the economy would have to be substantially modified; and part of the economic surplus now disposed of for private ends that are often socially undesirable, or for public purposes which frequently subserve those private ends, would have to be redirected.

Poverty in the U.S. is closely linked to two basic institutional factors. One is the unequal distribution of income; the other, the instability of an economy based on private property.

I

Conceivably, the distribution of income could be unequal without there being any poverty; the 20% of all spending units who received only 5.1% of after-tax income in 1957 need not in theory have been poor, although in fact they were. The social welfare and insurance schemes which have been created over the past two decades have mitigated the extremes of income insecurity among the aged and the short-term unemployed. Theoretically, their coverage could be extended and benefits raised so as to banish poverty altogether. But this is an academic proposition which ignores the social context in which these schemes exist, and the insurance principle on which

TABLE I

Distribution of Family Personal Incomes After Federal Income Taxes Among Quintiles of Consumer Units, 1950 and 1958[1]

Quintile of Consumer Units, Ranked by Income	Percent Distribution of Family Personal After-Tax Income	
	1950	*1958*
Lowest	5.1%	5.0%
2nd	11.4	11.6
3rd	16.8	16.9
4th	22.7	22.8
Highest	44.0	43.7
Top 5%	(19.2)	(18.2)
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

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benefits are based. The insurance principle is in itself "neutral" with respect to the distribution of income—which is to say, it helps perpetuate it.

The shape of the pyramid of income distribution in America has barely changed during the postwar period (see Table I), although that pyramid has moved to higher ground (see Table II).

TABLE II

Average Personal Family Income, After Federal Taxes, by Quintiles of Consumer Units, 1950 and 1958
(In Current Dollars)

Quintile of Consumer Unit, Ranked by Income	Average Personal Family Income, After Federal Taxes 1950	1958	Increase, 1950-58, in $	Increase, 1950-58, in %
Lowest	$ 1,040	$ 1,413	$ 373	36%
2nd	2,329	3,287	958	41
3rd	3,416	4,758	1,342	39
4th	4,614	6,436	1,822	39
Highest	8,946	12,353	3,407	38
Top 5%	(15,634)	(20,582)	(4,984)	32
Average	**$ 4,069**	**$ 5,650**	**$1,581**	**39%**

A glance at Table I shows that a change in income shares occurred only for the top 5% of income recipients over the postwar period. (The figures could be carried back to 1947 or forward to 1959 without showing any important deviation from the data presented.) The contraction in the share of this bracket can probably be ascribed to a shift in importance in the form of its income, from salaries, interest or dividends, to capital gains. These, when realized (i.e., through the sale of an appreciated stock), are taxed at a much lower rate than other kinds of income, and are not reported as part of personal income in the Department of Commerce statistics here used.

The disparity of income between the upper and the lower income groups is probably much larger than is revealed by the table. Incomes in kind of high-income recipients are inadequately or not at all enumerated, most notably tax-exempt expense accounts.

Looking at the absolute dollar increases in the fourth column of Table II, we note that, while the *average* rise in family income was $1,581, the lowest group's income rose by less than one-fourth of that amount, and that the gains of 60% of all U.S. consumer units were below that average. On the other hand, the gain of the top 20% exceeded the average by 119%, and that of the top 5% by 264%. Like all statistics, the statistics of income distribution have limited illustrative value. They say nothing, for example, about the distribution of wealth; or about the degree and kind and social value of the effort necessary to earn a given income; or about the number of persons contributing to family incomes. Let us go into some of these matters a bit.

The average number of earners per family in the three middle fifths of income recipients rose from 1.45 in 1948 to 1.54 in 1957.[2] According to Census estimates (in which incomes are tabulated on a somewhat

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different basis from the one used by the Department of Commerce's Office of Business Economics; but this does not affect the present argument), the median income of all families in 1958 was $5,100. However, the median income of that near one-half of all U.S. families having but one earner ran to only $4,670, while it took two earners for median family income to amount to $5,880, and three or more for income to reach $7,200.[3]

The postwar expansion of family incomes has to a large extent been made possible by the entry of wives into the labor force: 30% of all wives (with husbands present) were gainfully employed in 1957, as against only 15% in 1940.[4]

Living standards cannot be analyzed without some reference to the effort necessary to attain and maintain them. "Consider a family," writes Lloyd Reynolds of Yale University, "in which the husband's income alone is insufficient to support the family at minimum level. The wife therefore works, though unwillingly, and her earnings are sufficient to bring total family income above the poverty line. . . . In business and professional families, the wife frequently prefers to continue working as a 'career woman.' It seems likely, however, that in working-class families the majority of working wives work out of necessity. What weight should be given this factor? If one says that the family just described is not impoverished, that its living standard is adequate, this amounts to saying that the wife *should* work as well as the husband in order to support the family. This assertion involves a value judgment which is certainly debatable."[5]

The average work week in the U.S. has declined from around 60 hours in 1890 to about 40 at present. Granted that conditions of work have changed fundamentally, many American families still must put in a 60-hour work week to live adequately, if wives' working hours are added to husbands'. (Travel time is, of course, not included in the work week, though it should be. It has risen substantially since 1890.)

THE DIFFERENTIAL between before- and after-tax income has only a minimal effect on income distribution. In 1958, for example, the income share of the top 20% of recipients was reduced from 45.5% to 43.7% owing to Federal tax liability. The after-tax share of the lowest quintile was raised by only three-tenths of 1%, and that of the other quintiles by about four-tenths of 1% from the before-tax figure.[6] Furthermore, the impact of *all* taxes taken together on incomes is actually greater for low-income than for higher-income recipients: *28.3% of the family income under $2,000 is paid out to Federal, State and local governments, while families earning five-seven times as much surrender only 24% of their incomes to public authorities.*[7] That the U.S. tax system has become less and less progressive and that it places an increasingly inequitable burden on lower income groups is shown in

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an excellent article by Robert Lampman in the September 1959 *Commentary,* to which the interested reader is referred.

"Government policy aimed at moderating economic inequality seems merely to have prevented a fall in the share of the relatively poor," cautiously states a recent study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of Congress.[8] Government policy has resulted in major redistributive movements *among* the lower income groups rather than *between* the higher and lower ones. Thus, transfer payments are mainly derived nowadays from social insurance funds. Payouts from these funds have tripled since 1949, and run to about $16 billion a year at present.[9] The Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) portion of social insurance, being financed to the extent of 50% from contributions levied on the first $4,800 of earnings, falls most heavily on the lower wage and salary earners. Unemployment insurance, another type of transfer payment, is in many states partially borne by the insured workers, while the employers' premium is defrayed through charges against labor costs.

It is true, the passing on by employers of their share of social insurance costs means that redistribution takes place, but such passing-on has the effect of a regressive tax. Social insurance is, of course, vastly preferable to public assistance; still, it must be noted that the transfer of funds effected through it occurs chiefly between the pockets of the same pair of pants.

WHILE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE here to examine in detail the institutional roots of the unequal distribution of income, we shall briefly deal with one of them: the extreme concentration of personal and corporate wealth in the U.S.

According to a recent study by Robert Lampman,[10] 1% of U.S. adults (persons over 20 years old) held 26% of the tangible wealth in 1958 (stocks, bonds, mortgages and real estate, etc.). A very long-run tendency towards the equalization of wealth appears to operate: thus in 1922, the top 1% held roughly 32% of U.S. wealth. According to Lampman there has, however, been an upward movement in the amount of wealth holdings by the top 1% since 1949. Furthermore, there has been no abatement in the concentration of stock ownership which, from the point of view of the economic weight of financial assets, represents the most important form of wealth in the U.S. today. The top 1% of adults owned close to 76% of the value of corporate stock in 1953, as against 62% in 1922.

About 75% of income from dividends went to the 13% of consumer units with incomes of $10,000 or more in 1957. Furthermore, while there are about 900,000 incorporated firms in the U.S., whose net profits ran to some $23 billion in 1956, over one-third of these profits, or $8.3 billion, went to only 100 corporations.[11]

The concentration of wealth, in addition to its untoward social

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and political effects, of necessity exacerbates the inequality of the distribution of income.

II

Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of poverty, a criterion of income adequacy must be formulated. The basic official standard of income adequacy still is the Bureau of Labor Statistics' "City Worker's Family Budget," last priced in October 1951. Although no longer representative of today's cost pressures on actual family budgets, it must still serve public and private welfare agencies as a basic reference, and will serve as such here.[12]

The BLS budget was first devised in 1946 and 1947. It was based on a prewar pattern of living—this is the major weakness in its use today—but, of course, it took account of postwar family living costs. It was not supposed to be a "subsistence" or "maintenance" level budget. Rather, it was meant to represent "the necessary minimum" defined in terms both of scientific (or experts') desiderata of adequate nutrition, clothing and housing standards, and of community standards prevailing in the prewar period.[13] "The necessary minimum was not conceived as the point below which people were considered poor. Rather, it was . . . the point where the struggle for 'more and more' things gives way to the desire for 'better and better' quality. . . . Below this level . . . people find it harder and harder to economize," i.e., they become progressively less able to spare money since there are fewer cheaper goods among which they can choose.[14]

The BLS's urban worker family consists of an employed father, a housewife not gainfully employed, and two children under 15 but over 8 years old. In October 1951, such a family's annual cost of living on a "modest but adequate" scale, averaged (by this writer) for 34 cities, ran to $4,163. This sum included allowances for income tax, social security contributions, a small life insurance, and meals eaten out by the breadwinner. The budget made no provisions for savings, health insurance, a telephone, or the operation of a car.

Between 1951 and 1958, the cost of living rose by about 11%, so that in the latter year an income of roughly $4,600 was needed to cover the modest expenditures budgeted by BLS.*

* Since this article went to press, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has published a revised City Worker's Family Budget (see *Monthly Labor Review*, August 1960, p. 785 ff.). This budget takes postwar living standards more or less fully into account. However, it is regarded by its authors as "below the average level enjoyed by American families," although sufficient to "maintain a level of adequate living according to standards prevailing in large cities of the U.S. in recent years" (p. 786). The annual cost of the budget averages roughly $6,000, ranging from a low of $5,400 in Houston to a high of $6,600 in Seattle.

The revision of the City Worker's Family Budget and the higher income it calls for do not, of course, affect the writer's methodological approach in determining the extent of poverty in the U.S. But the estimates of income inadequacy presented in this article must, in the light of the revision, be considered as very conservative.. The extent to which persons and families are excluded from "enjoying the average level" of American living standards is substantially greater than indicated by the writer's compilations.

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In 1958, the mean size of consumer units in the lower two-fifths of all income brackets came to about 3.44 persons. On the basis of the BLS budget, a consumer unit of that size requires an income of $4,000. In 1958, there were around 11.9 million families, numbering some 40.7 million persons, whose incomes fell below $4,000. Furthermore, assuming that $2,000 (i.e., earnings at $1 an hour, the present Federal minimum wage, for 40 hours a week, 50 weeks a year) provide a "moderate but adequate" living for an unattached individual, we must add about 4 million persons who received less than that amount in 1958. Close to 45 million persons, then, or about 26% of the U.S. population, have incomes failing to meet basic needs.

A somewhat more refined approach to estimating the extent of poverty yields substantially the same results. Using Census data of money income in 1958, we shall assume that $3,000 covers the subsistence needs of a family of four. Census income data does not reflect (as do Office of Business Economics figures) some types of non-money incomes, such as the imputable net rent from a home partly or wholly owned. Still, the $3,000 subsistence income postulated here is substantially below the BLS standard, although well ahead of what many public and private agencies consider as needed for subsistence.[15] In order to arrive at the minimum needs of units with more or fewer than four persons, multipliers implicit in estimates of consumer needs by family size made by BLS 12 years ago have been used.[16]

TABLE III

Number of Persons and Percent of Consumer Units With Incomes Below the Indicated Minimum, 1958[17]

Size of Consumer Unit	Percent of All Consumer Units In Size Group	Number of Persons Receiving Less Than Specified Minimum Income	
		In Thous.	$
1 person	50.3%	5,408	$1,500
2 persons	23.6	6,725	2,000
3 "	16.2	4,658	2,500
4 "	14.7	5,328	3,000
5 "	19.2	5,524	3,500
6 "	29.5	5,122	4,000
7 " and more	49.6	9,420	4,500
Total		**42,184**	

According to Table III, in 1958, 42.2 million persons, or close to 25% of the noninstitutional population of the U.S., had incomes falling not only below official standards of adequacy but below our arbitrarily set minimum standards as well.[18] (Naturally, the lower the standards are set, the lower the number of persons who are considered poor, and vice versa. Robert Lampman, in the study on the low-income population sponsored by the Joint Economic Committee referred to above, sets a minimum income of $2,500 and, on that basis, estimates that there are 32.2 million poor in the U.S. (See reference note 8.)

Perhaps not all of the 42.2 million persons receiving less than the minimum income postulated in the table above should be considered

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poor. For example, there were about 2.3 million families in 1958 headed by persons under 25 and averaging three members. Roughly half of these families were reported to live on incomes below $3,000.[19] Some of the heads of these families may, however, have been professionals in trainee or graduate status, obtaining financial support—not enumerated as income—from relatives, or just willing to make do temporarily. But, on the other hand, lack of experience and of seniority rights make young workers the first victims of layoffs. The unemployment rate of the civilian labor force in the male 20-24-year-old bracket early in 1959 exceeded 12%, and was close to 10% during the first quarter of this year. (Both rates were about twice the average unemployment rate for the periods indicated.)[20] Lack of a steady income and of definite occupational perspectives among young people, and the increasing slowness with which they are integrated into the labor force, certainly is an aspect of poverty peculiar to them.

There may be other reasons why the statistics of low-income status overstate poverty. Some persons with low incomes may own assets from which they derive a modest revenue or on which they can draw in case of need. On the whole, however, it seems doubtful, especially in view of the independent estimates cited, whether these and similar qualifications would, were they statistically ascertainable, seriously affect the magnitudes recorded in Table III.

Indeed, we shall find that our definition of poverty simply in terms of a subsistence income is inadequate. There are broad social strata which are permanently poor; but, for reasons to be discussed, the number of persons belonging to these strata is probably slowly shrinking; i.e., their incomes are gradually approaching subsistence levels. On the other hand, the *status* of poverty cannot be assigned to large and growing numbers of people whose incomes and assets are contracting, even while they may still be well above subsistence needs; or whose income security is increasingly impaired. We are referring to persons made jobless, or threatened by joblessness, because of technological and other structural changes in the economy, or because of cyclical fluctuations. They all face imminent poverty, particularly in cases where unemployment is prolonged. Furthermore, there are large groups of wage earners in certain semi-skilled and unskilled occupations whose incomes tend to be close to subsistence levels.

The table above reflects poverty as a *status;* it says nothing about the systematic tendencies toward poverty just mentioned. To discuss them, we shall have to refer to different sets of data.

III

Of the 42.2 million poor represented in Table III, roughly half are heads of households; the other half are dependents. Of these, a very large portion, numbering about 11 million, are children. About two-thirds of these children are members of big families living in rural areas; and many of them are Negroes. "Millions of children are eco-

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nomically disadvantaged," says the U.S. Children's Bureau,[21] "not only because of the low income of their families but also because of the economic situation of the states in which they reside"—meaning in the main that they lack proper educational facilities. The unequal distribution of income among regions and states is thus a major factor in the perpetuation of poverty in the U.S. This inequality is largely caused by past and present investment policies of private industry, coupled with the inadequacy of public policies for spurring more productive employment of resources in low-income regions. (The investment policies referred to have been and are, of course, subject to the dictates of a relatively free-market economy. It is characteristic of a free-market economy that it breeds the virtuous circle of growth in some favored regions and the vicious circle of stagnation and decline in unfavored ones. (For a most competent exposition of this point see Gunnar Myrdal's *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions,* London, 1957.)

Per capita income in the Southeast was about $1,000 below that of the Atlantic states in 1958. Increases in incomes in the prosperous mid-fifties were far smaller in the Southeast and some other areas than elsewhere. Industrialization *has* taken place in the South; incomes there *have* risen; in fact, the South's successful competition for industry has had damaging effects on the economies of other areas of the country, and has led Southern Congressmen to oppose distressed area assistance schemes for fear that these would keep industries from moving south. Nevertheless, as of 1958, the unequal *pattern* of regional income distribution had not changed. Per capita income in the southeastern states rose by $240 between 1951 and 1958, while that of New England, for example, increased by $355. The per capita income of the State of New York was over $500 above the national average of $2,057 in 1958.[22]

GENERALLY, THE CHIEF VICTIMS of regional income inequalities are either farming people or unskilled workers. Their low-income status is closely associated with relatively low educational attainment—they often have less than 8 years of elementary school. Will the gradual uptrend in educational attainment (of which there is no doubt) eliminate unskilled jobs as an occupational category? Probably not. But is that uptrend, by itself, a factor tending to raise family incomes? Yes, probably. Even for today's unskilled jobs, a more prolonged formal education seems necessary than for yesterday's. Generally speaking, rising educational standards, insofar as they accord with the requirements set by the institutional environment, tend to raise productivity, and hence incomes. (It is an open question whether educational standards *should* always accord with social rather than with human needs. But it is not an open question whether the incomes of the poor should be raised. Therefore, at certain levels, educational standards should be set primarily with a view to improving the social position of the underprivileged and the poor.)

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Perhaps one-fifth of the poor in the U.S. are Negroes, who represent but one-tenth of the total population. This, of course, unfavorably affects the conditions of all Negroes, and aggravates the indignities they suffer. However, poverty cannot be viewed as an ethnic problem, much as it may be the problem of ethnic minorities.

Low agricultural income continues to mark many areas of the country, but especially the South. Government programs have subsidized farm prices rather than farm incomes and this has sharpened the inequality of agricultural incomes by favoring the big operators. Farm income is distributed even more lopsidedly than nonfarm income: In 1958, 7% of all farm families received more than one-quarter of farm income, while one-quarter of all families received less than 7% of such income.[23] The median income of all rural families was $2,747 in 1958; in the South it was $2,055, and for rural Negro families it was $1,089, less than half the nationwide average.[24]

Migration to other regions has not materially affected rural poverty in the South.[25] But it has posed serious social and economic problems for the receiving areas. Local industrialization, which would be a basic solution for rural poverty, has lagged, in large measure because ". . . the typical socio-political dominance of a few large farmers interested in preserving a plentiful and cheap farm labor supply . . . frequently deters local program leaders [of the Department of Agriculture's Rural Development Program—H. B.] from openly recommending outmigration or even local industrialization."[26]

The transfer of low-income individuals to presumably more productive occupations and regions, occurring as it does under generally chaotic conditions, does not necessarily reduce or eliminate the social costs of poverty, but often simply shifts their incidence. "Existing educational systems, social groupings and economic structures have been disrupted by the rapid influx of migrants into urban areas . . . (The) rapid replacement of the old population in central cities by migrant nonwhites whose economic status is low [adds] considerably to the difficult adjustment problems already mounting in urban areas. . . . A recent Michigan study reported that, although persons born in the South make up only 9.5% of the State's population, they account for 31% of the prison commitments. . . . The rate for whites born in the South is more than twice the rate for whites born in Michigan."[27]

The surge of Negro and Puerto Rican migration into Northern cities during the fifties is quite comparable, except in magnitude to the waves of foreign immigration into the U.S. prior to the twenties. However, the economic bases of migration have changed radically: the foreign immigrant waves coincided with the growth of mass production techniques involving "minute subdivision of operations and a wide adoption of automatic machines worked by unskilled and often illiterate men, women and children."[28] The Report of the Immigration Commission of the 61st Congress (1911), quoted by the authority just cited, states that in bituminous coal mining, "Southern and Eastern

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Europeans are confined to pick mining and the unskilled and common labor jobs. The same situation exists in iron and steel and glass (and textile) manufacturing, and in all divisions of manufacturing enterprise."[29] The Irish immigrants of the mid-19th century faced an analogous situation (in the New England textile industry) and discrimination against them was in some respects strikingly similar to that which exists today against urban Negroes and Puerto Ricans.

The economic base of the most recent migrants is in large measure in trade, the service industries and in light manufacturing. Productivity in these industries tends, in general, to be low and, except in public and private administration (from which the new migrants are, because of inadequate education and racial discrimination, largely excluded), is rising but slowly. Incomes in trade and the services therefore are relatively low. Advancement opportunities are limited, partly because of the small-firm structure of these sectors, partly because of prejudice.

While an ethnic minority can improve its lot by acquiring more and better education and skills, this does not in itself affect the occupational structure of society as a whole. Lowly-paid jobs exist independent of discrimination and inability to compete on equal terms. And indeed, according to a recent study by Oscar Handlin, earnings differentials for given jobs between Negroes and Puerto Ricans on the one hand, and non-Puerto Rican whites on the other, have been diminishing. Income disparities exist because of the fact that "Negroes and Puerto Ricans were clustered in the least rewarding occupations."[30]

Thus, an analysis of the occupational structure of American society is necessary to explain low-wage incomes. We shall return to this subject again briefly in Part VI.

IV

There are two other large groups whose poverty is mirrored in Table III: Women household heads, and the aged.

We referred above to 11 million children who live with low-income families. Of these, about one-third live in households where the father is "absent." The national divorce rate, though relatively high, does not fully reflect the extent of family disintegration. Poorer couples usually don't divorce; this is too expensive. They separate, or the husband deserts.

There are today about 10.8 million households headed by women in the U.S. Roughly 19.4 million persons live in these households, and more than half of these live on less than subsistence incomes. There are over 6 million elderly widows living as "unattached individuals"; two-thirds of them must get along on annual incomes considerably below $1,500.[31]

Poverty among women is in many cases directly related to the disintegrative effects on recent migrants from rural areas of an exploitative system of labor allocation. In New York City, for example,

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82% of all aid to dependent children under official programs ("dependent" here is a euphemism for "fatherless") goes to Negroes and Puerto Ricans.[32] Poverty among women also is one of the harsher effects of the unequal distribution of incomes. The social security coverage of widows remains utterly inadequate, if there is coverage at all; and in many instances, widows, whose housework and caring jobs had made it possible for their husbands to hold a job, are completely dependent upon public assistance.

This brings us to a brief analysis of poverty among the aged.

The pathos of becoming old in America is made especially poignant for the many millions of persons who reach 65 without adequate incomes. Younger people whose incomes are small can usually look forward to increased earnings; they can generally regard present financial difficulties as a temporary condition. For old people, however, a steady and adequate income is nowadays the chief means of preserving a personal sense of dignity, of banishing the fear or actuality of falling into dependence on relatives or relief agencies.

Social security payments are putting a floor under the incomes of the aged, one that is rising but slowly, however, and that still does not support some 30% of the 16 million old people in the U.S. (Of these 30%, more than half, or 2.5 million, were wards of local welfare agencies in 1958.[33]

In 1958, the average social security benefit amounted to $71 a month.[34] This compares with $26 in 1948. Less than $50 then (less than $35 in constant dollars) were added to the income of the aged in 10 years of unprecedented prosperity. To be sure, many social security recipients have additional incomes but, according to estimates of the Social Security Administration, one-fourth of them depend *entirely* on their benefits.[35] Sample surveys by that agency have shown that the total income of 35% of elderly couples runs to less than $1,800 a year, and those of 58% of nonmarried elderly persons to less than $1,200.[36]

The income needs of the aged are not much below those of economically more active groups. The Social Security Administration's standard budget for an elderly couple (without dependents), formulated in 1948 and averaged for 34 cities (by this writer), required an income of $2,415 in 1959, after rough adjustment for price increases over the preceding 11 years.[37] However, the budget's allowance for medical care and drugs, an obviously major item in old people's expenditures, were based on patterns dating back to 1928-31, and were admittedly out of date even at the time the budget was compiled.

The great majority of the aged do not have incomes even approaching the modest figure quoted above. According to Census data, 2.6 million "unattached individuals" 65 years old and more, or almost three-fifths in this age bracket, have incomes below $1,500. Similarly, 37% of elderly couples and other households headed by a person over 65 have poverty incomes. It is true that homeownership and, in some

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cases, the possession of other nonliquid assets mitigates the hardships of a low cash income. However, not only does a sizable portion of the aged not own any assets whatever but, in so far as they do own houses, the latter's state of repair is frequently bad and their market worth low. As regards savings, according to a Federal Reserve survey in 1959, 32% of persons over 65 owned no liquid assets at all, and at least another 30% had less than $500 in such assets.[38]

In terms of income, the majority of the aged are not much better off today than they were 10-12 years ago. The percentage of old people earning less than $1,000 in constant dollars in 1957 was 60%; in 1948, it was 68%. Nonetheless, a much larger proportion of the aged is now able to retire; the meager wages they received a decade ago have been transformed into meager pensions, so that in terms of welfare there has undeniably been some progress. As the earnings of economically active groups and contributory rates rise, benefits, too, are bound to swell. Political pressures to assure at least a subsistence income to that majority of the aged who must still live on less are too strong to be resisted very long. But more than that—more than a subsistence income for them—is certainly not now in sight.

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In some respects, then, status poverty will undoubtedly diminish over coming years. Social security coverage is likely to be extended, benefits are likely to increase. Opposition to public health insurance cannot be countenanced forever, even by a Republican administration.

On the other hand, the reduction of rural poverty is conditioned in part on the extent to which migrants can find employment elsewhere. The past two decades of general prosperity have encouraged the flow of interregional migration. However, the prospects of continued absorption of migrants by the nonfarm economy are now dimming. First, the labor force will be growing more rapidly during the present and subsequent decade than at any time since the early years of this century, due to the upsurge in births since 1940.[39] And, second, the problem of structural unemployment and of depressed industrial areas, to be discussed in the sections below is becoming increasingly weighty. Local industrialization would thus have to carry a far greater burden of reducing rural poverty than hitherto.

V

While the proportions of "status poverty" in the U.S. seem likely to contract, the threat of income loss resulting from unemployment or from being downgraded is, as we shall see, growing. Job insecurity is becoming rather typical outside the bureaucratic and other "overhead" sectors of the U.S. economy.

Unemployment rose to postwar records during the 1957-58 recession. Census estimates of jobless persons actively looking for work averaged just under 4.7 million for all of 1958, or 6.8% of the civilian labor

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force. This rate, too, represented a postwar high. If partial unemployment (i.e., involuntary part-time shifts) is added up so as to yield a full-time equivalent—this can be done on the basis of official data—total unemployment in 1958 amounted to about 7.2 million persons.[40]

More disturbing still than these figures is the *trend* in unemployment over the postwar period. During the latest business expansion, which may well have reached its cyclical peak early this year, the unemployment rate was greater than at the comparable point in either of the two previous postwar cycles, notwithstanding much higher output indexes. Similarly, as has been indicated, in 1958, when a cyclical trough occurred, it exceeded the rates of the other two postwar trough years (see Table IV).

TABLE IV

Unemployment and Unemployment Rates in Three Postwar Business Cycles[41]*

Business Cycle Years	Cycle Peak		Cycle Trough	
	Number unemployed (in millions)	Unemployment Rate (in %)	Number unemployed (in millions)	Unemployment Rate (in %)
1947-49	2.2	3.6%	4.2	6.8%
1953-54	1.7	2.6%	4.0	6.2%
1957-58	2.6	3.8%	5.0	7.3%
Jan. 1960- ?	3.4	4.8%	—	—

Not only has there been a notable upward trend in unemployment over the low and the high points of the cycle, there also has been a lengthening of the period of unemployment. In 1948, the annual average duration of unemployment was 8.6 weeks; by 1956, a year of unprecedented business activity, it had risen to 11.3 weeks. In 1959, when the national product rose to another record, it ran to over 14.4 weeks. The steady increase has largely been due to growing long-term unemployment: In 1948, 15% of the jobless were out of work 15 or more weeks; in 1956, 21%, and this percentage has continued to mount.

Before we turn to a further exploration of these trends, let us look at the economic position of today's unemployed.

Unemployment benefits, where the unemployed worker is indeed eligible for them (and one-third of all jobless are not), are far too small to make up for more than a fraction of his income loss; in fact, the fraction covered by benefits has actually diminished over the past 20 years. In 1957, the average unemployment benefit amounted to $28.21 for all 48 States, compared with $10.66 in 1939. But in the latter year, average benefits made up for 41% of wages lost, while in 1957 they covered only 35%.[42] Of course, it was much easier to get another job than in 1939, so that perhaps one cannot properly speak of a deterioration in the economic position of the unemployed over this twenty-year period.

However, taking the postwar years alone, the trend has been quite unfavorable. First, as we have seen, the duration of unemployment has

* Peak or trough refers to the Federal Reserve Board's Index of Industrial Production. Period of the Korean War, 1950-52, was omitted from this table.

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lengthened. This means that the number exhausting their benefits has been increasing. Second, the administration of unemployment insurance has tended to become harsher. Eligibility rules have progressively become more restrictive; waiting periods have been extended. This greater harshness is in large part related to the consistent lowering of rates of employer contributions, from a 48-state average of 2.75% of total payrolls in 1940 to one of 1.31% in 1957; in some states, the rate is less than 1%. This lowering of rates is linked to the sharpening competition among states for industries; unemployment systems have become footballs in this competition, to the detriment of their intended beneficiaries.[43]

Income losses are severe when unemployment strikes. In a four-person household where the claimant is head, cash income drops by 50% (evidently assuming, however, that there are some earnings by other members of the household); cash outlays decline by over 20%.[44] How long outlays can remain ahead of income depends largely upon savings. But usually these don't amount to much: In 1959, 68% of U.S. spending units had less than $1,000 in such assets, and 56% had less than $500.[45] Thus, the duration of unemployment becomes a critical factor for the maintenance of expenditures above poverty levels. Where weeks and months go by without the chief breadwinner finding a job, his benefits dry up and he is compelled either to go on relief or, if he is lucky, he finds a job frequently requiring less or no skill and paying lower wages.

It is this problem of downgrading and chronic unemployment of workers which we turn to now.

VI

The rapidity of technological change over the last ten years is at the root of the problem of "downgrading" and of the rise in chronic unemployment. To give the reader an inkling of that rapidity, let us cite a few illustrative data.

Manufacturing production between 1948 and 1959 rose by about 60%, while employment in manufacturing industries increased by only about 6%. This increase, however, has been entirely attributable to more white-collar jobs (including administrative, clerical, research, etc.). The number of production workers in manufacturing has actually declined over the 11-year period, from 12.7 million to 12.2 million, i.e., by almost 4%. In certain key industries, there has been a drop in output accompanied by a much sharper drop in employment. Thus, in autos, production decreased by 6.3% between May 1950 and May 1959, but jobs by 11.1%. In coal mining the corresponding figures are –25.5% for production and –60.2% for employment, reflecting partly the shift towards liquid and gaseous fuels and partly the mechanization of mining.

Changes in military technology have had profound employment effects. Between 1953 and 1958, spending on "conventional" armaments declined from $15 billion to $5 billion, an enormous drop over so short

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a period, which has probably been a major factor in the stagnation of such regions as Southern Michigan and certain airplane centers in the East.[46]

According to General Orval R. Cook (ret.), president of the Aerospace Industries Association of America, airplane manufacturing jobs in just the past three years dropped from over 900,000 to 680,000, with the decline in production workers alone running close to 200,000. "This trend in employment," states the General, "is continuing, with our labor force decreasing on a monthly average of (about) 5,000 workers."[47]

The transformation of patterns of industrial location has been no less striking. It, too, must be regarded in the light of cumulative technological changes in transportation and energy sources. Suburbs grew as much during the fifties as during the entire preceding half century; over two-thirds of the growth in the U.S. population since the end of World War II has taken place in the suburbs, and virtually all new industrial plants and shopping centers were built outside the central cities.

Closely paralleling these developments have been certain accelerated changes in the occupational structure of American society. These cannot be fully appraised here; a brief survey must suffice.

As already indicated, there has been a sharp absolute and relative decline in the number of manufacturing production workers. This decline was by no means permitted to occur simply through attrition (i.e., death, retirement, quits, etc.). Rather, as will be shown further on, there has frequently been active displacement of workers. Technological advancement and the bureaucratization of society have tended, of course, to raise educational and skill requirements; but this has probably a much more limited effect on the needed quality of the labor force as a whole than is commonly supposed.

Let us cite an example: Numerical controls for metal cutting machines, fed by computers via tapes to electronic devices guiding the tool are known to be slowly but inexorably reducing the need for skilled machinists. According to the *American Machinist,* the leading trade journal of the nonelectrical machinery industry, recent innovations in metalworking ". . . are so fantastic that there is strong indication that within five years industry will be able to handle what is now considered highly advanced work with semiskilled operators."[48] The existing literature on automation is full of examples confirming the trend implied in this quotation.

The number of professional and technical employees rose from around 4.5 million in 1950 to 7.1 million in 1959, a 60% increase. However, close to half of all white-collar jobs (or 13.6 million) are in the clerical and sales categories, where educational requirements and skills are considerably less lofty. Possibly one-third of them are in part-time positions, a fact which has a necessarily depressing effect on conditions of work and wages, despite the considerable investment in latest types of equipment and the unusual pace of organizational innovation in

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trade and office administration. For example, the average weekly wage in department stores and mail order houses in February 1960 ran to less than $53; in general merchandising stores, to less than $48; in banks, to under $70.[49]

Furthermore, "manual" workers still represent nearly 37% of the total labor force, though this is down from 38.5% 10 years ago. Undeniably, their wages have steadily risen, though their job security has not improved. However, only about half of them earn incomes close to or exceeding $100 a week, a rather modest sum nowadays. The average weekly wage in durables manufacturing runs about $98 at present, that in nondurables, to about $80.

Service worker employment has expanded nearly as fast as white-collar employment since 1950, i.e., by 20%, to over 8 million. The service industries' investment in labor-saving devices and rationalization rivals, in some respects, those in retail and office administration. Yet, wages continue to be strikingly low, often less than $50. A recent agreement between private hospitals in New York and a hospital workers union, raising wages of a sizable number of workers to $1 an hour, was greeted as a substantial gain.

It is true that the wage level in the U.S. is relatively high. But a low-wage problem unquestionably persists, which lack of space does not permit us to analyze in detail. More than 3 million nonfarm workers earn less than $1.25 an hour, and about 1.4 million of these are paid less than $1.[50]

VII

In a class society in which the gains resulting from technological and innovational change can be and are appropriated by groups favorably located on the scale of wealth and status, one cannot impartially weigh gains against losses. Rather, one has to examine to whom accrue the gains, and who suffers the losses. Here it is our task to deal with some of the social and human losses.

Unemployment due to changing technology is not a new problem in capitalist society. Nor is the concentration of unemployment in defunct one-company towns of recent origin. However, "the emergence of the distressed industrial area . . . is really quite recent in terms of the magnitude of the problem."[51]

Structural and technological unemployment cannot be alleviated by raising the general level of income and employment. Nor is it a "local" problem. The contraction of anthracite and bituminous mining in Pennsylvania, for example, is hardly the result of local developments.

In Pennsylvania's 11 areas of "substantial labor surplus," the unemployment rate was 11% of the civilian labor force in such "good" years as 1956 and 1957. In Michigan the unemployment rate during the 1957-58 recession was over twice that for the country as a whole. In automotive manufacturing, decentralization, increased efficiency, ruinous competition between auto firms, and the drop in military procure-

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ment have recurrently caused Detroit to become one of the major distressed labor areas of the U.S. In prosperous 1956, 7.2% of Detroit's working population was jobless. In the spring of 1958, almost 300,000, or 18% of its labor force, pounded its streets.[52]

Solomon Barkin, in an analysis of the problem of distressed areas and chronic unemployment has this to say: "There are economic conditions which cause the deterioration of an entire area. The industry on which such a community is built simply collapses; this is happening with textiles, railroad repair shops, coal, agricultural implements, automobiles. . . . With the vast technological and economic changes now occurring in the automobile industry, the whole middlewestern complex built around it is going to be beset by long-term problems of redevelopment. [The automotive industry] will spread all over the nation, emphasizing automation, prefabricated parts, the use of modular systems of part substitutes and measurements. And all this means that tens and hundreds of thousands of automobile workers now in this industry will no longer find employment. We must soon find a substitute for that economic activity . . ."[53]

When rapid changes tend to depress a great regional economy, migration is a partial solution at best. Its economic value is limited by the great waste of public and private capital it implies for the communities left behind and the social and human problems it creates.

For the affected older workers—those over 40—it usually represents no solution at all. They are faced with a truly desperate situation since not only are their skills frequently obsolescent but they are also discriminated against on account of age. The authors of a thoughtful study of the Packard Motor Co. shutdown in Detroit in 1956, "Too Old to Work—Too Young to Retire," done for the U.S. Senate's Special Committee on Unemployment Problems, state: "Our study is . . . a kind of portent of a new possibility in the world of work in America. For two decades, it has been taken for granted that the experience of years, the seniority provisions gained through collective bargaining and the like, were guarantees of job security for the older worker. But the new developments of technical progress and decentralization and industrial consolidations create conditions that were not foreseen when the current principle of seniority rights was promulgated. Too often, the plants affected by these new developments cease to exist, thus throwing the older workers with years of service to his employer into the job-seeking market where he must cope with age discrimination patterns among the remaining companies."[54]

The length of unemployment of workers who lost their jobs because of the Packard plant closing averaged six months for nearly half of them. In 1957, 47% even of the skilled workers had been jobless for more than six months, as against "only" 29% of the skilled young.

The existence of widespread chronic (or, if you will, semi-chronic) unemployment argues against the generally held belief that economic growth alone suffices to absorb redundant labor. "Economic growth"

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is not merely unequal, it is *necessarily* unequal in the incidence of its benefits (or of its costs) where private investment decisions of profound public impact can be made with relative freedom from Government controls. As has already been indicated, uncontrolled economic growth tends to aggravate the unequal distribution of wealth and incomes between classes as well as between regions and occupations.

The outstanding example of an occupational shift in response to job opportunities opened up by general economic growth is that from agricultural to nonagricultural employment. Between 1950 and 1959 alone, 1.7 million farm jobs disappeared. There have probably been no other occupational movements which have proportionately been (or can be) so massive, excepting perhaps shifts out of mining (which happens also to be an extractive industry). However, unlike the rural migrant who has the prospect of improving his situation, the already industrialized worker, who has acquired a skill, experience and a modest education, often faces downgrading when he suffers permanent job loss in his line (i.e., when his layoff is not merely cyclically conditioned). The experience of the Packard workers is unquestionably representative. "Among those [former Packard workers] obtaining employment for any length of time," write the authors of the report already cited, "there was an increase in the number required to accept unskilled jobs as compared to their skill levels while employed at Packard. By 1958, no more than three-fifths of our sample were working jobs at skill levels equal to or above those held at Packard. [And these lacked seniority rights at their new jobs, a fact which often subjected them to renewed unemployment later.—H. B.] The service-type industries, with typically lower wages and less desirable working conditions, hired proportionately more Negroes than Whites. . . . On the economic side . . . the average hourly wage of the re-employed was below that earned at Packard. . . . [Their] savings decreased, and they were required to reduce, above all, their purchase of food and clothing."[55]

Retraining of persons with obsolescent skills and the transfer of seniority rights would undoubtedly help those threatened by or actually suffering chronic unemployment. Incentives to private investors to locate factories and other businesses in regions affected by declining industries would also alleviate job problems. (The rather modest Area Development Act, vetoed by President Eisenhower last Spring on the false ground that such communities can help themselves, would have provided some such incentives.)

But these solutions do not touch upon the basic nature of the problem. Why, to begin with, should a large employer be permitted to leave an entire community stranded by moving away? Why should it be possible for automation and other technological changes to be introduced without regard to their effects on jobs? There is ample evidence of the deepening social and psychological trauma—and of the deleterious economic consequences—induced by the accelerating pace

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of technological change. Why should that change not be slowed, its direction controlled, its impact mitigated?

You cannot legislate against technological change, but you *can* create institutions and formulate procedures aimed at modifying its untoward effects. Indeed, this is not merely desirable, it is becoming a necessity: Labor-saving machinery and labor-saving organizational innovations are gradually invading the service and trade sectors, which have absorbed almost all of the net increase in the labor force since World War II. And, as has been said above, the labor force can be expected to grow at a faster rate during this decade as the great number of babies born since 1946 comes of age. The problem of preserving and creating jobs will thus become a very serious one. What has been happening in the areas of chronic labor surplus of the U.S. in recent years may well be an advance warning of what the "soaring" sixties have in store on a considerably enhanced scale—unless technological changes and the economic instability they give rise to are subjected to rational controls, devised in the interests of human labor.

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The nature of poverty in the U.S., as in other advanced countries, has unquestionably changed from previous decades, when not only economically marginal or inactive groups but large masses of industrial workers were compelled to live at substandard and even below-subsistence incomes. The steady advance in productivity in the extractive and manufacturing industries, together with the organization of industrial trade unions, has long ago resulted in raising wage levels above mere subsistence needs. Mass unemployment on the scale of the thirties which, of course, vitiated much of the progress made in advancing wage rates, appears to have become less of a threat. However, job insecurity is now intensifying for industrial workers as a result of the acceleration of output rates resulting from rapid technological changes and of the unmistakable tendency towards overcapacity in many sectors of industry.

It would seem gratuitous to end this article on a hortatory note. The wealth and capital resources of the U.S. have expanded immensely since World War II. Industrial production has grown at more than twice the average rate of population increase. The gross national product has risen by 47% since 1947, in real terms; productivity, by 45%. Yet poverty has persisted on a relatively large scale.

We have attempted to analyze its causes. Its remedy lies clearly not in a mere acceleration of economic growth. Rather, it is likely to require fundamental shifts in the allocation of resources—a redirection of the flow of abundance into more rational, socially and humanly more beneficial channels.

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1 Selma F. Goldsmith, "Size Distribution of Personal Income," *Survey of Current Business* (a U.S. Department of Commerce publication), April 1958, p. 10 ff.; and, by the same author in the same publication, April 1960, p. 8 ff. The tables in the text were derived from the data in these articles.

2 *Survey of Current Business*, April 1959, p. 9 ff.

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[3] "Income of Families and Persons in the United States," *Consumer Income,* P-60, No. 33, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. Reference is to before-tax income. "Median income" means that half of the recipients receive less and the other half more than the stated amount.

[4] *Survey, op. cit.,* April 1959; and *Statistical Abstract of the U.S. for 1959,* tables 269 & 274.

[5] Lloyd G. Reynolds, *Labor Economics and Labor Relations,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1956, p. 655-6.

[6] *Survey, op. cit.,* April 1960.

[7] *Allocation of the Tax Burden by Income Class,* issued by the Tax Foundation, New York, N.Y., 1960.

[8] "The Low Income Population and Economic Growth," by Robert Lampman, *Study Paper No. 12,* Study of Employment, Growth and Price Levels for the Consideration of the Joint Economic Committee, Joint Economic Committee of Congress, December 1959.

[9] *Social Security Bulletin,* a publication of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, October 1959

[10] "Changes in the Share of Wealth Held by Top Wealth Holders, 1922-1956," by Robert Lampman, *Occasional Paper No. 71,* National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960, pp. 21 and 26.

[11] *Statistical Abstract for 1959,* p. 487 ff.

[12] "City Worker's Family Budget for October 1951," *Monthly Labor Review,* a publication of the U.S. Department of Labor, May 1952.

[13] *M.L.R.,* February 1951, p. 155.

[14] *M.L.R.,* February 1948, p. 131.

[15] The difference between personal income tabulated by the Office of Business Economics and that enumerated by Census arises from the inclusion of nonmoney income by the former agency in its data. This type of income diminishes in significance as the scale of income gets lower.

[16] *M.L.R.,* February 1948, p. 179. The implicit multipliers are as follows:

For a family of four with an income of $3000 a year—1.0. For one person—.462. For two persons—.65. For three persons—.837. For five persons—1.15. For six persons—1.28. For seven and more—1.49.

[17] Derived from *Consumer Income,* P-60, No. 33, *op. cit.,* table 5.

[18] For another independent estimate, see Martin David, "Welfare, Income and Budget Needs," *Review of Economics and Statistics,* November 1959, p. 393 ff. David formulates an index of welfare, relating a household's current resources to basic needs, as defined by the size and age composition of the household, and the employment status of its members. Basic needs refer to the BLS's City Worker's Family Budget. According to David's calculations, 35.4% of all spending units had current resources insufficient to cover basic needs in 1955. If current resources *and* liquid assets are related to basic needs, the percentage is 28.7%

[19] Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Board, *Survey of Consumer Finances, 1959,* p. 713; and "Population Characteristics," *Current Population Reports,* Bureau of the Census, series P-20, No. 100, March 1959, table 9.

[20] *Employment and Earnings,* a publication of the U.S. Department of Labor, February, March and April 1959 and 1960.

[21] "Children of Low-Income Families," prepared by the Children's Bureau, Social Security Administration, in *Characteristics of the Low Income Population of the United States,* Selected Materials Assembled by the Staff of the Subcommittee on Low Income Families, Joint Economic Committee on the Economic Report, 1955, p. 54.

[22] Robert E. Graham, Jr., "Regional Markets in 1958," *Survey of Current Business,* August 1959, p. 15.

[23] "Size Distribution of Personal Income," *Survey, op. cit.,* April 1960, p. 13.

[24] *Consumer Income,* series P-60, No. 33, *op. cit.,* p. 30.

[25] Space does not permit detailed substantiation of this contention. But see, Dale E. Hathaway, "Migration from Agriculture: The Historical Record and its Meaning," in *American Economic Review,* Vol. 50, No. 2 (May 1960), especially p. 390; and James Y. Maddox, "Private and Social Costs of the Movement of People out of Agriculture," *ibid.,* especially p. 399 ff.

[26] "Rural Low Income and Rural Development Programs in the South," Report of the National Planning Association, reprinted in *Hearings* before the Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, March 1959, p. 181.

[27] Dale E. Hathaway, "Migration from

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Farms and its Meaning," *M.L.R.*, February 1960, p. 139.

28 Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth,* Cambridge: 1954, p. 153.

29 *op. cit.*, p. 146.

30 Oscar Handlin, *The Newcomers, Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a Changing Metropolis,* Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p. 70.

31 *Consumer Income,* series P-60, No. 33, *op. cit.*

32 *Public Assistance Recipients in New York State, January-February 1957,* by Eleanor M. Snyder, State of New York, Interdepartmental Committee on Low Incomes, p. 36.

33 Public Assistance Recipients in N.Y. State, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

34 *Consumer Income,* series P-60, No. 33, *op. cit.*, Computations by the writer.

35 *Social Security Bulletin,* November 1959.

36 *ibid.*

37 "A Budget for an Elderly Couple," Social Security Administration, Bureau of Research and Statistics, *Bureau Memorandum No. 67,* March 1948; and *M.L.R.*, September 1951.

38 1959 *Survey of Consumer Finances, op. cit.*, p. 716 and p. 1112.

39 During the fifties, the labor force grew by about 730,000 persons a year. Between 1960 and 1965, 1.1 million persons are expected to enter it annually, net. "Population and Labor Force Projections for the United States, 1960-1975," *Bulletin No. 1242,* Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.

40 Philip Eden, "For More Adequate Measurement of Unemployment," *Current Economic Comment,* University of Indiana, p. 21.

41 *Monthly Report on the Labor Force,* U.S. Department of Labor, March 1960, and *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* December 1959 and April 1960.

42 Seymour H. Harris, "The Incidence of Inflation, or: Who Gets What?" *Study Paper No. 7,* Joint Economic Committee, November 1959, p. 6.

43 *ibid.*, p. 64.

44 Data assembled by the Bureau of Employment Security, U.S. Department of Labor, and quoted in Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

45 1959 Survey of Consumer Finances, *op. cit.*, p. 715.

46 Sources for this survey of technological changes since World War II will be furnished by the writer on request.

47 Chamber of Commerce of the United States News Service, *Text of Statement* of General O. R. Cook, June 27, 1960.

48 "Trends in Machine Tool Design," *American Machinist,* March 7, 1960, p. 90.

49 *M.L.R.*, May 1960, p. 494, and *Statistical Abstract for 1959,* table 279. Computations are the writer's.

50 *Statement* of James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor, before the Subcommittee on Labor Standards, House Committee on Education and Labor, April 21, 1960, p. 4 (U.S. Department of Labor press release).

51 Area Development Act, *op. cit.*, testimony of Frank Fernbach, staff economist of AFL-CIO, p. 244.

52 Area Development Act, *op. cit.*, p. 57 and p. 149. Forty-six (out of a total of 149) major labor areas, and 143 smaller centers were classified by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Employment Security as "areas of substantial labor surplus" in July 1959 (i.e., 6% or more of the civilian labor force was out of work). Of these areas of substantial labor surplus, 70 were classified as having a "chronic" labor surplus, meaning that the unemployment rate was 50% above the national average. These areas accounted for about 500,000 unemployed, 15% of the jobless total in July 1959. See *Chronic Labor Surplus Areas, July 1959, Experience and Outlook,* a publication of the above-named agency.

53 Area Development Act, *op. cit.*, testimony of Solomon Barkin, director of research, Textile Workers Union of America, p. 19 ff.

54 H. L. Sheppard, L. A. Ferman and S. Faber, *Too Old to Work, Too Young to Retire: A Case Study of a Permanent Plant Shutdown,* Special Committee on Unemployment Problems, U.S. Senate, December 1959.

55 *ibid.*, p. 65. Other examples of downgrading associated with structural and technological changes can also be found in the *Hearings* of the Senate's Committee on Unemployment Problems.

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CONCENTRATION AND CONTROL

James O'Connor

Let it be admitted at the outset: If there is a theory of monopoly—in the sense of a unifying explanation with some factual basis of the gradual transformation of competitive into monopolistic market organizations—I do not know of it.

There is something like a theory of monopoly in Schumpeter, but neither Marxists nor non-Marxists have taken it very seriously. In academic economics there is nothing resembling such a theory, apart from a single ingredient, decreasing costs, which is also associated with Marxism, where it figures importantly in the theory of capitalist development.

Marx rightly insisted upon the distinction between "concentration" and "centralization." Concentration is nothing more nor less than capital accumulation itself, having no real significance for the growth of monopoly (although it plays a major role in the theory of capitalist breakdown). Concentration *may* limit competition, but there is no obvious reason why it should, meaning as it does merely that over time the business unit tends to grow larger in absolute size. Defined in this way, no one could seriously maintain that concentration is not a permanent feature of capitalist development. According to a recent report of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, *Concentration in American Industry*—a collection of figures on which I will draw freely throughout this essay—the largest fifty American firms did 23% of the nation's manufacturing in 1954; in 1947, only 17%. The 200 biggest firms accounted for 37% of the business in 1954; seven years before, 30%.

There is nothing especially mysterious about this phenomenon; it is undoubtedly the inevitable outcome of the increasing complexity of product engineering together with the rise in demand stemming from growing real incomes and an expanding population. Clearly, an elaborate theory is unnecessary to explain why the average textile firm is ten (or twenty) times as large today compared with a hundred years ago.

The notion of centralization, however, is on a different logical level altogether. In Paul Sweezy's words, centralization means "the combining of capitals which are already in existence," directly implying a reduction in competition. Strong firms buy up or maneuver into a position of control over weak firms and, as a result, end by commanding a larger *share* of the industry's business. Centralization is thus amenable to rough quantitative measure; in fact, economists measure the degree of monopoly (careful

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economists would say, "the likelihood of monopoly") in a particular industry with the so-called "concentration ratio"—in Marxist terminology it would be the "centralization ratio"—the percentage of total business done by the industry's four largest firms.

Why are some firms stronger than others? This, of course, is the interesting question. Unfortunately, Marxists have tended to equate bigness with market power (or to say the same thing in another way, absolute with relative size) and thus have confused the *fact* of concentration with the *effects* of centralization. It is not legitimate to deduce a reduction in competition from an observed tendency toward concentration (as, for example, Paul Baran seems to do in a recent essay) rather, one must *demonstrate* a tendency toward centralization.

Why is the difference between bigness and market power obscured in Marxist theory? Mainly because centralization supposedly comes about as a result of decreasing costs arising from economies of large scale production. The larger the firm, the greater the play for specialization and "managerial efficiencies," the mode refined the division of labor—thus, the lower the unit costs. Clearly, if large firms are able to undersell their smaller rivals on the basis of lower costs, the latter must sooner or later give in to the former, or be driven to the wall. Under these conditions, it is not misleading to equate a firm's absolute with its relative size. The only difficulty with this theory is that there is no observable direct relationship between bigness and market power (as measured by "concentration ratio," which we will use as indications of centralization).

For example, if you take all the firms in manufacturing which employed more than 100,000 workers in 1954, 50% of them (according to the Senate report) are in industries where the concentration ratio is less than 20%, while *none* are in industries where the ratio exceeds 70%. Contrast this with all firms employing between 5,000 and 10,000 workers; only 14% of these are in industries where the ratio is less than 20%, while 19% are in industries where the four largest firms do over 70% of the business. If anything, the relationship between absolute and relative size is an inverse one!

Moreover, the Senate report reveals the lack of correspondence between bigness and market power over time (Table 1).

During 1947–54, of the nineteen industries in which the average firm em-

TABLE 1: Changes in Centralization in Major Manufacturing Industries, by Size of Firm United States, 1947–1954

Average Size of Firm (Employees)	*Number of Industries in which Concentration Ratio:*			
	Rose	*Fell*	*Did Not Change*	*Total*
100,000 and over	6	3	10	19
50,000–100,000	16	4	10	30
20,000–50,000	23	15	18	56
10,000–20,000	17	11	11	39
5,000–10,000	13	10	11	34
less than 5,000	17	9	5	31
Total	92	52	65	209

Source: Adapted from *Concentration in American Industry*, Table 27.

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ployed more than 100,000 workers, centralization rose in six, diminished in three. However, at the other end of the scale, centralization also rose in twice as many industries as it fell. In all classes, fewer firms are doing relatively more of the industries' business.[2]

The data seem to support the conclusion that centralization, as a process, is a fact; thus the Marxists are right but for the wrong reason. I am convinced that economies of scale, leading to lower unit costs and a competitive advantage for the large firm, are not the key to understanding the monopolization process. The data point this up; there is independent evidence as well. Joe Bain in a careful study of barriers to entry in twenty industries attaches little importance to economies of scale as a limit on competition.[3] Instead, he places emphasis on product differentiation and control of key resources. Moreover, as will be shown in a moment, centralization—at least in the 1950s—has been attended mainly by a wave of mergers; it has *not* been a result of internal expansion of plant.[4]

I might point out that by 1954, concentration ratios exceeded 75% in over 130 of approximately 850 identifiable manufacturing industries. Of these—for illustration—I selected the following at random: light bulbs (93%); watches (99%); plate glass (91%); soap (76%); razor blades and razors (97%); salt (83%); metal cans (81%); dentifrices (78%).

IF THERE IS NO inevitable tendency toward centralization on the basis of economies of scale, must we concede that further centralization is unlikely? I think not; I base my judgment on the data presented above, on Table II, and on the analysis which immediately follows.

Table II tends to confirm our view that centralization is not confined to a few hard-core monopolistic sectors, rather that it proceeds along a very broad front. Just as centralization grows in industries characterized by small as well as large firms, similarly, competitive industries (as defined by low 1947 concentration ratios) are becoming less competitive and monopolistic industries more monopolistic. Centralization is evidently a lengthening as well as a deepening process

TABLE II: Changes in Centralization in Major Manufacturing Industries, by Degree of Competition
United States, 1947–1954

Concentration Ratio in 1947	*Number of Industries in which Concentration Ratio:*			
	Rose	*Fell*	*Did Not Change*	*Total*
over 75%	18	15	0	33
50%–75%	24	32	2	58
25%–50%	33	28	7	68
under 25%	29	20	5	54
Total	104	95	14	213

Source: Adapted from *Concentration in American Industry*, Table 56. Note that Table I and Table II classification procedures are not perfectly equivalent. In the former, if the ratio changed by plus or minus two points or less, the industry was lumped under "Did Not Change." In the latter, these industries were classified under the appropriate column, "Rose" or "Fell." The latter procedure, however, significantly underestimates the economy's tendency toward centralization, as a quick comparison of Table II with Table I will indicate.

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(I am unable to explain the figures in the 50%–75% class, where on balance centralization declined).

On the one hand, firms in industries where competition is already effectively circumscribed continue to consolidate their position, driving out or merging with marginal firms. To take a few examples: typewriters (the ratios in 1947 and 1954 were 79% and 83%, respectively); gypsum products (85% and 90%); sewing machines (77% and 81%). On the other hand, centralization is manifest in industries where competition still produces price and output instabilities and uncertainty; prefabricated wood products (16% and 32%); paper and board products (15% and 25%); finishing textiles, except wool (14% and 24%); wines and brandy (26% and 38%) are all cases in point.

As I pointed out earlier, I do not know of any coherent, single explanation of this phenomenon. One superficially plausible reason springs to mind: Perhaps the Cold War has something to do with it? The facts are dramatic enough; in 1958, 40% of all Defense Department procurement contracts went to only ten firms; 75% to 100 firms. Admittedly, military spending has speeded *concentration* while at the same time completely distorting the economy's capital structure, but there is no real evidence that centralization has been accelerated. Quite the opposite. The electrical machinery industry, for example, has been the direct or indirect beneficiary of huge amounts of Defense Department largesse, yet of sixteen industry sub-groups, concentration ratios *fell* in eleven and rose in only four. For example, the ratio fell from 61% to 41% in electrical measuring instruments; from 73% to 64% in electronic tubes. What has happened is that rising product demand (stemming in this case from military spending) has raised profit margins and thus attracted new firms into the industry, increasing competition.

IF WE HOPE to understand this sustained movement toward further monopolization of the economy, I think we ought to return to fundamentals, by which I mean the theory of competition itself. Incredible as it may sound, no abstraction—save possibly Keynesian doctrine—still lies nearer the core of contemporary academic economics; the theory of competition still remains the round hole into which economists persist in forcing the square pegs of economic reality. Among most practicing economists, the "competitive model" has no rivals; models of monopolistic competition and oligopoly, developed in the 1930s and 40s by economists of the stature of Joan Robinson, E. H. Chamberlain, and Paul Sweezy, must now be regarded—if the measure of a theory's importance is the extent to which it is put to practical use—as curiosities. The reason for this queer state of affairs is simple; compared with the competitive model, the others lack "empirically testable implications." In short, they are intractable. Unfortunately for contemporary economics, the real world is intractable as well.

What does the theory of competition say? Allow consumers to make up their market baskets as they see fit, oblige factors of production to respond to changes in factor prices (by the threat of starvation or monetary loss), let firms, guided by market prices over which they are assumed to have no control, seek maximum returns—then commodities will be pro-

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duced at lowest possible costs consistent with diminishing returns and turned over to consumers at prices equal to costs. In short, Utopia.

Central to the theory is the assumption of rationality; consumers are expected to read their own interests correctly (who still believes that they do?), and, more important, firms are assumed to find rational means to their interminable profit seeking. Clearly, if capitalists fail to predict future market demand, or combine factors in uneconomic bundles, consumers suffer, labor suffers, and they themselves face bankruptcy or foreclosure.

Consider the logic of this system. Suppose I am a rational capitalist, a profit-maximizer; there is no question but that I will do my best *not* to compete. As monopolist, or party to restrictive agreements, I can gain an overwhelming advantage over any competitive firm, its fate in the hands of Ricardo himself. To combine, merge, integrate, monopolize raw material supplies and transport facilities, smother sources of price and profit instability—these are my likely responses. Thus the competitive model collapses under the weight of its principal assumption. I think this is the answer to the question: Why centralization? Men are rational; rational men are not likely to be happy under conditions of competitive anarchy. Yet must the competitive model be abandoned for that?

Certainly not, since the obvious policy implication is to write and enforce anti-monopoly legislation, to preserve, promote and extend competition. The United States—alone among the developed capitalist economies—has outwardly accepted this implication. The logic of the competitive system is embodied in the Sherman, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts. But—here as elsewhere—to the business class appearances are useful only to the extent that they successfully obscure reality. The boys just aren't serious about cutting their own throats.

In the 1950s, heightened centralization was served largely by an accelerated pace of industrial mergers—the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 (which tightened up the statutes on mergers) notwithstanding. The days of the overnight industrial *coups*—the big combinations around the turn of the century—are over. The current merger movement, less dramatic in many ways, is, however, in my view an expresssion of a similar desire for price and profit stability and a minimum of risk.

From 1951–59, 138 of the economy's largest 1,001 manufacturing companies disappeared.[5] Of these, eighty-five were relatively small, forty-two, medium-size; only eleven were among the largest one hundred firms in 1951. Moreover, sixty-five of these 138 firms were bought up by the largest 200 firms; medium-size companies swallowed up an additional thirty-six. Only twenty-six of the defunct units merged with small firms.

In short, small units were absorbed by large firms at a very rapid rate. As we would expect, this trend was not seriously challenged by the government. Of the largest 200 firms, only one acquiring company out of seven had a single acquisition questioned by the Department of Justice or the FTC.

IF THE GOVERNMENT has failed to *preserve* competition by its "enlightened" merger policies, has it *promoted* competition by dissolution or divorcement

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proceedings under the anti-trust statutes?

To begin with, bear in mind that many industries are partially or wholly exempt from anti-trust action. These include: shipping (1916); export trade associations (1918); oil producers (1935); agricultural marketing (1937); retail trade (1937, 1952); insurance (1945); and railroads (1948). In short, major sectors of trade, fuel, agriculture, transport, and finance are encouraged *not* to compete.

Moreover, the concept of perfect competition—where decision-making is completely decentralized, power dispersed, with market prices playing the role of the Planning Bureau in allocating economic resources—has long been abandoned as the principal test of competition or its absence. In its place, legalistic definitions of "workable," "fair," and "sufficient" competition have been substituted. Unfortunately, the lawyers are ill-equipped to provide the set of rules required by the competitive model; specific policy implications regarding price discrimination, licensing agreements, and the like. As a result, enforcement of the statutes since 1950 has been scandalously lax. In the Alcoa (1950), GMAC (1951), Meat Packing (1954), and DuPont Cellophane cases (1956), the government went down to total defeat. A.T. and T. (1956), while making minor concessions, held on to its manufacturing monopoly, Western Electric. Only in the DuPont-ICI (1951) and United (1954) cases did the Justice Department enjoy moderate successes. Steel and automobiles—despite the encouragement the Anti-Trust Division has received from anti-big business elements in Congress—still remain untouchable.

The Justice Department, the FTC, and the courts between them are evidently no match for business men intent on securing greater control over markets. In practice, of course, the tensions between profit-seeking businessmen and those whose job it is to regulate their activities are more apparent than real. Their interests are by and large identical. Bright young lawyers get their training in the Anti-Trust Division, and then are snapped up by the corporations; you learn how to get around the law by practicing its enforcement! Executives move freely from the large companies into the regulatory agencies and then back again, their interests and orientation unchanged. Tax disputes are settled to the "mutual satisfaction" of businessmen and the Treasury Department. Where the nature of the industry tends to preserve competition, in retail trade, for example, firms run to the state for protection, and get it in the form of Fair Trade Laws. It has long been a cliché that the business class rigs the rules of the game; like many clichés, this one continues to bear repetition.

WILL THE NEXT DECADE yield more highly developed forms of monopoly organization? The answer is clearly yes. Is it possible to make any predictions in connection with the probable effects of ever-increasing monopolization? I think so.

First, monopoly invariably implies higher than competitive prices and smaller than competitive outputs, or to put it another way, excess capacity at the ruling price. This in turn means that it becomes increasingly difficult —in Marxian terms—to "realize" surplus value; sales departments operate under increasingly more intense pressure—engineers are attracted away

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from productive to non-productive (sales engineering) occupations; advertising outlays as a proportion of total costs continue to rise secularly; the packaging industry expands beyond all rational limits; the future is assured to the "sales minded" graduate.

Material wants are not forever unlimited, however. Given the growth of excess capacity which accompanies further monopolization, as the economy oscillates between prosperity and recession, the gap between aggregate demand for commodities and industry's capacity to produce will widen. Barring a relative increase in Cold War spending, recessions will no doubt become successively more severe; the two slumps since 1951, the second more serious than the first, the second leaving in its wake a larger residue of structural unemployment, seem to conform to the expected pattern.

Second, the contradiction between the mythology of free enterprise and the reality of monopoly control will become more dramatic. Here is a socio-psychological problem of some significance. Appearances will be transformed into new rationalizations of monopoly power. This is already evident in some trade advertising; one large firm recently announced that it will be able to give better "service" on the basis of new acquisitions of raw material sources and transport facilities. This is the kind of information that twenty years ago was kept from the public eye. Obviously, our sense of the absurd is going to be put to new tests.

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1. Paul Baran, "Reflections on Underconsumption," in *The Allocation of Economic Resources* (Stanford, 1959), p. 56.
2. U.S. Steel is the classic example of a firm which has grown spectacularly in absolute size, yet its share of the industry's business is less now than it was in 1900.
3. Joe Bain, *Barriers to New Competition* (Cambridge, 1956).
4. For evidence that this development is not new, see Ben B. Seligman, "Merger and Monopoly in the U.S.," *Dissent*, Spring, 1955.
5. Frank J. Kottke, "Mergers of Large Manufacturing Companies, 1951–59," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, December, 1959.

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In our winter 1960 issue, we published, for the first time in the United States, the remarkable document, "On Socialist Realism," written by an anonymous Russian writer. This document presents a picture of the situation of Russian intellectuals under the Communist dictatorship, as well as a review of Russian literary history, which is of the greatest historical and intellectual interest. "On Socialist Realism" is to be published in the winter of 1961 as a separate book by Pantheon Books. We print below, with the kind permission of Pantheon Books, the introduction to that forthcoming volume, written by Czeslaw Milosz, the distinguished Polish novelist and poet, and author of The Captive Mind.

—EDITORS

"SOCIALIST REALISM": AN INTRODUCTION

Czeslaw Milosz

The essay which follows was written in the Soviet Union and sent by its author through friends to Paris, asking that it be published. It came out first in 1959, in a French translation, in the Paris monthly *Esprit*. We need have no doubt as to its authenticity. We do not know the writer's name, nor would there be any point in trying to discover it. All the evidence goes to show, however, that he belongs to the younger generation of Russian writers, educated entirely under the post-revolutionary system. The fact that he has decided to have his work published abroad shows his belief in the importance of what he has to say. Let us consider this step: here we have a man with ample talent for attaining popularity in his own country, but who secretly writes something intended at best for reading by a small group of intimates. He then goes to a great deal of trouble to place his manuscript in reliable keeping, and in this way it is brought across the frontiers. He knows full well the risk he runs should the authorities identify him as the author, while at the same time the preservation of his anonymity means that he can acquire neither fame nor money, even if his work is translated into many languages. At the same time he must also face the thorny problem of his loyalty as a citizen, for he lives in a state which forbids writers to publish without permission, and which regards violation of this rule as tantamount to violation of a citizen's duties, i.e., treason. This man has chosen to do what is condemned by the existing institutions and by the community formed by these institutions for he sees no other way to voice his beliefs.

But American readers would be mistaken if they attributed their

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own values and perspectives to this anonymous Russian writer, and regarded him as a supporter of the Western way of life, for instance. Were this so, the situation would be relatively simple (an internal enemy of the system would have found means to reveal himself). If we are to understand him, we must abandon the division of people into Communists and anti-Communists. If this anonymous Russian were asked whether he is a Communist or an anti-Communist, he would almost certainly shrug and answer: "What does that mean?" Only one kind of reality exists for him: it is that in which he has grown up and which forms his daily environment. The world outside the Soviet Union might just as well not exist, as far as he is concerned. He lives with the problems of his own community, and it is significant that he uses the form "we"—"we did this and that," "we believed," "we ought to". . . This essay should be taken as a voice participating in an internal discussion among Soviet writers; in conditions of greater freedom, his voice would be regarded as a manifestation of the normal right to criticize.

To what extent does this anonymous Russian express the trends prevailing in the society he belongs to? There is a good deal of evidence to show that his views are shared by a large proportion of the intellectuals, particularly among the younger generation. The Russian press has published attempts to reach conclusions in a vein similar to this essay, though they are cautious and half-hearted. Where this anonymous Russian differs from his fellow writers is in the boldness with which he goes to the heart of the matter. Outside the Soviet Union proper, in the countries of Eastern Europe now ruled by the Communists, his ideas would cause no surprise. In some of these countries, where matters of the same kind are openly discussed, such arguments as we find in this essay are, at least unofficially, as plain as daylight to everyone.

Some Americans may believe that Socialist Realism or "socrealism," as it is called, is nothing more than a style applied in the literature and art of the Soviet Union and in those areas to which its influence extends, a style which bears witness to the nineteenth century tastes of bureaucrats for wedding-cake architecture, for flat colors in painting, and for plush luxury. That anyone who opposes this system of aesthetics is committing a political offense might appear fantastic. But unfortunately, socrealism is not merely a question of taste. It is a philosophy, too, and the cornerstone of official doctrine worked out in Stalin's days. Socrealism is directly responsible for the deaths of millions of men and women, for it is based on the glorification of the state by the writer and artist, whose task it is to portray the power of the state as the greatest good, and to scorn the sufferings of the individual. It is thus an effective anaesthetic. The inferiority of poetry, novels, plays and pictures produced in accordance with this formula cannot be avoided, since reality, which is quite disagreeable, has to be passed over in silence in the name of an ideal, in the name of what *ought* to be. However, such an inferiority does not prevent, and indeed facilitates, the extension of

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the influence of this kind of mass culture. The battle against socrealism is, therefore, a battle in defense of truth and consequently in defense of man himself.

Literature in Western Europe and America has never had the social character it possesses in Eastern Europe, except perhaps during the Reformation, when the writer spoke on behalf of a specific religious community. Although the political part played by certain writers has sometimes been great (Rousseau and Voltaire are obvious instances), the collective imagination has never had its archetype of bard, leader, and teacher. Historians of literature can refer only to the isolated example of Ireland in this respect. The violence of national and social conflicts in the eastern territories of Europe has made specific demands on writers. The origins of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 may well have been the Petőfi Club, so named after the nineteenth century poet, and if so this has symbolic meaning and is simply the repetition of an older pattern. The history of Polish-Russian relations can largely be reduced to the collision of two different concepts of freedom, concepts maintained by writers and closely bound up with their pedagogic functions, different though these functions were in the two countries. After the 1917 revolution in Russia, writers were given the honorary title of "Engineers of Souls." This was not particularly novel. It would never occur to the President of the United States to consider poems and plays, and to wonder whether their authors should be rewarded or exiled to Northern Alaska. But the authorities of America have never regarded literature as dangerous to themselves or as an important instrument for maintaining power. In Russia, on the other hand, Tsar Nicholas I personally censured Pushkin's verses. Revolutionary movements in Russia were created by the intelligentsia, who let off steam by writing and used words as a substitute for, or introduction to, action. When the Communist Party established its dictatorship, it retained the custom of allotting a high social rank to writers. And the theory of socrealism itself, which the party adopted, took shape long before the revolution, as this anonymous Russian shows. For these reasons the present work is not merely the reflection of arguments about aesthetics, of no interest to the public at large. The game is being played for much higher stakes.

Faced with statements such as those made by the anonymous Russian writer, issuing from the mysterious East, many Western readers may well tend to be incredulous. This irony, this kind of lyrical rage, strikes them as the privilege of modern writing, which could not have developed in a country deprived for decades of any kind of contact with the outside. Hence the suspicion may arise that here we have a čase of the "internal emigré," imitating forbidden but longed-for foreign models. But to claim this would be to disregard the fact that Russian literature is vast enough to provide models to satisfy anyone.

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Even before 1917, Russia was one of the biggest consumers of books, and although most of the enormous number of books published in Russia since the Revolution are official and mediocre, there also have been a good many Russian or foreign "classics"—the last in excellent translations. This saturation by the printed word constantly creates, as it were, a surplus of demand, which cannot be satisfied by the current monotonous production. Even during the worst periods, a second current has always existed alongside the official one: the unpublished Boris Pasternak, for instance, had a few thousand admirers who knew his verses by heart. When "coexistence" started, tourists who visited Moscow brought back poems circulating in manuscript mainly among young people. These were examples of a large body of totally unknown works by prisoners in concentration camps and by students. Some are remarkable for their high quality, and all are imbued with various shades of sarcasm and irony. The anonymous Russian is therefore not alone in his stylistic leanings.

THE PROBLEM OF SOCREALISM is much less simple than it might appear at first sight. Despite many attempts, the elements which constitute its theory have never been combined into a harmonious whole. In fiction, the division of characters into "good guys" and "bad guys" is required just as it is in any Western. The hero is allowed to have some doubts and make some mistakes, but good must finally triumph. Yet this good does not mean morality based on the Ten Commandments, but simply the individual's conformity with the communal aim. And this aim is the victory of the revolution throughout the world. But since victory can be obtained only through a state led by the Party, the aim is everything which assists the Party to increase the state's industrial, military, and other strength. So the norms of individual behavior are to be found not within an individual, but are determined from without: the "subjective honesty" of a man who, motivated by moral impulses, might condemn the use of tanks in Budapest does not lessen his "objective guilt," for the independence of Hungary would be at variance with the interests of the Soviet Union and hence with the interests of the Revolution, i.e., of all mankind. Although this reasoning is crude, it is not difficult to perceive its origins in the German philosophy of history of the first half of the nineteenth century, which introduced the concept of historical development taking place independent of our wishes and desires. This philosophy fell on remarkably fertile soil in Tsarist Russia, because its solidified social structure faced the individual with obstacles whenever he tried to exert his own will; he therefore learned to make the system itself responsible, even for his own incompetence. In this way powerful habits of mind were formed, encouraging dreams of revolution to solve all the personal problems of men and women faced with the world; moral norms were transferred from the inner forum of the conscience to a providential historical process. This transfer was characteristic of the Russian progressive

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intelligentsia, and was noticed by Dostoevsky, who wrote in his *Diary of a Writer* in 1873: "By making man dependent on every error in the social system, the science of environment reduces man to total loss of personality, to total release from all individual obligations and any kind of independence, it reduces him to the worst slavery imaginable." This shows that the apparently naive formulas for novels and plays, laid down by the party for writers to follow, were preceded in Russia by many decades of argument as to the relations between the individual and society.

What the anonymous Russian writer does for us is to let us for a time enter the skin of a Russian, into a circle inaccessible to anyone without the same background of experiences and rooted in another tradition. His wide knowledge of Russian literature both old and new shows we are dealing with a professional, whose answers to the fundamental questions are not merely academic, for his own progress and realization of himself as a writer depend on them. The most important point in his argument seems to me to be this: the Great Aim—the glory of Russia as sung in the eighteenth century by Derzhavin—was found again at the moment when Lenin seized power, when Russia was torn asunder by the revolutionary movement, after the doubts and searches of the nineteenth century. From this time on, Russia has been the chosen nation, a *Welthistorische* Nation, since it has chosen to be the instrument of a providential historical process leading "out of iron necessity" to Communism throughout the world. The hymns of praise that were sung in the past to the Russian state, assurances of the high vocation of the Russians and their superiority to other nations, were justified *ex post*. The light of the universal task (the salvation of man) has dawned upon Russia. Therefore, singing the praises of that future happiness which is to be the lot of all men, and this ceaseless ode in praise of themselves (which is what Soviet literature is) amounts at the same time to an ode in praise of tomorrow. Socrealism emerged from the fusion of two creeds: belief in the mission of the Russian nation and belief in the mission of the (Russian) proletariat. The anonymous Russian writer has had the courage to reject both these creeds, for he believes that an aim attained by methods such as have been used changes into its very opposite: "So that prisons should vanish forever, we built new prisons. So that all frontiers should fall, we surrounded ourselves with a Chinese Wall. So that work should become a rest and a pleasure, we introduced forced labor. So that not one drop of blood be shed any more, we killed and killed and killed."

THE COMMUNISTS of several countries west of the Soviet Union —first the Yugoslavs, then the Hungarians and the Poles—adopted the phrase "the humanizing of Marxism," and many of them paid a high price to oppose what they regarded as a parody of Karl Marx's thought. Literature and art played a leading part in these attempts to do away with dogmas that were crushing man, and it is no exaggeration to say

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that the breakdown of socrealism has opened the prison gates. Nevertheless the "humanizing of Marxism" depends in the first instance on changes in the Soviet Union, for until they come about, attempts undertaken in other countries ruled by the Communists will continue to fail. That is why the voice of this anonymous Russian is so important, and it is interesting to consider how far it bears witness to a ripening of new tendencies directed against the heritage of the Stalinist era, and also what prospects these new tendencies have of emerging triumphant. Moderate optimism seems called for, since the number of factors working for or against are about equal.

Technical progress requiring a whole army of highly educated specialists, and the development of education both in high schools and in universities, are bringing conditions into being in which social sciences, literature and art shackled by dogma clearly do not fit. The main argument used by Soviet "liberals" is the fact that readers and audiences are more intelligent than the product served up to them by the highly paid practitioners of socialist realism. A simplified picture of the world is not enough; the demands of these readers and audiences cannot be satisfied until the presentation of life in the Soviet Union is cleared of its numerous taboos. The falsity of novels, poems and plays which sterilize reality is too self-evident. These readers and audiences want the truth, at least as savage as that of Khrushchev's 1956 report. And this public, capable of thinking for itself, is going to increase. Thus the very fact that the Soviet Union is changing into a highly industrialized country supports the campaign carried on by those who share the views of our anonymous writer, even though they have to be more circumspect in the way they set about uttering them.

Still, we must not forget that the writer is a Russian, and is guilty of *lese-majeste* in criticizing his own civilization. His fellow countrymen obtain plenty of nourishment every day for their national pride, and the government makes sure that this nourishment never runs short. Though they cannot eat the moon, it bears the emblem of the hammer and sickle. Collective glory is not something fictitious; it is very real, and has been acquired by ruthless indifference to human life. Socrealism has served for several decades as a drug exciting activity, and the effectiveness of hymns of praise has been proved. Should this tried and tested creed be jettisoned, and, instead of rejoicing at measurable results, should one turn to what is immeasurable—the happiness and unhappiness of man?

Attempts at drawing analogies between the Russia of the past and present-day Russia may well lead to errors. Nonetheless, it is likely that the Russians who want freedom and justice find themselves in conflict with most of their fellow countrymen, just as their predecessors did. This is what happens when criticism of things as they are seems to go against patriotism. Admittedly, Russia is no exception in this respect, and there are other societies in which the cult of *raison d'etat*

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was and is highly developed. Yet, the case of Peter Chaadaev, author of *The Philosophical Letters* gives some indication of the strength of this cult inside Russia. When Chaadaev, in 1836, published one of these *Letters,* public opinion was so incensed that the Tsar did not even think it necessary to jail the unfortunate philosopher: obedient doctors diagnosed the originator of the uproar as a lunatic. But as we now know, Chaadaev's severe judgments regarding his own country were little short of prophetic. Thus he said: ". . . we are one of those nations which do not seem to be an integral part of the human race, but which exist only to give some great lesson to the world. The instruction which we are destined to give will certainly not be lost: but who knows the day when we will find ourselves a part of humanity, and how much misery we shall experience before the fulfillment of our destiny?"

Alexander Herzen, too, was to find that even the most progressive circles supported him only as long as he did not question the frontiers of the Tsarist Empire, and Russia's right to dominate the territories she had conquered. Each one of us should beat his breast and ask himself whether he does not tend to modify attacks on his own native institutions, if these attacks are likely to expose him to the charge of subversion and assisting enemies from without. Russia has given the world many evangelically pure men and women, fearless in condemning evil, and fully aware that that which is to be rendered unto God is not the same as that which is to be rendered unto Caesar. The writer of this essay is one of their number. Yet a government has effective means at its disposal to prevent independence of mind; for no matter what may be the feelings of those it governs, they will be united whenever national pride is to be upheld. We can only cling to the hope that the day is nevertheless approaching when the Russians "will find themselves a part of humanity."

THE LAST WORD ON THE CANDIDATES

"John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon are quite different men. Yet there is a quality they have in common, something not quite tangible enough to be defined outside of metaphor. Neither seems to be a man at whose funeral strangers would cry."--Murray Kempton, *The Progressive,* Sept. 1960

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POLITICS OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE

Some months ago there took place in Cambridge, Mass. a discussion among student leaders, especially those who had been active in the movement for Negro rights, on the relevance of non-violent resistance to larger political problems. Both for their intrinsic interest and as reflections of the thinking that is now taking place among liberal and radical students, we are pleased to present here, in condensed versions, two of the presentations made at that meeting.—EDITORS

1. THE IDEA OF RESISTANCE

Michael Walzer

1. Disillusionment with the idea of revolution is one of the most interesting features of American intellectual life today. Since revolution was never a practical possibility in America, this disillusionment might seem as unimportant as the enthusiasm preceding it. What was always impractical has now become abhorrent; it is a part of the process of accommodation. And yet it is more than that, for in the light of recent history, it surely seems necessary to be at least critical of the revolutionary tradition. After seeing the terror and the purge and all that goes with the revolutionary transformation of a society, the brutal manipulation of human beings, the corruption of culture—after seeing all this we are none of us, I suppose, revolutionaries. We have renounced Bolshevik "realism"; we have accepted, in some secular fashion, the fact of human limitation; we have searched for moral laws and human rights so absolute as to control our activity and our goals. We have learned that there must be in human affairs a realm of the forbidden, of things which men cannot do. (I don't mean to deny that men, or rather *a man,* may on occasion have to do the forbidden thing; that is another question. It is important, however, that at such a moment he knows what moral risks he takes.)

But the general disillusionment has gone much further than this; men are never content to be taught elementary things. Having viewed the revolution through an apocalyptic haze, our intellectuals have come away so shaken by the vision as to renounce every spark of enthusiasm in their hearts and every utopian dream in their heads. They have fallen back in

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disorder upon the practical politics of pressure and reform. I say disorder because the retreat has brought with it no major re-examination of political alternatives. The defense of pragmatic, democratic politics has moved entirely between the poles of reform and revolution. We have been warned that any step outside the realm of conventional politics—outside the parties, the parliament, the system of pressures—is a step toward revolution and totalitarianism. Nothing is seen but terror on the one hand and gradual reform on the other. I would like to suggest that there are more possibilities than this—and especially that there is one, radical and far-reaching, but entirely compatible with the moral repudiation of revolutionary terror. (At the same time, I want to leave the question of revolution itself unclosed; the apocalypse may yet turn out to be an exaggeration.)

2. The idea of revolution in Western thought emerges in the course of the 17th century from the much older idea of resistance. Long before men conceived of a plastic political order which could be refashioned at will, they had developed modes of response to oppression. These responses were not aggressive and transforming, but were rather defensive and limited: they were designed to defend natural law, traditional rights or legal order. They involved civil and disciplined disobedience by groups of men led by the lesser magistrates, their immediate political superiors. Resistance was a form of collective defense of laws and rights. Its practicality was based upon two features of medieval life. It required, first, the existence of an objective body of laws and rights —whether divine, natural or conventional—in other words, of an ideal order. And it required, secondly, the existence of groups—corporations, guilds, churches, cities, provinces—capable of independent, cooperative and disciplined activity.

It is obvious that resistance can lead to a transfer of power; it approaches the forms of revolution. It can also lead to civil war, though this would be, in medieval terms, a "just war" rather than a crusade: it would have limited, secular reasons rather than millenarian purposes. The nonpayment of taxes, the refusal to publish the king's decrees, the passive refusal to stir at his command—these are all forms of resistance. They can be enacted at many different social levels, down to the smallest community of men which, in an organized fashion, can insist upon its immediate obligations to divine commandment or natural law, and refuse to obey the mightiest sovereign.

I have not presented here any picture of medieval practice, nor any adequate view of the highly developed theory of resistance. I have only intended to suggest an alternative politics to that of reform and revolution. Resistance has survived in the West as civil disobedience, but it has come, largely under the impact of protestantism, to be an individual activity and a matter less of objective law and right than of private conscience. Every conscientious objector is practicing a form of resistance; his disobedience is not revolutionary precisely because it is *civil*—that is, it is orderly and public, it involves no conspiracy, it does not require the total renunciation of the established social order. But civil disobedience can also be a collective activity. The 500 people who refused to take shelter when ordered to do

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so in New York's civil defense drill were practicing a form of resistance; so were the young people who "sat-in" at the Un-American Activities Committee hearings in San Francisco. And so, finally, are the Negro students whose demonstrations continue.

All these activities can be called resistance because they oppose governmental activity or social convention with an appeal to a higher law and to the conscience of the community; because they are orderly and disciplined activities, with limited aims; and finally because they express sentiment from "below" rather than policy from "above." Reform is always a governmental function, though governments are likely to act only in response to public demand. But resistance is entirely a popular and communal function. Revolution, as we have learned, is the task of professionals, requiring total commitment and life service; resistance is a politics for amateurs and citizens.

3. I would suggest that resistance can become considerably more extensive than it has yet been in modern America. The enormous growth of governmental power makes it increasingly necessary to develop means of communal and collective self-defense. It seems fair to argue that the effort of liberals to increase the participation of citizens in the affairs of government has failed. And the failure of participation, the virtually total inability of ordinary citizens to affect decision making, leaves resistance as the only possible response to the misuse of governmental power and to decisions wrongly made.

If resistance is to be effective in practice we need, first of all, to be less conscientious in our political activity, and more moral, less private and more communal. We need to free ourselves from the protestant tradition, which turns activity into personal testimony and the *actor* into a *witness*. We need to appeal without embarrassment to the religious and humanist traditions of objective law and human right, and we need to act collectively and not in such an eccentric and self-indulgent fashion as to alienate the mass of our potential colleagues. Resistance is ideally the act of an already constituted political community, led not by private individuals but by the elected officers of that community. But resistance is also a form of spontaneous action, producing entirely new kinds of association, discovering a new discipline in common needs and interests and throwing up new leaders. Even spontaneous association, however, has its roots in some shared identity and trouble and in some collective sense of power and possibility.

There is in every political society a system of concurrent powers, whether constitutionally recognized or not. There are always groups of men whose consent is required before policy can be carried out. Such groups exercise a kind of veto over policy decisions. One of the things we mean when we talk of mass society is that secondary associations and functional communities of this sort tend to disappear. They are replaced—never entirely—by bureaucratic organizations which represent the supposed interests of the old groups, but are no longer intimately responsive to their actual needs and desires. The politics of the old group was a kind of resistance: workers "sitting-in," peasants burning crops are different but related examples, and so are the various forms of cultural resistance practiced by reli-

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gious and ethnic groups, their struggles to maintain old laws and customs. The politics of the new organizations is largely a politics of dealing and pressuring: one of the indicators of "massification" is the replacement of communal resistance by organizational pressure. Parallel to this, of course, is the increasing isolation of the conscientious objector.

Members of Southern Negro churches and students on the various Negro campuses are currently reviving the forms of collective resistance. It is especially important that they have turned to the community at large for support, that they have insisted upon mass arrests and not permitted the martyrdom of the heroic individual, and that they have tried to enforce city-wide boycotts. In doing these things, they have moved beyond the lonely courage of the political witness. They are in search of a social basis for resistance. It is not too much to suggest that this search may replace, at least for a time, the search for a "new" revolutionary class.

Surely the answer to "states'-rights" is to insist upon the rights of still smaller groups—churches, universities, cities. But we need to develop also a sense of the rights and duties of "lesser magistrates," of those vast numbers of intermediate officials of all sorts, administrative and political, governmental, corporate and religious, whose independence and moral willfulness have withered away, leaving individuals to be acted upon directly by the national government. A benevolent and liberal state power ought to function as an enabling agency for magistrates and groups, setting limits and enforcing standards, of course, but also sponsoring and encouraging local activity. In the absence of such a state power, we need to imagine situations, however unlikely at the moment, in which unions would withdraw their members from participation in armaments projects, in which whole cities refuse to hold civil defense drills, etc.

It is a piece of the good-willed naivete of liberal reformers to refuse to recognize the rights of local obstruction. So long as legislation is merely human, evasion and resistance are perfectly legitimate responses. If the obstruction is itself oppressive, as it is in the South today, then men must organize and resist it in their cities, colleges, unions, in the name of human rights or of higher law. National reform is too often a kind of philanthropy, directed at "under-privileged" groups; resistance at its best is a kind of collective self-help. The two are not historically unrelated, and they are often both necessary—resistance prompting reform, reform making resistance possible—but surely the preference of radicals ought to be for resistance.

4. The boycott and the strike are forms of resistance, though the passive immobility of the sit-down is perhaps its best symbol. All these were first used in the fight against economic injustice, and socialists once hoped that the worker would carry on from these activities to revolution. But the refusal to work, the refusal to buy, the refusal to move are not, in fact, revolutionary. They are acts of stoppage and withdrawal, expressions of discontent, requiring physical presence, self-control and solidarity. But they do not point to transformation and utopia; they aim at concrete grievances and at limited self-aggrandizement; they defend, often enough,

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threatened standards and ancient liberties, the good society which once had been. The general strike in Budapest in 1956 seems to me an act of resistance: a public and demonstrative repudiation of an oppressive ruling party. But in the absence of any group comparable to the Puritans, Jacobins or Bolsheviks, it would be difficult to argue that there was an Hungarian revolution, in the full sense of that term.

Whatever the social level on which it is enacted, and whatever the forms employed, resistance implies an essentially defensive politics. I do not mean to renounce that more purposive and aggressive politics which is so important an element in revolution. But perhaps, after all, utopias are not established or even approached through the old revolutionary channels: by seizing governments, writing constitutions, announcing decrees and enforcing them with a new police. Such activities may still be necessary—and if necessary then worthwhile—in Africa and Asia. But in the West today what we must look for in politics is the defense of standards, the protection of rights and liberties, the maintenance of life. These are not little things, and each of them is endangered and threatened by those historical trends whose conclusions have become contemporary cliches: mass society, garrison state, totalitarianism. Against all these, the forms of resistance are appropriate. Indeed, insofar as communities exist through which resistance is possible, the grotesque and awful future we so casually promise one another may safely be postponed. The possibility of communal resistance, and not the balance of organizational pressures, is the only test of a pluralist and democratic society. When consent becomes a platitude and a myth, resistance is the proper activity of citizens.

2. THE NEW PACIFISM

Stephan Thernstrom

Only an extraordinarily prescient observer could have predicted the revival of the American pacifist movement in the fifties. Shattered by the international crisis of the late thirties, pacifism had become by 1941 an intellectually bankrupt, morally compromised appendage to America First.

The New Pacifism has been called into being by advances in military technology. Our age of nuclear terror has given new force to the pacifist dogma that war is the supreme evil, to be avoided at all costs. In recent months the cause of non-violence has reaped further gains from its dramatic application in the Southern sit-ins. Particularly for students, the philosophy of non-violence put into practice in the South exercises a seductive appeal. Pacifism appears a bright shining cause. The battles of the thirties are dead, and the traces of radicalism that have survived the thirties seem quaint and cold. The other alternative, the pallid defensive liberalism of the fifties, is equally uninspiring. The

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longing for a total vision of life which popularized crisis theology on the campus in the fifties may find expression in pacifism in the sixties.

If pacifism is to become a significant radical force in the sixties, it would be well to give its credentials careful scrutiny. Pragmatic choice of non-violent tactics in appropriate circumstances is one thing; espousal of the pacifist world-view quite another. My purpose here is to insist on this distinction, and to argue that pacifism as a total vision of life is highly unsatisfactory.

1. At the very center of pacifism is a core of faith which resists rational analysis and evaluation. A probing discussion of the roots of pacifism inevitably drives the pacifist into a leap of faith his questioner is unable to take. This is most evident when a secular non-pacifist confronts a religious pacifist. It is equally true, if less obvious, when he opposes a pacifist whose point of departure is humanist. The gulf that divides their views of "human nature" is ordinarily so profound as to be unbridgable. Thus an exposition of "the pacifist ethic and humanism" by a leader of the Student Peace Union declares that "such eminent psychologists as Karl Menninger, Erich Fromm and Sigmund Freud [!] have pointed out that love is a more powerful force than hate." The same writer advances as a central tenet the principle that "it is more important that we do good ourselves than that we suppress evil in others." Both of these dogmas rest on assumptions about the quantum of good and evil in the universe which many non-pacifists will find difficult to accept.

Hume has shown us the inescapable gap between fact and value, and we all recognize that ultimate value judgments involve some leap of faith. But the pacifist, I believe, displays a curious eagerness to leap into darkness at the earliest opportunity rather than as a last resort. A longing for absolute solutions is integral to the pacifist ethos. Consider the recurrent pacifist complaint that every war has "failed," and that hence we must abandon war as a method of solving disputes. The simple-mindedness of this line of reasoning is staggering. It is perhaps fortunate that few pacifists feel compelled to draw the obvious inference that capitalism, socialism, Christianity, democracy, and marriage have also "failed."

2. Three crucial premises of pacifist argument demand closer inspection. The first of these is the assumption that the principle of consent is sufficient to explain the functioning of a complex social order. Deceived by the rhetoric of liberal democracy, pacifists sometimes speak as if American society were based entirely on the consent of its members, and blithely assume that the principle of consent can be extended into the arena of international politics. Pacifism of this variety is an especially naive version of Lockean liberalism which nervously lifts its skirts at the mention of social *power*. Society is viewed as one vast Quaker meeting, a collection of sweetly reasonable atoms in which decisions emerge not out of conflict but out of "harmonious interaction."

This bias towards atomistic individualism, this blindness to power is a radical defect. Unable to comprehend society, pacifism of this variety is useless as a tool for political analysis. The pacifist stance is that of the Protestant evangelist. The object of action

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is to win souls, and all souls are equally candidates for salvation. Whatever the problem—a strike for union recognition, an international crisis over the economic privileges of an imperial power, a civil war—the pacifist appeals to the "spark of the divine" which is in every *individual.* The pacifist mentality is slow to recognize that societies are more than mere collections of souls, and that social decisions are shaped by forces other than individual will. Society is a structure of power, and the distribution of social power is determined by the clash of competing interest groups or classes. Social change takes place when one of the competing parties is able to grasp further power and wield it successfully.

An awareness of power relations is the prime ingredient necessary to construct what pacifism lacks—a social philosophy which locates discontented social groups which constitute a social base for a political movement. Michael Walzer's recent essay on "The Politics of the New Negro," [DISSENT, Summer 1960] for instance, reveals that not all Americans, not all Negroes, but certain Negroes in a specific social situation have acted as the driving force in the Negro student movement. As Niebuhr observes, "those who benefit from social injustice are less capable of understanding its real character than those who suffer from it."

3. An important segment of the pacifist movement—represented by A. J. Muste and some younger radical leaders like James Lawson—can be partially exempted from this charge. Conceding that power pervades society, pacifists of this persuasion fall back on the assumption that there is a qualitative difference between violence and other forms of social power. They embrace, to varying degrees, political pressure and legal coercion as techniques of struggle, but unreservedly condemn the use of physical force. It seems plausible to distinguish sharply between violence and other forms of power in a society which enjoys democratic political institutions. Where law comes clothed in the language of high moral purpose, it requires some hard-headedness to see that behind every law, however unanimous the consent of its subjects, stands the policeman's night stick. The very essence of law, indeed, is the exercise of social power (ultimately physical violence) in order to restrain recalcitrant individuals or groups. Let the pacifist struggling to win freedom for the Southern Negro ask himself whether or not the exercise of federal power on behalf of the Negro in recent years has materially aided his cause. An affirmative answer raises the question: has not the threat of violence been the ultimate sanction which has made federal power effective? There may be debate over the expediency of dispatching federal troops to Little Rock at a given time. But can it be doubted that the position of the Negro in, say, Mississippi would be much more dangerous if the *possibility* of Northern interference were removed? Bayonets alone will win no permanent victory for human rights, but in a desperate crisis sometimes only bayonets can protect them. (This is not, of course, to reduce the delicate legal and moral fabric of a democratic society to organized terror.)

4. A third pacifist tenet is the doctrine that, in pacifist lingo, "ends and means are convertible." From this premise it follows that one can never

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successfully use "bad" means for "good" ends, for bad means can have only evil consequences.

This is an age in which much blood has been shed in pursuit of utopia, and pacifists deserve credit for their perception that violence tends to be self-perpetuating. But it is false to insist that lesser-evil calculations must never be made in politics. Principled political action is in fact impossible without a clear grasp of the distinction between tactics and ultimate objectives, between ends and means. The *impossibilisme* which denies this is perilous, for when it is shattered by the imperative need to act, all restraint is gone. The history of the American pacifist movement in the thirties provides abundant documentation of this point. Pacifists here were generally quick to see the Fascist menace, and some urged aggressive "preventive measures" of a non-military character which might have severely hampered the dictators in the early years. But as the world moved closer and closer to war, pacifist fear of American involvement began to blot out the movement's moralistic internationalism. Foreign policy moved to the center of the American political stage, and pacifists felt increasingly compelled to take politically relevant *action* against "that warmonger" in the White House. Forced away from their lofty internationalism by the pressure of events, many American pacifists then plunged into ugly isolationism.

5. A word on pacifist "successes." The pacifist asserts the universal applicability of non-violent methods as a substitute for war and revolution, and triumphantly cites such "evidence" as the Indian Liberation movement and the Southern sit-ins. Of how much real weight as evidence for the pacifist proposition are such instances? The history of each is too complicated to enter into here, but one point is clear to the non-pacifist. In each case, the conditions of the struggle and the nature of the antagonist were peculiarly well-suited to non-violent action.

It is quite possible that the circumstances of our age will make non-violence increasingly suitable as a technique of mass action. The development of military technology has already proceeded to the point where the state frequently possesses such a monopoly of the means of violence as to make it impregnable to military assault from internal revolutionary forces. The frontier nickname for the Colt 45., "Old Equalizer," sums up the age of small arms warfare now dead. In a world of tanks and jet fighters, Ghandian methods of mass resistance may be the only effective means of opposing a regime in many cases. But the only test of this hypothesis is the pragmatic test.

The pacifist true believer scorns such tests. For him, peace is the overarching, all-embracing good (the Peace that surpasseth understanding. . . .) He is right to maintain that nuclear war is unthinkable. But large-scale military conflict with conventional weapons is improbable and dangerous, not unthinkable. More limited military conflicts will be unfortunate but these are almost certain to recur again and again. The choice of violence is evil, but often a lesser evil. Peace is a value, but not the highest value. There will again be times of painful choice, times when the radical must choose not peace but freedom and equality.

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SOME PROPOSALS FOR THE SIXTIES

Michael D. Reagan

Like other dissenters, I can go along with a number of the specific proposals of the major party platforms (particularly the Democratic document) for meeting the domestic needs of the Sixties. But socialists and radicals, it seems to me, must challenge liberalism's assumption that ameliorative measures are enough. We must go beyond liberalism to begin the task of reshaping the social structure so that it will be compatible with the goals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.

American liberalism is a straddle between democracy and plutocracy: it assumes that a society of political and social equality can be erected upon an economic base of flagrant inequality. It asserts that the formal political equality of one man—one vote is in itself sufficient to ensure the responsiveness of public policy to the needs and demands of the majority, ignoring both the direct political power of wealth and the barriers to social and cultural equality that it inexorably creates. But democracy is more than a procedure for discussion and voting; it is a way of life, the way of sufficient equality of condition so that, as G. D. H. Cole said, "no one is so much richer or poorer than his neighbors as to be unable to mix with them on equal terms."

Most liberals assume that competitive individualism and private initiative provide an adequate base for community life. I assume that industrial democracy must make decisive inroads upon the managerial hierarchy of modern capitalism, that the goal of individual fulfillment today requires a community-provided base of much expanded proportions, and that the optimum human use of our economic resources can only be attained through overhead planning. Paul Johnson's words, although written with Britain in mind, are equally applicable here:

> The function of Socialism is not to improve, but to change society. Having consented to operate within the framework of nineteenth-century society, Labour now finds that it has accomplished most of the tasks which this limitation allows. It therefore has the choice of becoming a party of government, concerned primarily with administering a social structure to which it has become reconciled, or attempting to change the structure.

To give concreteness to these differences in assumptions, I submit a group of proposals—illustrative and tentative rather than exhaustive and firm—that might stir further discussion toward a platform for a dissenters' political movement.

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Integration

The Negro, the Puerto Rican, the Mexican, are all discriminated against in their political, economic and social rights. While there is general sentiment for the breaking down of the most egregious barriers to treatment of members of minority groups as individuals, an effective program must go beyond what many liberals are prepared to advocate. Specifically, dissenters should propose:

1. Permanent federal registration of voters for all elections. This can help overcome the obstacles to Negro registration in the Deep South. Plans involving the filing of suit or the exhaustion of state administrative remedies subject the Negro to coercion and delay, and are too complex for all but the well-educated.

2. National FEPC and Fair Housing Practices legislation. To rely upon state action is to leave the problem untouched in exactly those states and communities where it is most serious. Fair employment and housing practices would mean a great increase in freedom and dignity for all minority groups—racial, ethnic and religious.

3. *Giving priority to integration when it conflicts with other social goals.* Liberals have let integration go by the board when it interfered with other goals in housing, education, etc. We must put integration first, for segregation is the deepest blot on the national conscience. If this means no federal aid to education, then so be it. The "pragmatic" approach, which separates the segregation issue from all other issues, means separating the issue from all the most effective tools of persuasion. When federal funds of all kinds are withheld from segregated projects and from institutions and communities permitting segregation, the hard choice will be made for integration.

4. Ending the proletarian-outcast status of farm workers, particularly migrants. Because these families are excluded from most protective legislation (though they need it most) and are largely unorganized (though an Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee of the AFL-CIO is at last making an attempt), they are in a position as bad as that of textile workers in the early 1800's. Application of minimum wage, child labor, and unemployment compensation programs to farm workers, plus special requirements for housing and education, are essential first steps toward helping these most disadvantaged of Americans.

Distribution of Income and Wealth

On April 15, 1960, the *Wall Street Journal* carried a story on the newly released income distribution figures for 1959, reporting that average family income had risen 4% to $6,520. The *Journal* did not report that the government statistics also showed that the *median* income (half the nation earned more, half less) for 1959 was $5,300; or that the *modal* income (the most frequent or usual family income) was only $4,600, and this before taxes. The median and modal incomes, however, are much the more meaningful figures in providing a picture of the degree of general well-being, and $4,600 presents a slightly different picture from $6,520.

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Just as the commonly presented, and commonly accepted, picture of "average" income is distorted upward, so also is the assumption of continuing redistribution of income from top to bottom. The facts are, however, that redistribution has been a top-to-middle phenomenon; that the tax system does little to dent the pre-tax disparities in income; and that the distribution of personally held wealth (as distinct from current income) remains almost as unequal now as in 1922, and the inequality has been *increasing* since 1949.

The overall picture for 1959 is that 7.5 million families and unattached individuals had incomes below $2,000, their collective share of income being 2%; 11.6 million families in the income range of $2,000–$3,999 received 10% of personal income while constituting 21% of the population; and the top 5% of income receivers with incomes over $15,000 received 21% of total income.

To understate the matter, it is clear that ours remains a most unaffluent society for at least three-fifths of the families. The consequences of poverty include above average sickness, both physical and mental; below average—even below minimum—housing; and, in the lowest fifth, permanent conditions of squalor, ignorance, and total lack of opportunity for the children of such families to break the vicious circle.

The direction of policy in which we must move is clear: a revitalization of the redistributive mechanisms—particularly the Federal income tax—that have largely broken down. While rapid economic growth and full employment must underly our efforts, they are not in themselves sufficient, for the most disadvantaged groups do not gain enough from general raising of the national income to lift them out of the vicious circle of despair and lack of opportunity. As Moses Abramovitz has written, "Whereas only a rise of average income could eliminate the widespread poverty of a century ago, only redistribution of income can alleviate the poverty of relative deprivation."

Industrial Democracy

The phrase "industrial democracy" is generally used with reference to relationships within the plant community. The need for democratization, however, is just as great at the level of "macroeconomic" decision making, and both areas are referred to here.

Despite the mandate of the Employment Act of 1946, we continue to suffer from inflation and unemployment—which we now ingeniously manage to bring about simultaneously. We have done little to assure integrated planning toward the goals of maximum employment, production and purchasing power, and nothing to relate the composition of production to the priorities of human need. The result is that we are, as Robert Heilbroner states, "in the unpleasant position of watching our society change under the impact of its own technology while we stand impotently by to suffer the consequences for better or worse."

It is time to back up the Employment Act with an effective planning

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process, while also enlarging the scope of national economic goals to include substantive targets for income distribution and public sector goods and services. To leave economic performance to "the market" is, in the modern, concentrated economy, to leave it to the interplay of powerful, hierarchically organized interest groups—and to the corporate-Defense Department elite of the cold war economy. We already have planning—private planning. We need to make it public so the planners will be accountable to the electorate, and the planning will serve public ends. A set of public expectations as operational standards needs to be worked out (through the party-political process, which has at least the formal equality of one man-one vote) and brought to bear upon economic allocation through a central planning agency under Presidential direction to produce the broad diffusion of ultimate authority which democracy implies. A first step in this direction would be the passage of the Clark-Reuss bill, which calls for public hearings on price increases that might cause inflation, and for the setting of precise goals for employment, productivity and growth in the President's *Economic Report*. In time, control over private investment, both its rate and its areas of application, would be needed also.

Because the inflation-recession cycle continues to plague the economy, and attempts at stabilization have frequently suffered from split authority (President-Congress-Federal Reserve) over monetary and fiscal control, we need to do with tax, spending and monetary policy what we have done with tariff policy since 1934: put the initial power of decision in the hands of the President, and give the veto power to Congress, thus reversing existing arrangements in order to secure prompt and coherent action.

In the micro-policy area, the needs are for democratization of the workplace, a guaranteed annual wage, and controls over corporate power. Frank Marquart has written of the "sole prerogative" principle, by which management alone determines

> what is to be produced, how it is to be produced, how much is to be produced, what plants are to be built and where, how much capital is to be invested, what kinds of machinery are to be installed, when workers are to be hired and when they are to be laid off, and how production operations are to be rationalized.

Behind this authoritarian system, and despite all the "human-relations-in-industry" literature, lies the assumption that the worker is but a "factor of production." Even the unions, as Marquart says, do not challenge the system; in fact, they further it by the leadership's disapproval of internal opposition and critical discussion.

Restructuring of the corporate world requires breaking through the sole prerogative principle to a recognition of the social character of the work process, of the legitimacy of the worker's claim to a voice in the decisions that affect his life more intimately than those of political government. But it also calls for internal union democracy. The role of public policy is not to impose democracy from above, but to en-

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courage the strengthening of unions so that their bargaining power may produce managerial concessions to worker participation, and to ensure the openness of union processes to internal opposition.

Wage employment in a fluctuating economy means that the cost of business downturns falls most heavily on the class least able to bear it, the hourly wage-worker, while the corporation escapes its share of the burden by treating labor as a variable cost rather than as part of overhead. Supplemental unemployment benefits and guaranteed wage plans should be encouraged, to give additional impetus to the technological forces that are gradually shifting employment from blue- to white-collar status. The discrepancy in dignity between the insecurity of an hourly wage employee subject to sporadic lay-offs and the security of the monthly or yearly salaried employee who is assured full time income is one of the sorest injustices of the industrial economy.

Our system of business regulation is in need of complete overhaul—not only because of bribery, lying, inefficiency and stupidity in the regulatory commissions, but because we are regulating what could be controlled by the market (e.g., much of the transportation industry) while not regulating the more significant power of the non-utility industrial giants and not doing the important job of policy formulation.

We regulate railroad rates (when truck and air competition might do the job as well) but leave General Motors free to make investment and price choices that may spell inflation or deflation for the whole economy. We manipulate the credit supply so that the consumer, the home-buyer, the small businessman, and school construction bear the burden while the large corporation continues to spend whatever it likes through internal financing. Of all the "independent" regulatory commissions the Federal Reserve is the only one with powers of fundamental importance to the maintenance of full employment, and yet it is the farthest removed from Presidential direction. And so on, and so on, and so on.

The regulatory commissions need abler appointees and a code of ethics, but they need something more drastic: They need to be abolished. Their policy-making and operating functions should be placed in a federal line department under direct Presidential supervision. (They are now, by law, largely outside Presidential jurisdiction.) Their quasi-judicial functions (rate-setting, allocation of routes or broadcasting channels, e.g.) do call for some insulation from partisanship, but this can be provided within the administrative process at least as well as by the present system of *in*dependence from the Presidency with a consequent *de*pendence upon the regulated industries and the good-will of Rep. Oren Harris. With an end to independence, and the policy guidance of a National Resources Planning Authority, business regulation could perhaps begin to operate in the public interest. If it did not, after a reasonable trial period, then the straddle of regulation—which leaves initiative in private hands and the public without a

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positive policy—should be abandoned in favor of de-regulation of what can be left to market control, and public ownership of the remainder.

Housing, Education and Health

If the social balance is to be redressed, public expenditures must rise. And these expenditures must be largely federal, for only the national government has the tax capacity to do the job. The major party platforms recognize the need, but fail to establish priorities for public sector programs. Since everything can't be done at once, selection of the crucial areas is necessary. To my mind, these are housing, education and health.

To start with housing, we need much more of it (population growth is expected to exceed 35 million by 1975), much better (the 1950 census classified ten per cent of our housing as unhealthful and unsafe), and much faster (the pace of slum creation appears to outrun the pace of slum clearance).

A national housing goal of 2 million units per year has been widely suggested, of which one million would be for population growth; 300,000 for replacement of houses destroyed or otherwise withdrawn from use; and 700,000 to make some dent in the backlog of substandard units. Why can't the private sector take care of this? The best answer is that it manifestly does not. Average construction of new housing units per year is closer to one million than to two. In 1959 housing starts were 1.3 million; in 1960 the pace is slower. Even if there were more of it, private housing is far too expensive for those in greatest need. The national median price for a new house in 1958 was reported by the National Housing Conference to be $10,990. Using the rule of thumb that housing expenditure should not exceed one-fifth of income, the Conference figured that an income of $6,409 would be required to carry the minimum house—and less than 30 per cent of families had incomes this high.

If 7 out of 10 families can't buy new houses, let them buy those older houses that "trickle down," we are told. The trickle-down theory, however, unfortunately requires a surplus of houses at each price level in order to operate—and there has been no surplus in the post-war years.

How about apartment rental then? The National Housing Conference reports that three-bedroom apartments are generally more expensive than ownership, and that in most cities there are few or none to be had. The result is a situation familiar to any reader of the metropolitan press: entire families occupying one- and two-room apartments in converted single-family dwellings at rents higher per room than many luxury apartments on Park Avenue.

Since the private housing industry, even with subsidies, has demonstrated its inability to design and construct homes or apartments within the reach of low income families, and since nothing trickles down until already dilapidated, the only solution to the housing disgrace is a vastly increased and improved public housing program. The cel-

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ebrated American standard of living—and the non-material quality of life—could be balanced and raised perhaps more by a housing program than by any other single measure. But to achieve its full value, a public housing program must create participative, varied communities, not the urban "poor-houses" of earlier programs.

The public housing program's size might well be measured by the gap between needed housing and the private rate of construction: about 700,000 units per year. This would be somewhat of a change from the declining rate of public housing starts in recent years: 134,000 in 1946, 64,000 in 1953, and 10,515 in 1957!

A second crucial area is the educational system. The starting point of our thinking must be the recognition of a *national interest* in the quality of schooling received by *all* children *everywhere* in the nation. It is not a merely personal or merely local tragedy that Mississippi spends only $123 per pupil annually while New York can spend $362, and still have its educational budget a lower proportion of state income than Mississippi's. As with families, so with the states: those who have the least need the most. If vast inequalities in educational expenditure are allowed to continue for lack of significant national aid —and no amount of bootstrap self-help can overcome the hard fact of wide variations in state tax bases—then a heavy price will be paid in corresponding inequalities in chances for individual development and economic opportunity, and in political and cultural alienation. Just as no community can afford, ethically or practically, to give a second rate education to the children of its less affluent families, so the nation cannot afford the waste of talent and the human frustration caused by our failure to use national wealth to bring the educational systems of the poorer states up to the level of the best now known—and then to improve the best.

The most obvious needs are to improve existing schools and build new ones, so that a third of a million students can receive full-time education, and to raise the quality of teaching by the simple device of paying salaries adequate to compete with commercial occupations in the recruitment of well-trained, liberally-educated graduates.

As these immediate inadequacies are remedied, more subtle challenges should bring forth additional efforts. One such is the need for "enrichment" programs. By this I do not mean only or primarily that the most advanced students are given sufficiently challenging experiences, but that culturally underprivileged children are given the supplemental aid by which their natural capacities can be released from the constrictions imposed by educationally inadequate home and neighbhorhood environments. One experiment in a New York City junior high, in which slum-area children were exposed to museums, natural scenery and other taken-for-granted experiences of middle-class children—and, perhaps most important of all, received attention that assumed they were worth helping—has already shown dramatically favorable results. Educational equality of opportunity includes specifically the problem

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of creating motivation that will break the pattern of apathy and despair, and make capable children of educationally apathetic parents aware of higher education possibilities.

In the impending age of increased leisure, the quality of life can be improved by the development of adult education programs. We need to escape the vocational confines of existing programs to provide openings into the world of liberal culture for adults who, in their maturity, regret their failure to explore the liberal and fine arts in their formal education. And our children—*all* children; not just the "college-prep" contingent—deserve not less than their parents, and should be educated for a lifetime, not just for the first job. The two-class system in education must go: not all children can reach the same level of understanding in philosophy, art, science and literature, but all deserve to partake of their common cultural heritage so far as their capacities permit. If anything, as W. H. Ferry has argued, those who are *not* college-bound should receive the greater emphasis in their high school years upon a basic understanding of man and society than those who will have four more years' exposure.

The third focus of a social balance program should be on health—the creation of a national health service. Not just hospitalization, and not restricted to the aged, but a system universal in eligibility and coverage as in Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Medical care for the aged is indeed, as the American Medical Association charges, but an entering wedge for a larger program. The trouble is that it is *only* an entering wedge when we should have the whole program.

Housing, education, health—these are not the only areas in which expansion of the public sector can compensate in part for the inequities of class privilege generated in the private sector, but they are all "key" measures because they would provide, collectively, the necessary foundations for individual achievement.

The Media and the Marketplace of Ideas

Our chances of accomplishing any significant changes in institutions depend heavily upon prior changes in attitudes and ideology. These rest in turn upon the openness of the marketplace of ideas. And it is here that the most dangerous accretion of corporate power has been developing. Not content with its economic power, the modern corporation is branching out into education, community development and politics. Though business has long had disproportionate weight in the legislative process, corporations such as General Electric, Ford Motor and Gulf Oil have now taken the plunge into electoral persuasion as well—with all of us subsidizing the effort to the extent that corporate expenditures are considered tax-deductible. Through its charitable contributions deduction, again the corporations are attempting to exercise a trusteeship over education and cultural development. And all of this manipulating of the climate of opinion is done in the name of the corporate "conscience!" The best immediate way to diminish this push

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of the economically dominant institution into other areas of life appears to be to pull the corporation back to its goods-producing function by ending the tax-deductibility of political and cultural expenditures, and perhaps writing federal charters for the largest 500 firms, restricting them to economic functions. Then business men could compete in the marketplace of ideas on the same basis as the rest of us—with their own personal funds and talent.

Thanks to the less direct, but even more pervasive, influence of the corporations upon the "public" media of press and broadcasting, we are bombarded with stereotypes of the nineteenth century put forward as descriptions of the mid-twentieth: "individual enterprise," in a society over ninety per cent wage and salaried; "peoples' capitalism" as a label for a corporate ownership structure in which over ninety per cent of adults have no share and in which, in any case, shareholding bears little relation to control of industrial property.

Given the monolithic tone of the large-circulation media when they do enter the world of public policy, and given their entertainment orientation and consequent lack of attention to the real world, how can ideas, facts, proposals pointing the way to an alternative to the cold war-business culture obtain free entry to the arena? Given the middle-class, business-based sponsorship and management of the media, how can the needs and aspirations of the lower-middle and working class majority of the population be articulated?

The answer to these questions, as well as to that of realizing the cultural potential of broadcasting media, lies in the creation of non-commercial institutions, and the imposition of clearer public responsibilities upon the commercial media (whose continued existence must be assumed in this country). When the producer of a quiz show can defend rigging, deception and lies by pleading the "terror and panic that besieged us," something is wrong with the system. That something is of course monolithic commercialism, based on a concept of broadcasting as a service to advertisers: "The public," said another producer of rigged shows, "wasn't paying any admission price to watch these programs." The advertiser pays (though of course we pay the advertiser in inflated prices), therefore the advertiser calls the tune.

A partial remedy has been prescribed by Walter Lippman:

> The economic organization of the television industry is in conflict with the intent of the law, which is to use this valuable and essential monopoly for the public benefit . . . we shall be compelled, it seems to me, to establish alongside commercial television . . . another network founded on the principle of public benefit and moved by non-commercial motives.
>
> Such a network, which could be governed by disinterested citizens and operated by the frustrated and unhappy professions of the existing networks, could become a powerful competitor, and by the competition of its example a powerful regulator, of the existing commercial networks.

The new network could be financed—and a nice ironic twist this would be—by a percentage-of-profits charge upon the commercial net-

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works, as John Fischer has suggested. And it seems to me that it would be worthwhile also to impose separation of advertising from programming (the "magazine concept") upon the commercial networks. These changes would not of themselves usher in a new era of cultural creativity; but they would provide an institutional basis to encourage rather than stifle free discussion and free art.

The Reconstruction of Democratic Politics

Political commentators as diverse in viewpoint as Charles A. Beard and John Strachey have been united in seeing the problem of democratic politics as the problem of concentrated economic power versus the diffused power of numbers. But while Beard sees universal suffrage as embodying an impossible dream of political equality, Strachey sees one man-one vote as an essential and partially successful force for countervailing the push of monopoly capitalism toward ever-increasing inequality. The existence of a progressive income tax and the emergence of health care for the aged as a prime issue in a Presidential election year demonstrate the connection between the suffrage and the direction in which public policies are formulated. Conversely, the retention of the 27½% depletion allowance for the oil industry and the failure of federal wage, hour and child labor legislation to protect the retail clerk, the cannery worker, or the migratory family illustrate the strength of minority and property-oriented elements in our political system.

Our need is more accurately characterized as the creation rather than the maintenance of democracy. We began in 1789 with a constitutional structure explicitly designed to throw obstacles in the way of majority rule (See Madison's Federalist Papers No. 10 and 51) and then, as all texts in American government point out, we modified this system in the direction of greater democracy by the development of national political parties, the direct election of senators, and the abolition of the property qualification to voting, and the development of a *de facto* system for direct election of the President. But what the texts ignore is the gradual, and I suspect increasing, development of a counter-trend of vulgar Madisonianism.

What I mean by this is that we have not been content with the separation of power and checks and balances established in the Constitution, but have added to these a host of additional roadblocks which make more difficult the creation of effective government. Examples include ideas such as Calhoun's "concurrent majorities" doctrine, which in its modern form means that action is taken only when almost every organized group is willing to accept a program, and the attitude that a party split between President and Congress is a good thing because it provides a further check on power. Part of the pattern also are the establishment of autonomous agencies outside the sphere of Presidential control, the excessive judicialization of the administrative process, the seniority system of Congressional chairmanships, the irresponsible

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power of the House Rules Committee, and the denigration of party discipline and responsibility in the name of "independence."

The result of these anti-majoritarian accretions to an anti-majoritarian Constitution is a system celebrated in contemporary political science as "pluralism": public policy will be determined by the free interplay of opposing groups, slowly, without leadership, without planned objectives, without stepping on anybody's toes. One defect in such a system is that, to operate equitably, it must assume a balance of power among groups. Because such a balance does not exist, the forces of property and industrial power have made full use of the system's openness to organized group demands. *Their* toes do not get stepped on. The 1958 election and the passage of Landrum-Griffin in the 1959 Congress illustrate the size of the gap between the electoral factor—one man-one vote—and the wealth factor in our politics.

An anti-action, weak-government structure inevitably hurts the "have-nots," for their welfare requires change while that of the "haves" generally requires only that the status quo remain undisturbed. But the stronger government I want to see must also be a more accountable government, and a second significant by-product of this spurious pluralism is its destruction of governmental accountability to the electorate. Without party discipline and relative homogeneity, with an emphasis instead upon undisciplined narrow-interest groups, there is no way for a national majority of voters to hold their representatives to the program upon which they have been elected. So long as the determination of policy in Congress is free of party control, so long will we have an irresponsible government reflecting the will of economic power blocs rather than the will of the majority.

A dissenter's program of political reform, therefore, must have as its twin objectives the removal of Madisonian and pseudo-Madisonian obstacles to action, and the strengthening of the party-electoral process. The two being interdependent, what helps in one area will help in the other. For example, establishing full Presidential authority over the agencies of economic regulation would increase the degree of electoral control because of all the parts of our national system, it is the Presidency that can come closest to expressing the sentiment of a national majority. The party reform proposals of Stephen K. Bailey and James M. Burns provide the needed outlook and program: mass-based national party financing; simultaneous election every four years of the President, House and half the Senate; repeal of the 22nd Amendment; revision of the seniority system; strengthening of party policy committees in Congress; and a focus on the Presidential candidate as the policy leader for the whole party. Without structural changes toward a more majoritarian system, a liberal-radical program will be badly blunted, if not smothered, by the conservative coalition to whom the leaderless process of group pluralism is so supremely suited.

But politics is as much a matter of social as of governmental struc-

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ture: it is as much a matter of building a social movement as of revised political mechanics. Only a strong national party of industrial and farm labor, Negroes, and the liberal segment of the middle class can provide the power base for the "Coming Political Breakthrough" that Bowles and Schlesinger have been predicting. The earlier proposals of this paper—for civil rights, redistribution of income, economic democracy, and social balance programs—will have as an important by-product the strengthening of popular political capacity—in awareness, skills, wealth. Only as the organizations of *people* are given the support of public policy will they be effective counter weights to the organizations of *capital* that threaten to re-combine political and economic power in a new elite. As Daniel Bell has suggested, political action by labor can do more, and more equitably, than collective bargaining to raise sub-standard wages and assure full employment and full purchasing power by affecting fiscal and monetary policies. The NAACP's judicial politics also need to be followed up by Negro participation in other arenas of social change. The sit-in movement—spontaneous in origin and with widespread personal involvement—points the way to effective political action as well. The conviction that radical change is necessary and possible, it has now been demonstrated, can itself be the spark to ignite a significant social movement.

PREDICTION

If N beats K
Or K beats N
The electorate is bound to win
The blessings of a four-year grin,

A tusky joy—from film and page
Teeth meet the issues of the age.

Hail, autumn sun, by whose bleaching grows
Still whiter the reassuring rows

Till harvest time (no relation
To the dragon's dental semination)!

When N beats K—
    Not grim Nikita-You-Know-Who,
    Just Smiling Jack, or Bob, to you—
Or K beats N
Two faces smile in one again.

HAROLD ROSENBERG

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PRIVATE MAILER RE-ENLISTS

Robert A. Bone

Every Army psychiatrist is familiar with the strange phenomenon of re-enlistment. On Monday the rifleman hates the Army with a bitterness bordering on homicide. On Tuesday he signs up for a new hitch.

Clearly the impending transition to civilian life is more painful than the institutional adjustment which, however disagreeable, has become a habit. The soldier's adolescent years have been consumed in becoming a man, as the Army understands manhood. Now he is reluctant to begin again, on civilian terms. In the Army he leads a half-crippled existence; if he has seen combat, he is perhaps a good deal more than half dead. Yet this is preferable to the painful changes which await him.

Something of this sort has happened to the art of Norman Mailer. Metaphorically speaking, Mailer is in danger of becoming an Army career-man. It is readily apparent from his new book* that his emotional range has not transcended the rifle range. To be sure, he takes target practice under new auspices, having joined a hipster outfit as Pfc. (Prongsman First Class).

Hip is the "truest" experience Mailer has encountered in civilian life because it corresponds most nearly to his conception of truth as formed under combat conditions. But if he wants to grow, he must transcend his war experience, which represents an arrested development. On furlough from death, he must discover life. Otherwise he will be remembered not as the healer he hopes to become, but as just another casualty.

I

A good deal of the material in Mailer's new book stems directly from his war experience; the rest derives more tortuously from the same source. All of it is given form, in retrospect, by the unifying vision of Hip. The power of this vision—its usefulness in structuring experience—cannot be denied by anyone responsive to Mailer's best prose. The trouble is that Hip, as myth, is too narrow in scope to sustain a fully serious art. But perhaps it will be well to survey the terrain before taking up battle positions.

The intellectual core of *Advertisements for Myself* is contained in the from the embattled lower-class Negro, duced to its essentials, Mailer's argument runs as follows: against a background of official violence symbolized by atom bomb and concentration camp appears the hipster, the American existentialist. The hipster derives his life style as well as his language from the embattled lower-class Negro, who subsists on the margin of danger.

* *Advertisements for Myself*. Putnam. $5.95.

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Since we all live in the shadow of atomic incineration,

> . . . the only life-giving answer is to accept the terms of death, to live with death as immediate danger, to divorce oneself from society, to exist without roots, to set out on that uncharted journey into the rebellious imperatives of the self.

Mailer has undertaken such a journey in the pages of his recent book. Familiar landmarks are in sight, but his early concern with death and courage has given way to a variety of new themes. Foremost among them is the split in Western consciousness between mind and body, which has produced "a cancerous alienation of the senses." Closely related is the sexual orgy, which promises a healing release from the encroachments of machine technology on the human ego. To these must be added a religious note, almost mystical in character. In a brilliant review of "Waiting for Godot," Mailer presents an existentialist interpretation of the deity. God, he suggests, does not have it made; He is at the mercy of man's fate. In his next long novel, he intends to explore this theme.

Beginning with his discovery of Hip, Mailer's explorations have led him in the direction of a comprehensive world-view. It is neo-Romantic in essence, existentialist in its philosophical pretensions, and Reichian in its sexual-political emphasis. Whether the increasing ideological weight can be carried on the slender shoulders of the hipster is a question that must await the appearance of his forthcoming work.

II

It is time now to examine Mailer's values in the light of his war experience, and to discover, perhaps, the limits of his art. His language gives him away: "In 'The White Negro' we began a patrol through the theme of Hip which will continue through the rest of this book." It is his central metaphor. What follows (I am quoting from the "Advertisement for Games and Ends") is a portrait of the artist as squad leader, escorting his troops through a difficult and dangerous terrain.

Consider the following passages from "The White Negro":

> Any Negro who wishes to live must live with danger from his first day, and no experience can ever be casual to him, no Negro can saunter down a street with any real certainty that violence will not visit him on his walk.

What is this man but a soldier on patrol? The essay continues in a more explicit vein:

> Knowing in the cells of his existence that life was war, nothing but war, the Negro [read "soldier"] . . . could rarely afford the sophisticated inhibitions of civilization, and so he kept for his survival the art of the primitive, he lived in the enormous present, he subsisted for his Saturday night kicks, relinquishing the pleasures of the mind for the more obligatory pleasures of the body. . . .

Writing of the hipster's instinctive preference for movement, Mailer resorts to the language of combat: "In motion a man has a chance." He observes in the hipster, as in the soldier, "that incandescent consciousness which the possibilities within death have opened. . . ." In an essay on obscenity he comments: "I would like to express myself properly, and the true communication of soul to soul is speeded on its way, as every soldier and ex-soldier knows, by the foul lan-

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guage God gave our tongues. . . ." From these and similar examples it is clear that combat was the shaping experience of Norman Mailer's life.

Life is war, nothing but war, even for God:

> But most certainly, He is not all-powerful; He exists as a warring element in a divided universe . . . ; perhaps He is trying to impose upon the universe His conception of being against other conceptions of being opposed to His. Maybe we are in a sense the seed, the seed-carriers, the voyagers, the explorers. . . .

The hipster, in short, is a squad leader on patrol for the great General.

Life is an athletic contest in which the split-cheek formation affords a slight competitive advantage. It is a ruthless competition for pleasure, but there is not nearly enough to go around: "And so the sweet goes only to the victor, the best, the most, the man who knows the most about how to find his energy and not to lose it." Life is a war, and its characteristic atmosphere is hostility. Not since Adam Smith, however, has unrestrained aggression been regarded as an instrument of the greater good:

> . . . to be engaged in one primal battle: to open the limits of the possible for oneself, for oneself alone, because that is one's need. Yet in widening the arena of the possible, one widens it reciprocally for others as well, so that the nihilistic fulfillment of each man's desire contains its antithesis of human cooperation.

III

Under combat conditions, a soldier becomes morally desensitized. To smoke a cigarette or kill a man—*c'est égal.* The disease persists (it is the central disease of our time) as an absolute ethical relativity. Thus in Mailer we find good and bad rapes, good and bad pimps, and so forth:

> But the Negro, not being privileged to gratify his self-esteem with the heady satisfactions of categorical condemnation, chose to move instead in that other direction where all situations are equally valid, and in the worst of perversion, promiscuity, pimpery, drug addition, rape, razor-slash, bottle-break, what-have-you, the Negro discovered and elaborated a morality of the bottom, an ethical differentiation between the good and bad in every human activity. . . .

Like Hemingway before him, Mailer tends to blur ethical and esthetic categories. To pursue his argument to absurdity, we should have to recognize good and bad lampshades made of human skin (crazy, man). There is no room for *atrocities* in this scheme, but for Mailer there are no atrocities except those committed by the State. This view flows naturally enough from the military situation in which, for an individual soldier, moral choice is not really possible: "Hip sees the context as generally dominating the man, dominating him because his character is less significant than the context in which he must function." It is a view which would commend itself at once to a guard in a concentration camp.

Mailer also follows Hemingway in making a secondary virtue the center of his moral universe. This is the combat virtue of courage. The cult of courage leads in turn to Mailer's militant veteranism. In running Hemingway for President in *The Village Voice,* he cites his war record as a prime political virtue. Not unknown in the American Legion, this attitude is something of an innovation on the political left.

Mailer is treading on dangerous ground in his concept of a battle-

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tested elite. Knowing the man, knowing his anarchist inclinations, it would be a mistake to make too much of his militant veteranism. Yet something remains to be said. What Mailer admires on an individual plane would have disastrous consequences as an organized political force.

Mailer's flirtation with psychopathic violence is further evidence of his psychic war wound. He speaks of the inhibition upon violence which civilization exacts of us—a restraint relaxed on behalf of the combat soldier, and no doubt reimposed at the cost of a stormy emotional conflict. Hip provides Mailer with an outlet for his violent fantasies; this is perhaps the historic function of expressionism in the arts. But the right to unrestrained physical violence which Mailer demands is imprisoning, not liberating. Its projection on the international plane would do us all in. If human history progresses, in Mailer's phrase, "from melodrama, farce, and monstrosity," it will be precisely to the extent that the individual is freed from the tyranny of arbitrary violence.

It is only fair to add that Mailer is fully aware of the psychopathic potential in the hipster personality, with its tendency toward the unrestrained expression of violence and sexuality. Given the appropriate Square taboos, his apparent advocacy of Hip has been widely misinterpreted. Mailer himself is partly at fault, for the intrusion of repressed desire has not contributed to clarity. But buried wishes aside, Mailer's intellectual attitude toward Hip is roughly that of Marx toward early capitalism: it is brutal but progressive. His conception of Hip is not static but dialectic: thesis, Square; antithesis, Hip; with a new synthesis in process of becoming. This dialectical conception gives him the advantage of presenting, in tentative fashion, certain ideas for which he can at any time disclaim responsibility.

IV

The closer a soldier comes to combat, the more he finds himself in an all-male world. Where he does make contact with civilian populations, his characteristic sexual outlets are rape and prostitution. Under the circumstances, his attitude toward women becomes openly hostile and contemptuous. And so it is in Mailer's literary world, a bleak landscape which for all its sexuality is curiously without women.

This weakness is evident throughout the body of Mailer's work. As he surveys the literary talent in the room, for example, his female contemporaries remain invisible:

> I have a terrible confession to make—I have nothing to say about any of the talented women who write today. Out of what is no doubt a fault in me, I do not seem to be able to read them. Indeed I doubt if there will be a really exciting woman writer until the first whore becomes a call girl and tells her tale.

The world of Hip is of course thoroughly male chauvinist. The male alone, as Mailer reminds us in "The Time of Her Time," is capable of plain or fancy rape. In his discussion of the hipster idiom, he betrays his basic attitude: to goof, to flip, is to lose control, to "reveal the buried weaker more feminine part of your nature. . . ."

If a writer hates what is feminine in himself as much as this would suggest, he cannot create female characters who are more than men in disguise. A case in point is Cara Beauchamp of the "Prologue to a Long Novel": "She still had the masculine mind of a whore or a hostess—she was a

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businessman—she searched for synthesis, the big view. . . ." The only successful female character in *Advertisements for Myself* is Yuriko of "The Paper House"—perhaps because an ex-Geisha is a particularly feminine kind of whore. Norman Male-er. If he wants his art to grow, he must come to terms with his castration fears. He must learn from Tiresias, old man with wrinkled dugs, that a writer can be feminine without being effeminate.

It is worth observing parenthetically that Mailer, who is thoroughly Whitmanesque in temper, has written very little verse. Poetry, it would appear, is for sissies; a he-man wants his prose. Mailer's attitude toward the Beats is instructive: he sees them, with rare exceptions, as poets and pacifists, not really *macho*. Once again his attitude derives from his Army days. If the Squares are civilians, the Beats are non-combatants. They have adopted a life style based on danger, without having reached the front lines. Their only danger is from flying semen; they do not quality for the club.

V

Mailer's compulsive search for the apocalyptic orgasm can best be understood in terms of the sexual deprivation of the combat soldier. Gratification, if it comes at all, is a matter of the weekend pass and the one night stand. Sexual relations assume an obligatory character; there is only so much time to "score." With the right partner (see Mailer's prospectus for his new novel), you can not only make time, you can make Time stand still. For such a relationship has no past and no future, and few financial or emotional complications. In a word, it is adolescent: all gratification and no responsibility.

Translated into Hip, this wartime sexuality is reflected in such terms as "go," "beat," "getting your kicks," and "keeping cool." Here is a passage from "The White Negro" which is pure Guadalcanal:

> "Go" with its sense that after hours or days or months or years of monotony, boredom, and depression one has finally had one's chance, one has amassed enough energy to meet an exciting opportunity. . . .

To be "beat," by way of contrast, is to be sexually drained (combat fatigue).

"Getting your kicks" is a matter of thrill. The element of danger is essential, and is assured by recourse to drugs or some other criminal act. This calculated risk with the cops serves to separate the hipsters (crack divisions) from the squares (civilians). In sexual terms, it is an attempt to reproduce the intensity of the wartime love affair, "hopped up" by the proximity of death. "To be cool is to be equipped"; that is, combat-ready. But keeping cool, after all, is only a few degrees from frigidity. It is learned under fire, when the emotion to be mastered is fear. If it becomes a habit, one is rendered incapable of love.

"Coming out of the orgy of war," Mailer writes, "our sense of sex and family was torn in two." By destroying the stability of love relationships, the war promoted infantile modes of sexuality. This appears on the surface of Hip as an accent on adolescence. "All desire is lost," Mailer confesses, "for talking to readers older than oneself." Hip is "a language most adolescents can understand instinctively." Not content with halfway measures, "Hip proposes as its final tendency that every social restraint and category be removed . . . ,"—a typical adolescent demand. Here is a world in which,

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like the world of Madison Avenue, one is not permitted to grow old:

> It is not granted to the hispter to grow old gracefully—he has been captured too early by the oldest dream of power, the gold fountain of Ponce de León, the fountain of youth where the gold is in the orgasm.

But the tag "adolescent" does not do justice to the depth of the regression. Mailer says of the psychopath, ". . . the fundamental decision of his nature is to try to live the infantile fantasy." "Like children," he adds, "hipsters are fighting for the sweet. . . ." Their appetite for orgasm is voracious; they pursue what Wright Morris has called "the love that has no appeasement, the quest that has no resolution, the hunger that has no gratification." As in all forms of greed, the more they gorge the emptier they become.

The problem with pure appetite is that it becomes jaded. Since each orgasm must be more apocalyptic than the last, the hipster swings faster and faster to a stepped-up tempo of self-destruction. Confronted with a declining rate of profit, he resorts to exoticism. Hence marijuana. Hence strange fruit, whether interracial or bisexual. Hence Mailer's admiration for Paul Bowles, whose pioneer contribution to Hip is a short story which features the seduction of a father by his son. Hence Mailer's recent work in the vein of "The Man Who Studied Yoga" and "The Time of Her Time."

VI

So boundless an appetite eventually devours its possessor. As Wright Morris observes, "An infinite craving finds its resolution in a craving for the infinite." The suicidal tendency of Hip is nowhere more apparent than in the career of the late James Dean, hipster idol of the postwar generation. As for Mailer, the hero of his early story, "A Calculus at Heaven," is in search of the ultimate ecstasy of the death orgasm. And a fresh suicide is promised in his parting "Prologue to a Long Novel." The act of self-destruction, it would seem, engages Mailer's deepest instincts.

If suicide is the ultimate tendency of Hip, and combat its beginning, what could be more damaging to its claims on the literary imagination? A myth so confining can perhaps give structure to certain kinds of human experience. It can produce, for example, a great war novel. But it cannot provide the foundations of a mature art.

Mailer is right about the modern world: our century puts Barbary Shore to shame by its commitment to total war. But Hip was spawned in war; it is a symptom, not a cure for our malaise. To re-enlist is fatal.

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AMERICAN NOTEBOOK

Some Brief Comments On the Domestic Scene

Debasement of a Tradition

T. J. Ross

Among the staple TV Westerns is one called *Colt .45*. Its hero, as in most of these shows, is a cowboy-cop. The paces he was put through in an episode of a few months back—something titled "Gallows at Granite Gap"—exemplify the moral slant of all the TV action shows, a slant worth remarking on not only for its own grotesque sake, but also as a depressing reminder of how the tradition of the old-fashioned Hollywood action movie (before cinemascope) has been turned inside out by TV.

The *Colt .45* skit went this way: A criminal known as the Comanche Kid is about to be hanged. A matron seeks out the Kid's captors, Special Agent Colt and the neighborhood sheriff, to inquire about the prisoner's true ancestry, for she suspects the Kid may be her long-lost son. He had been kidnapped by the Indians in his infancy, but the mother hopes to ascertain his identity by means of a tell-tale scar on his chest. In a state of dramatic turmoil, she begs to be allowed to make this examination. Should the criminal prove to be her son, her joy of discovery will be scarred by the ghastly knowledge that she had given birth to a criminal-type. Since she herself is an innocent-mother-type, both Colt and the Sheriff feel for her and wish they could Do Something.

We have here an interesting and starkly simple situation, one which approximates to the primitively horrific and simple dilemmas of ancient tragedy, and which, in consequence, might have led (all within the half hour's format) to the moment of recognition and then perhaps to a resounding speech by Mother as she reproached the dooming paradoxes of fate, her eyes fixed all the while on her flesh-and-blood being marched off to his death. Or she might have risen to the more complex action of Choice and committed herself to death by her son's side as she attempted vainly to help him escape. Remaining, therefore, within the Code, the action might still have played itself out to a dignified and rousing conclusion. But what happens?

Sheriff leads Mother to the outlaw's cell. The Kid lurks in the shadows, a jauntily tilted sombrero covering half his face. He bares his chest, and

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it proves to be unscarred. Mother is so relieved that she explodes with a holier-than-thou crack at the Kid's expense: "I feel sorry for you"—then hastens away to catch the next coach back home, safe in the shelter of her stance as the wide-eyed, innocent-mother type.

But when the cell's incumbent removes his sombrero he proves to be —you guessed it—none other than the Special Agent, his vapid face contorted in a big "sheepish grin." The End.

THE POINT OF THE TRICK ending, however, contains a grim message of its own: that the Man with the Badge Knows What's Good For You even to the extent of being allowed *carte blanche* to poke his finger in the familial pie. The Man with the Badge now enjoys this freedom on all the action shows, Western or plainclothes; generally, his role, as in the skit just described, is to free a wholesome, adjusted type from guilt-feelings aroused by a sudden sense of connection to a shady, failure-type (the failure-type is quickly recognizable as the character who is or is about to become a criminal).

Take this skit from a Western called *Lawman:* A vicious badman comes to town. The Lawman-hero is a mature, hard-bitten type; his deputy is an apple-cheeked young sourpuss named Johnny. Of mysterious origins, Johnny has been adopted, and deputized, by the Lawman. But badman tauntingly reports that he is Johnny's dad. His morale upset, Johnny offers to resign his deputyship, for if badman is his dad then he himself is probably no good (a simplified point of view which none of the characters ever thinks to pause over). In the showdown badman is fatally shot by Lawman after drawing on both him and Johnny. Badman makes a death-bed clean-breast-of-it, exonerating Johnny of any blood-guilt. The hint is that the villain is kidding and engaging in a last-minute *beau geste* for the sake of his boy's peace of mind. We gather that a pep talk, and mauling about, given him by the Lawman before the showdown influenced his final testimony. By means, this time, of exacting false confessions the Lawman fulfils his role as tight-lipped smooth manipulator of peaceful states of mind.

But what if the action is such that a dread truth, or fact, cannot be avoided; how then does the Lawman help a hapless type adjust? Here is a *Gunsmoke* skit which offers the purest example of what the message, in such instances, always adds up to: A girl is raped, beaten, and enslaved by a gang of bad guys; they kill her dad, too. That most elephantine of all TV Big Dads—Marshall Dillon—effects her rescue only after shooting, clobbering, and pitchforking to death the desperate gang. Just before the fade-out the victimized woman stares up at the hero for the Word. Standing ready to depart from the shack of horrors he says, with a throaty, hard-bitten sincerity: "Don't be bitter."

And this is precisely why Special Agent Colt hid the truth from mother. He didn't want her to become bitter. For think where bitterness may lead to. Mother might have become Belle Starr, or Florence Nightingale, or Stellas Dallas; that is, she might have been transformed from an anonymous, lovable Type to a being with a singular, problematic, personal history. In a well-earned bitterness, after all, lurks sometimes the beginnings of idea or desire.

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II

Resistance on a TV character's part to a given culture or situation is allowed only when it is asserted with the connivance of the law officer. Thus the cards of the plot are so heavily stacked that the action skits must be pointlessly simple or, on the "adult" Westerns, inhumanly grotesque and archaic in situation and treatment. In each case, the point of resistance involves a betrayal of a member of a family, or a friend, or lover. This act of betrayal signifies a "weak" character's moment of self-assertion, of growth to manhood. After the moment of betrayal, the character is shown collapsing limply and gratefully into the arms of the Lawman; this gesture marks the acceptance of a character's validity by the State.

Gunsmoke, for example, is supposed to be the classiest of the Western shows. It deals with characters so "colorful," quaint and sturdy that their shenanigans are supposed to represent a "realistic" slice of Old West life. One skit had to do with a brace of sons tyrannized by a dad who was a religious hophead. The hobby of this colorful trio was to waylay ungodly-seeming wayfarers and beat them up. In between-times, Dad beats the sons for the slightest defection from his holy orders. One day this team (about as "realistic" a crew as will be found this side of Charles Addams) waylays Chester Goode, the Marshal's crippled assistant; to punish Chester for his frivolous attitudes, the father decides to chop off his arm. But the Younger Son, feeling some qualms over such extremism, hastens to summon the Marshal. Dad raises his axe to clobber Chester; the Younger Son and the Marshal burst through the clearing in the nick of time. It is the son who fires, killing Dad. He asserts his manhood by destroying his father in such a way as to win special approval from the representative of the State.

Here is an even less charming example taken from a show titled, *Detectives.* The detectives are sure that a certain racketeer is guilty of murder; the racketeer's alibi depends on the testimony of his mistress, a jolly night club "entertainer."

The cops go to work on the mistress. She is shown as being in a perfectly cozy relation with her lover; entertaining no illusions about her set-up, she is nonetheless as faithful to her "friend" as she is vulnerable to society. The cops first attempt to sneak a cop-gigolo-spy (unmarried, we are assured) into her confidence. When this fails, the cops tighten the screws by exposing to her the two-timing activities of her lover. They next employ keen psychology by taunting her with the difference in age between herself and her younger rival. The mistress still refuses to betray her lover. Finally, the cops terrify her by staging a mock attempt on her life. She begs for police protection; it is refused unless she squeals. So she squeals, collapsing hysterically into the paws of the square-faced gigolo-cop.

III

In its heyday, the Hollywood action movie—pirate, gangster, or Western—did contain, among its gross and silly aspects, some qualities of wit and emotion. Its sources and conventions made for such qualities even as the TV action shows destroy them. In contrast to TV's cowboy-cop, for example, the traditional Western hero was a Lone Rider, something of an

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ur-Hipster of the Plains. His origins, like those of the TV deputy, were mysterious, but unlike the deputy's, his code was neither formed nor approved by the State; nor was his style that of a trained seal. He was self-taught, autonomous, and, like Hemingway's types, a "hurt" man. His enemy was the gang in the backroom of the saloon, led by the compulsively competitive capitalist, who owned the town. The villain's henchmen were outlaws of the sort our hero understood well, for he was usually an ex-outlaw himself, haunted by his romantic past. As a classless hero, he was more graceful than the plebeian homesteaders, more vulnerable and isolated than the bourgeois ranchers; and he threw in his lot with one or another side on the personal basis of friendship, or love for the girl in one of the camps, or, as Robert Warshow has observed, through the romantic need to assert the inviolability of his style, that is, of his private attitudes.

Rather than manipulate situations himself, he usually acted on the spur of situations arranged by the ever-plotting bad guys. Because his was not the holier-than-thou code of the insider to the inside born; because he tended to resist organized power rather than reinforce it, he was the recognizable stranger in town, the Outsider whose key strength lay in his fancy style, a *shaneh bochur* whose name, in the most well-known depiction of this type, is, sure enough, Shane.

IN THE PEPPIEST and purest types of action movie the hero's personal choice was spiced frequently by a revenge-motif, the imperative to square accounts for an outrage perpetrated on a member of his family, or a friend. The revenge-motif from Seneca through the Renaissance to Dumas has been a constant in the tradition of the thriller in its liveliest and most free-wheeling aspects. The motif had carried over into the movies, from the earliest silents on up to a stray underground film or two of the fifties, like Randolph Scott's *Seven Men From Now*. So long as the action movie was anchored in what we may call, by comparison, this Grand Tradition (grand signifying a free-wheeling, sentimental, flamboyant, romantic-decadent mode not devoid of humanitarian meanings), it remained anchored to history, its convention and mood rooted in popular forms of the past. It served thus to assuage the aggressions and aches and pains of the populace in a traditional mode: a mode, that is, allied to the more vulgar aspects of humanism.

But the present efforts of movie and TV are empty of emotionality, wit, or fanfare. "Commercial" entertainment has become a form in a void; repressive rather than expressive, it is an entertainment which, like an iron curtain, separates the populace from its past moods. So, like the mother on the *Colt .45* show, the populace is being reduced to a *thing* without a personal history. It remains wide-eyed and genial-seeming, unaware of its true, wild blood relations.

For now it is the "hero" who sits in the front room of the jailhouse, surrounded by his coffee *klatsch*, waiting to be roused to action against some maladjusted lout. As a true-blue cop, he is the agent of the public attitude; his style is plain, *heimisch*, and threatening. When not perched in the front office of the jailhouse, he may be seen like Dale Robertson in the front office of his Organiza-

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tion, serving to untangle personnel problems and to test those characters with suspicious pasts who may deserve a chance to fit-in to the Organization once they have passed a loyalty test arranged by the agent.

The TV cop incarnates Function. He is of necessity a wise-cracking bore, using the wisecrack (or slogan) as a bludgeon to destroy the implications of thought or emotion. His very tautness stems entirely from the imperatives of function and evasiveness. He is indeed a creature of the post-McCarthy period.

Gathered in the TV room, family and friends nightly watch such a character operate to put strangers and family black sheep in their place. The audience stares at an "entertainment" which neither soothes nor teases it, but solemnly and religiously reduces it to the sum of its lowest common fears and pins it back on the sources of its own intellectual and emotional inarticulateness.

THE HIGHER MORALITY

"My father was a bigwig in the feudalistic societies. Due to support from the secret societies and due to his shrewdness, he was for nine years the head of Hochiang subdistrict. In March 1950 he participated in a rebellion and fled from home.

"I was told that the government demanded that the family look for my father. I firmly decided to take up the duty of locating him. . . . I finally found him in a small teahouse.

"He was sitting alone. His shrunken and pale appearance almost made me fail to recognize him. But he recognized me. I was happy. Was not that my father? My heart started to beat fast, but I calmed myself. With tears in his eyes my father told me, 'Since I parted from your brothers and sister, I have had to depend entirely on practicing medicine for a living. Before September, business was not bad, but after that there was hardly any business. Hunger, cold, and sickness almost took my life.' . . .

"After a night of conflict I finally shattered my incorrect thoughts and I consolidated myself on the principle of 'no compromise in revolution, and no sentimentalism in struggle.' I reaffirmed my stand.

"I went to the police bureau and informed the responsible comrade. Then I went to my father and demanded that he recant his past and reform. He said, 'How could you do this to me?' and tried to escape by saying that he was going to eat. But that time the armed comrades were already at the door. My father had no choice but to pretend to be willing to reform, and gave himself up. . . . My duty was at last done. I felt lighthearted. I was happy, for I had rid the people of a dangerous character."

—Quoted from an official Chinese source in *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution,* pp. 176–78.

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BOOKS

Political Economy of Growth

THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, by W. W. Rostow. A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press.

A pretentious title leads to a pretentious foreword, which leads to a very unpretentious introduction in which the author disclaims what he is doing. Having found Marx "unsatisfactory," he does not claim to do any better but frankly and strongly emphasizes that his five "stages of growth are an arbitrary and limited way of looking at the sequence of modern history . . . designed to dramatize not merely the uniformities . . . but also . . . the uniqueness of each nation's experience." You pays your dollar and you takes your choice.

This, however, seems to be the point of Rostow's theory: were the young or "underdeveloped" nations to follow a strictly determined pattern of development, most of them might stand little chance to make democratic choices or to avoid falling into the Soviet orbit. Looking around for a broader area of maneuver, Rostow* hopes to find grounds for more optimism. For that purpose, he breaks down the process of economic growth into five stages: *traditional, preparatory, take-off, maturity,* and *mass consumption.* Transition from one stage to the next, however, is not equally well determined for all five stages. Extremely complex rearrangements must take place in a "traditional" society before it is ready for the "take-off," and these conditions are different in each country.

On the other hand, once having "taken off," all societies reach maturity after sixty years. This law is so stringent that the rates of productivity increase for the United States and for Russia produce "remarkably similar" curves over a period of ninety years. What this means I am not quite sure, since Russia's "take-off" took place fifty years after the American and the "parallel" does not appear until the curve has been considerably manipulated. Anyway, the import of Rostow's "discovery" seems to be that an almost purely capitalistic economy and a sequence of highly traditional and Communist societies produce the same result. It therefore is not true that the new countries can procure the necessary investment rates only under the feverish impulse of a dictatorship.

I certainly wish this were true—but it is not even the right question. The problem is precisely the opposite: whether the underdeveloped countries can achieve maturity in *less* than sixty years without imposing on their populations the horrors which were characteristic of early capitalism and of primitive accumulation in Soviet

* He is now an adviser to Senator Kennedy.

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Russia. Democracy hinges, not on their *ultimate* ability to satisfy the politicized masses, but on their *present* ability to appease them. Professor Rostow neither answers nor even asks this question. Instead, he shifts the discussion to the later stage of "maturity" when a country's major industries have availed themselves of modern technology. Then, he says, a free decision will be possible: Shall the improved resources be used to enslave other nations, or to increase consumption? That was the choice before nations that reached maturity in the 19th century. Now the ten fingers suffice to figure that, with so many nations having "taken off," there will be few left to be enslaved, and hence all nations, including their dictatorial governments, should find it easy to make their option for mass consumption, democracy and peace. It's that simple, *q.e.d.*

IN THE PAST, steep differentials between highly developed and less developed countries tempted nations to choose "guns" rather than "butter." This even was natural for nations whose take-off had been sponsored or guided by feudal classes, such as imperial Germany and Japan. Rostow fears that the Soviet bureacracy, risen to power by promoting an extraordinary rate of investment in the war industries, also might not be ready to abandon its methods and habits. But he piously hopes that an option for peace would benefit the Soviet Union, since unlike the first half of this century, the nuclear age forbids newly emerging nations to try for world dominion.

All this is not very enlightening. If the major decision is to be a political one, it is difficult to see why so much trouble has been taken to define five stages of economic development. Nor does Rostow's charge against Marxism-Leninism seem to be more than a diversion from his basic agreement. Lenin maintained that capitalism must reach a certain stage where it tends to become parasitic, monopolistic, imperialistic and militaristic. What is this assertion if not one horn of the dilemma which Rostow says faces a nation at "maturity": to proceed to mass consumption, or to go to war? Lenin said—after Hilferding and Hobson—that capitalism cannot distribute its profits and therefore will become parasitic and belligerent. Until 1933 he was right, and our present mass consumption is based on the war industries. Moreover, the whole assumption of an "option at maturity" is tenuous. Imperial Germany on the eve of World War I spent 4 per cent of its national income on arms altogether—a sum that hardly would have made a difference if "distributed" —whereas present-day Russia assigns 20 per cent of the national income to the defense industries and to the conquest of foreign markets. Soon the question before the Soviet planners will not be the alternative of "guns or butter," but the possibility of having both. The differential of development which, according to Rostow's analysis, was more than a minor cause for both World Wars I and II, still supplies a necessary condition for the penetration of Soviet imperialism into underdeveloped areas, and hence for Soviet encouragement of the nationalist agitation in the new nations. The question of war and peace, therefore, is not simply "a choice for men," but hinges on the rivalry of power among big and small nations, on the social-political systems which narrow the choices for the politicians, and also on certain economic determinants.

All this is discussed on the basis of

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an extremely thin idea—that dividing the process of economic growth into five periods will provide a clue of policy—and reasoned with a distressing lack of coherence. Even where this reviewer would like to agree with the author, he fails to see how the argument leads to the conclusion. Finally, to make his outlook shine more hopefully than it does, Professor Rostow has to resort to a very cheap device: he compares his own optimistic view, which is based on man's moral freedom, with the deterministic views of Marx and Lenin, which allow for no salvation.

I AM SORRY to be severe with a man who has his own merit, but each man must be measured with the yardstick he applies to others. Mr. Rostow would mind if a sentence were taken from a political pamphlet he wrote at the age of 29 and subjected to textual analysis in criticism of economic theories he later expounded in a ponderous volume. Yet this is what he does to Marx. He quotes from the *Communist Manifesto,* e.g., the terse, polemical sentence that "capitalism left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest," and, displaying his superiority over Marx, proceeds to the triumphant summation at the end of his book: "In [my theory] man is viewed as a more complex unit." There is not one straight word in this sentence. As an educated, intelligent man and a teacher of economic history, Professor Rostow knows of course that Marx is not speaking of "man" but of capitalistic man; not of a real person with psychological motives but of an "ideal type"; nor can he possibly not know the numerous writings in which Marx has called for the liberation of the *whole* man—*der Mensch als Gattungswesen*—from the capitalist chrysalis. Or does Professor Rostow pretend not to understand the meaning of Marx's method of abstraction? Marx the economist analyzes abstract relations of values as whose protagonists people appear—but then, at the end of Chapter I in *Das Kapital,* he knocks the economists down by saying that all this is a fetishistic, alienated, reified appearance and we really should talk about people! He then analyzes the capitalistic relations for 22 more chapters, only at the end to destroy any false notions: in the famous chapter on "primitive accumulation" he again speaks of people and power. If Professor Rostow thinks *he* discovered the role of power, he should not be defending property but theft!

Marxist literature is full of examples for the assumption that the emergence of modern capitalism as a civilization depended on the emergence of the modern state. Only by ignoring this can Rostow claim world-shaking discoveries like the role of national welfare as illustrated by English factory inspection—of all things the reports from which *Das Kapital* quotes about fifty pages! Now Rostow not only suppresses all this, but with a sleight-of-hand also perverts the topic under discussion. Marx speaks of economy as "the anatomy of society," which Rostow transforms into the statement that individuals are "motivated" by self-interest. Since Marx only deals with classes, there simply is no such statement in his entire work. Wasn't it precisely Marx who waxed so indignant over the conflict between puritan ethics and business ethics? Or who analyzed the mechanics of power which drove Napoleon and Bismarck to war? Rostow's method of refuting Marx—who apparently still needs to be refuted after a hundred years, an

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honor none of his contemporaries shares—is on the level of the Freud-refuters who have heard someone say that Freud "derives everything" from sex.

ROSTOW'S ECONOMIC analysis of growth begins by dividing world economic history into two unequal parts—pre-Newtonian and modern. Athenian mercantile capitalism, Roman finance capitalism, Elizabethan predatory capitalism: all that disappears in the pre-Newtonian night where all cats are black, together with the manorial system of the Middle Ages, the slave-working plantation economy of the Roman Empire, the state- or priest-directed slavery of antiquity, the great works of public enterprise in the East. The researches of social and economic historians notwithstanding, Rostow calls all these societies static. Once this view is accepted, we may proudly point to the last 250 years when industry learned to increase at will the supply of certain goods by applying science to the production process. An entire literature has been written about the conditions which made that possible: the division of labor, a new attitude toward work, a spirit of enterprise, a calculating attitude toward things and people.

Rostow names two economic and one political achievement which introduced or facilitated the industrial revolution: first the increase in the productivity of farming, with farm products being converted into industrial investments; second the large-scale development of basic facilities which U.N. planners of aid to underdeveloped countries now call "infrastructure"—roads, dams, canals and similar great works which usually can be undertaken only by the state. Rostow's contribution to our better understanding of this latter factor consists in calling it "social overhead," and he maintains a generous silence on non-Marxists like Sombart and Marxists like Hilferding who had studied the role of railways and public works in the formation of capital. All this is of extreme importance for the late-coming nations, and Rostow has many interesting things to say about their chances to provide capital for these public works. It is all the more surprising that both in its historical and in its analytical aspect the farm revolution should have received less than a fair treatment. Western capitalistic societies emerged with the creation of an independent farming class, a condition which is not fulfilled in the new countries. Failure to understand the class structure of the new society results in bewilderment over the third condition for industrialism's "take-off"—nationalism.

In Rostow's analysis of the political conditions for modern industry it never becomes quite clear whether a favorable or an unfavorable environment offers the better stimulus for the right kind of response; at any rate, it must be a "positive, sustained and self-reinforcing response." But it is clear that the political and social structure determines different production goals in different countries. The "take-off" is said to have occurred in England around 1800, in France thirty to sixty years later, in Germany and the United States again fifteen years later, in Russia around 1900, in India and China only recently. Consumption need not increase during this period; an influx of foreign capital, on the other hand, may increase consumption without producing a "take-off." Foreign aid must find a propitious climate to become fertile. Post-colonial governments must be prepared to transfer

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income from parasitic to productive classes, and the latter must be ready either to borrow or to plow back the profits.

IN MARXIST LANGUAGE, the condition for a genuine "take-off" into modern industrialism is a "bourgeois revolution." Where industrialization began under the auspices of a middle class, chances of a democratic development soon appeared. In the new countries, instead, "national revolutions" are carried out by army officers and commissars in the absence of a strong middle class, while the workers have no democratic traditions at all but offer the aspect of a mob cheering a national leader. To promote industrialization under these undemocratic conditions, the leader must provide strong emotional incentives. The faster he wishes to increase the national capital, the rarer will be the chances for trade unions or any self-governing agency to share in decision-making. National planning will be dictatorial because neither property nor democracy stimulates growth at the desirable rate, which will be even higher because of the dictators' pride. But the less he can satisfy the masses, the more he must give them glory.

It seems that class analysis still yields realistic descriptions of actuality. On the other hand, Professor Rostow, who claims to start out from a more comprehensive "perception" of man, fails to spell out the most elementary political conditions of economic growth, and his "five stages" unfortunately are nothing but a pedantic schematism which helps little in understanding the process of growth. How right were the classics in calling their science *"political* economy"!

HENRY PACHTER

Pointing Toward "Utopia"

BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE, by Gunnar Myrdal. Yale University Press: 1960. 287 pages. $4.50.

One of the more curious things about the teaching of economics these days is the sharp and often vitriolic attack on planning. All too often the idea that careful forethought is essential to eliminate poverty and heighten the quality of economic existence is derided as a road to serfdom. Economics, we are told, is a pure science concerned only with spelling out the inferences to be drawn from a set of *a priori* statements. Man becomes a money-grubber whose selfishness redounds to the happiness of all; he delicately balances pain and pleasure in order to arrive at business decisions; he has sensitive antennae which impel him to respond instantaneously to the shifting demands of consumers; he can flit from industry to industry in search of ever greater profit; and all this supposedly makes for the best of economic worlds which only "planning" threatens to destroy.

One economist who dismisses such

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antediluvian notions is Gunnar Myrdal. As Sweden's Minister of Trade and Commerce, Executive Secretary of the United Nations European Commission, author of a monumental work on the Negro in America and now research director of the Twentieth Century Fund Asian Study, Dr. Myrdal has been able to draw from a deep well of practical experience to irrigate and make flourish an extraordinary body of theoretical work. He has observed planning in small communities, at national levels and among international agencies. He knows its values and its deficiencies, but he knows too that without planning only chaos will inherit the earth.

The present book takes planning for granted. Planning, says Myrdal, exists in a way that most conservative writers refuse to acknowledge, despite the fact that the interests for which they frequently speak have not been especially known for an altruistic rejection of tariffs, land grants or other government subsidies. In fact, national economies more and more have been regulated and literally planned to an extent quite unthinkable a hundred years ago. Consequently, the whole heated discussion on planning has an element of fantasy about it, for the fact is that government activity is now crucial for a viable economy and will continue to be so. Once again Myrdal touches a raw nerve in American life: the split between creed and deed, is as marked in economics as in race relations.

PARADOXICALLY, planning has been unplanned. It emerged gradually under the pressures of objective needs. The pure market economy conceived of man—or rather labor power—as a commodity, yet was unable to separate man from his ability to work. The dreadful conditions that this dilemma engendered during the Industrial Revolution was fully documented by Engels, Marx, Toynbee and the Hammonds. Yet the evil brought its own cure in the beginnings of state intervention. True, all this was at first *ad hoc,* limited and temporary. Measures were intended to protect women in factories, but the idea of state intervention to meet needs that private industry ignored was bound to spread. Wars and depressions accelerated the process; the gold standard, that myth of pristine automatism, was discarded; and businessmen, oppressed by an evergrowing burden of overhead and fixed investment, learned that they could not entrust the fate of their enterprises to the vagaries of a free market. Control and planning at enterprise, industry and national levels, became the dominant mode of answering economic questions.

The most striking aspect of this development, says Myrdal, has been the change in people's outlook. Old norms are losing their hold and more and more there is a desire to apply rational methods to recurrent problems. We no longer fear to make private contract subordinate to public requirement and we have adopted bargaining between groups as the organizing principle for social action. New personality types have been thrown up by changing economic forces. A whole psychology has been altered: the significant point, says Myrdal, is that this is a non-reversible process.

What has been happening, then, is a thrust toward a welfare state through "cumulative causation," a secular increase in state intervention occasioned by international crisis, increasing rationality, broader political participa-

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tion and the growth of large scale organization in all sectors of political and economic activity. Adopting a wide historical perspective (America "is still so young") Myrdal is hopeful that we shall move from ordinary intervention centered in narrow interests to meaningful planning. The usual techniques and objectives are all there: fiscal devices, maximizing opportunities, better education, progressive taxation and full employment all culminating in a "created harmony."

Drawing upon his experience with the Swedish welfare state, Myrdal insists that this is what people want. They feel freer, not less free in such an environment. A high degree of civic education and responsibility, with participation reaching deep into the political "infrastructure," has enabled the Swedes to meet their problems head-on. We here have been all too ready to discover deficiencies in this evolving society, but there are a good many more virtues in it, we are told, than can be found in our own political economy. And once the new rules of a "welfare culture" have been established, decentralization through a balanced growth of interest groups within the infrastructure can mean an actual decline of state intervention.

All this, Myrdal admits, is a Utopia. And like all painters of Utopia, he has deliberately drawn the picture with broad, hopeful strokes so as to highlight its genuine possibilities. We are still plagued by bureaucracy, a proliferation of legalistic rules and separatist tensions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the United States, where state intervention is rising only because the kind of inchoate planning we have has not yet caught up with "the need for coordination and simplification." Perhaps the major drawback in the kind of planning now going on is that it has intensified rather than lessened the parochial, nationalist sentiment which plagues all countries, large and small.

Myrdal concedes that planning as it is practiced today has served to widen the economic gap between the West and the "underdeveloped" nations. International economic disintegration has not been halted despite the heroic efforts after World War II; and with the collapse of colonialism and the coming of the cold war, there seems little likelihood that the Asian and African nations will soon catch up. In Myrdal's terms, global planning means a world without boundaries and without the kind of discrimination that sets off one nation from the next. But he is unwilling to admit that the cause of internationalism is hopeless. He urges that the only real prospect for man is to internationalize those very measures for integration which are pursued in building a national welfare state. There is no alternative except to build the Welfare World.

Is this possible? Myrdal says yes, despite the sorry start made in the United Nations and its satellite agencies. As he observes with no little acerbity, the International Trade Organization was stillborn, the Economic and Social Council mirrors the debating propensities of the General Assembly, the FAO draws blueprints which remain on paper, the ILO was outmoded 40 years ago. Yet he feels that these sad failures represent stumbling beginnings toward a genuine international community.

This is indeed a work of consummate optimism. For those afflicted with a dyspeptic view of world affairs

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it may prove a rather heady draught. But so long as one harbors the slightest hope of a democratic socialism, Myrdal's argument will have a strong measure of validity.

BEN B. SELIGMAN

Mobility and Status

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, by Seymour Lipset and Reinhard Bendix. University of California Press. 1959. 309 pp.

Thanks mainly to the foundations, the empirical study of social stratification and mobility has expanded enormously in the past decade. Research teams have been commissioned, thousands upon thousands of IBM cards punched, vast amounts of data accumulated. What has been lacking is a figure of real distinction to draw together these disparate, often trivial materials into a new synthesis. Seymour Lipset and Reinhard Bendix's *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* is an attempt at such a synthesis.

The stature of Bendix and Lipset has been steadily growing. Lipset's *Agrarian Socialism* and *Union Democracy,* Bendix's *Work and Authority in Industry,* joint products like *Class, Status and Power* and numerous essays in professional journals: these have been refreshing exceptions to the general tendency of American sociologists to devote more and more attention to progressively less significant problems.

The more pity, then, that their most recent work, despite many excellences, is disappointing. Part of the difficulty is stylistic. Bendix and Lipset have written well in the past, but here are 294 pages of almost unvaried gray. The mode of argumentation is supremely academic. Each point is cautiously qualified—at times, the exasperated reader may feel, qualified into limbo.

The real problem, however, is not one of form but of substance. Long sections of this work are full of rich and subtle analysis. It contains outstanding discussion of the social origins of the American business elite, social mobility in a metropolitan community (Oakland, California), and other topics. But these virtues are not enough to rescue the book from its unfortunate thesis.

THE PRINCIPAL THEME of this book is that social mobility, as "an integral and continuing aspect of the process of industrialization," is "high in all industrial societies." What is meant here by "social mobility"? Simply movement, it turns out, between manual and non-manual positions in the occupational hierarchy. Accept this as a satisfactory definition, as do the authors, and dramatic conclusions follow. America, often regarded as a distinctively "open" society, has indeed permitted a very high degree of "social mobility." But the apparent contrast between our non-feudal social structure and the more rigid

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class systems of the Old World is mistaken. A wealth of comparative evidence—studies, that is, measuring moves between manual and non-manual occupations—shows that if America has been a "land of opportunity," so too have England, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Japan.

Besides these mobility studies based on national samples, scattered materials utilizing less crude indices of social mobility are thrown into the text. The authors are tireless in recording bits of fugitive evidence which point to "high rates of social mobility" anywhere and everywhere—even in Poona, India. There is value, I suppose, in the reminder that Poona and Poughkeepsie are not wholly dissimilar, that the supposedly static stratification systems of the Orient do in fact allow for some degree of change in social status. (Kingsley Davis, however, underlined this point in a widely-read textbook years ago.) But Bendix and Lipset's mania for establishing these superficial similarities leads them far from their thesis. Why, one wonders, consider social mobility a function of *industrialization* at all if data from Poona and Sao Paulo, Brazil are included? Mobility appears rather a concomitant of *urbanization.* (The authors note this possibility in a final chapter.)

THIS HEAVY EMPHASIS on the universality of social mobility in industrial (or is it urban?) societies raises another question. "There is," Bendix and Lipset assure us, "an important relationship between a society's internal mobility and the stability of its political regime." They draw a Tocquevillean contrast between the flexible recruitment policy of the English aristocracy and the foolish rigidity of the French ruling class of the Ancien Regime. To be sure. Yet if the authors really have discovered a valid index of social mobility, as they claim, and have shown that differences in mobility rates between societies with different political systems are negligible, then social mobility and political stability are independent phenomena. They deny this, of course, and wriggle out of the difficulty by maintaining that similar mobility rates can have radically different consequences in different social contexts. Here they have a point, but much of what they smuggle in under the category of "social context" really pertains to social mobility, once that concept is broadened beyond their simplistic definition.

Social Mobility in Industrial Society, we learn in the introduction, grew originally out of an interest in social mobility in American society. It is on precisely this topic, it strikes me, that Bendix and Lipset are least enlightening. Social mobility, they assert, has been no higher in the U.S. than in many countries. What, then, does account for all that is undeniably distinctive about American attitudes towards the economic and social structure? The chief puzzle involves America's widespread adherence to the Alger myth. Bourgeois success values have somehow seeped down into even the lowest social levels here. Instead of a peasantry and a classic proletariat, America has produced a class of farmer-capitalists and a working class that has rarely advanced beyond "trade-union consciousness." Why?

BENDIX AND LIPSET devote thirty-seven pages to an explanation of the persistence of "ideological equalitarianism" in America. They resort to time-

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honored eclecticism, listing no less than six "factors" which bear on the problem. One of these, curiously, turns out to be our old friend, the existence of "a continuous high rate of social mobility in American society." Yet, as they sense, this can hardly play a major role in their analysis, else Finland would have its Algerism too. The unique character of the American faith, then, is finally to be explained as the product of other influences, such as economic abundance, mass immigration, and the absence of a feudal heritage. The presence here of a democratic educational system is listed as a principal factor, and striking evidence is marshalled to prove the marked superiority of educational opportunities for the common man in America. One footnote vividly contrasts the elitist educational system of Switzerland with that of the U.S. Since education, as Bendix and Lipset well know, is the prime agent of mobility in a technologically advanced society, what does account for the remarkable rate of upward mobility they claim to have discovered in Switzerland?

This not very convincing interpretation suggests the need for critical examination of the first premise which made it necessary, namely the hypothesis that mobility opportunities in America have been no greater than in other industrial nations. The major flaw in Bendix and Lipset's argument, it should be obvious, is the fact that their index of class rigidity doesn't measure what it purports to. Most national mobility studies depend on the manual—non-manual distinction, and Bendix and Lipset can hardly be blamed for the consequent thinness of available mobility data. But they can legitimately be criticized for erecting a large expensive house on such sandy foundations.

Use of the manual—non-manual criterion in one way exaggerates, in another underestimates the amount of real social movement in society. The exaggeration stems from the fact that this procedure glosses over the cruel paradox of status illuminated in Mill's seminal book *White Collar*. The process which opened up once high-status positions in white collar and service occupations was the same process which degraded the status of these positions, so that one wonders what it means to label the independent shoemaker turned factory clerk "upwardly mobile." As white collar jobs continue to fall in social prestige, economic reward, and quality of working conditions, the propriety of making the manual-non-manual divide a central one becomes increasingly dubious.

More important for the problem of American Algerism, however, is the fact that the technique of *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* leads to an underestimation of the feeling of status improvement experienced by the American working class during the crucial years of industrial transformation. There were, in fact, vital differences in status within the broad range of working class occupations, with an extremely high degree of rapid movement into the more attractive positions.

Research I am currently doing on the social mobility of workers in a nineteenth century New England mill town reveals a cycle at work which gave many American workers a strong (if deceptive) sense of status improvement. In the typical case, an uprooted Irish peasant labored in this coun-

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try as an unskilled or semi-skilled laborer. In an amazing display of bourgeois dedication, he sacrificed everything to one end—the accumulation of property. He characteristically succeeded, in a small way, and this was sufficient to give him faith in America as the land of opportunity. His children, forced into the factories in their early teens, crossed the manual-non-manual chasm infrequently, but usually managed to move into more highly skilled and better paid laboring jobs. The slender margin of economic security they enjoyed allowed them to educate *their* children, who then were equipped to climb out of the working class into jobs in the lower white collar, professional and managerial category. Thus the immigrant, his son, and his grandson could all feel that opportunities for individual ascent within the system were great, *although only the grandson made a move that would be registered on Bendix and Lipset's index.* In no other country has this escalator effect been quite so pronounced and dramatic, even though rates of manual to non-manual movement appear to have been roughly comparable in most of the industrialized nations. While the authors touch on this status cycle in their hasty discussion of immigration, their commitment to a superficial definition of mobility makes proper emphasis of it impossible. STEPHAN THERNSTROM

HAVE YOU READ OUR MESSAGE ON THE INSIDE COVER? PLEASE DO—AND NOTE THE COUPON ON THE FACING PAGE!

LETTERS

U-2 Repercussions

Editors:

In the Summer 1960 issue, on p. 313, you introduce a writer as a "professional student of American military affairs." I wonder about this "student's" qualifications. Everyone should know that defensive weapons cannot be distinguished from offensive weapons. To say that "the U-2 looked more like an offensive than a defensive instrument" is just nonsense; reconnaissance is just as essential to defense as to attack. Before launching an attack, a commander must take protective measures; e.g., going into a Blitz offensive, he must beware of the counter-strike and hence prepare air raid shelters. Your "professional student" however observes that "the U.S. never takes any measures to protect its citizens against a Soviet strike." To conclude from this that it must be planning an offensive, is like reasoning that the ancient Babylonians must have known wireless telegraphy since the archeologists have not found any wires yet. The logic is too crabby even for your "professional student" to assume responsibility for it; he rather attributes it to Mr. Khrushchev! Poor Khrushchev! Traveling around the U.S. and seeing our traffic jams, congested industrial areas and general unpreparedness, he must really have been frightened by so many signs of offensive intentions. And coming home, his "professional students of American military affairs" then must have told him that the U.S., being totally vulnerable to a first Soviet strike, cannot defend itself except by striking the first blow. Some Soviet military sources, quoted by Dinerstein and Garthoff, indeed have concluded that the answer to this can only be a "pre-emptive war" by the Soviet forces. Pre-emptive, in contrast to preventive war, is defined as the first blow which you get in just in the nick of time after having concluded that the enemy is about to do the same thing to you. We obviously are erring in a very vicious circle here. How can we cut it? American military thinking, as represented by the "Bulletin of Atomic Scientists," says the answer is in having

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sufficient hardware for a formidable counter-blow even if a Soviet "first strike" should be devastating. The "deterrent" evidently is not the ability to strike first but the ability to make the first strike too risky for the other side. Obviously that means counter-offensive; that again is elementary. Your "professional student" might have considered—it is in an early chapter of Clausewitz—that effective defense must be conducted offensively, i.e., the defender must be able to hit at the enemy's offensive positions. "Targeting was (the U-2's) mission" exclaims your "professional student" with raised hands, as though he had never heard of the most ordinary defense preparations. Of course, anyone concerned with defense must look for targets. One cannot just wait to catch the missiles. Unless one condemns every defense effort, one should not condemn his artillery to fire blindly. To conclude from the reconnaissance of possible targets that "it was not preparing for a second but primarily for a first strike" is not military science but an attempt at mind reading. We are very fortunate to know that Mr. Khrushchev's advisers are better professional students of American military affairs, or else he really might have launched a pre-emptive war. The conclusions which he drew from the U-2 incident were quite different, but your professional student has not even touched upon them. The first must have been that high-flying reconnaissance planes with modern optical equipment indeed are a formidable, but frail instrument of reconnaissance. Hence that they must be and and can be stopped by physical, diplomatic and propagandistic means. Far from accepting Eisenhower's "open skies" plan, Khrushchev refuses to legalize reconnaissance and prefers the status quo; today it is difficult for the Americans to obtain the information which the Soviet Embassy in Washington can get for a few dollars from the Government Printing Office. But it is precisely this "open skies" plan which your expert offers as *his* idea! Your "professional student" apparently does not know that the present arrangement suits the Russians and that any change of the status quo in reconnaissance relations could only be to their disadvantage. Otherwise he would not suggest that, as a gesture of friendliness, we offer them such a change. Nor does he seem to know that "overflight rights" have been offered to them precisely because the U.S. would learn more from such flights than the Russians. He ignores the fact that the Russians—rightly—have rejected the "open skies" offer. To come up, at the end of an unsubstantiated diatribe, with Dulles's and Eisenhower's discredited plan, is a curious conclusion for a "dissenting" voice. It is hardly surprising that this confused expert also advocates "certain types of rearmament" instead of disarmament and control.

HENRY PACHTER

"PROFESSIONAL STUDENT" *replies:*

Mr. Pachter's remark that defensive weapons cannot be distinguished from offensive weapons is half-true. A first strike force, however, does not need a defensive structure as an accompaniment, except over target. A second strike force does need a defensive structure quite as much as an accompanying offensive structure. Our own lack of a defensive system to protect our strike force makes precisely this point. That is why General Power has been so firm on the need for an Air Borne Alert, i.e. one which can survive an enemy first strike. To date we do not have the invulnerable second strike capability that we need, and it is precisely this fact which makes our force structure primarily first strike oriented, an inadequate deterrent over the years ahead.

But what Mr. Pachter—like many others, to be sure—says about targeting is, I fear, wide of the mark. He mixes counterforce strategy with second strike deterrence. In less technical language this means that there is little point in aiming at enemy *military* targets once the weapons stationed on these targets have flown, while there is still a point in hitting his cities, and letting him know that we can and will hit them to destroy his will to launch the preemptive war. The U-2 was looking for military targets, essentially. We already know where Moscow is. In other words, the U-2 was looking for first strike targets, not second strike targets, to repeat my original point.

Parenthetically, the case of the RB-47

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was quite different. Its mission was obtaining information as to radar installations, etc., a necessary step in planning a second strike against a prepared enemy.

Mr. Pachter intimates, I think, that Khrushchev could see from his trip that we were not truly offensively minded. American tourists can visit the USSR, and come to similar conclusions. But American tourists do not visit SUSAC bases any more than Mr. K. visits SAC bases. Believe me, things look different when one sees the plane on the end of the runway ready to go after the target a mere twenty minutes away.

Two other points. I feel sure that Mr. Pachter would agree that with the SAMOS "spy satellite" coming up the time is ripe to rethink the open skies proposal once more, and to rethink it in rather broader terms than before. Finally, Mr. Pachter is apparently not as yet fully aware of the possibilities of a restabilized world if we go rapidly to an invulnerable second strike capability with a force of Polaris, Air Borne Alert, hardened and mobile Minuteman missiles. This kind of rearmament may well do as much to lessen world tensions as many forms of disarmament and arms control. Far from inconsistent, rearmament is simply a means to a more stabilized world, one which I believe both of us want, for it would be a world in which the U-2 would not need to fly, and armed planes would not need to sit on the runways as an invitation to accident.

Your Help Wanted

Editors:

There are now two political prisoners behind bars in New Hampshire. On June 28, Hugo De Gregory was jailed for refusing to answer questions in New Hampshire's "subversive investigation." His imprisonment climaxes six years of persecution by N.H. Attorney General Louis Wyman, who holds the position of one-man investigating committee. De Gregory, a 46-year-old factory worker, was taken to Boscawen Jail, where Dr. Willard Uphaus has been imprisoned since last December for invoking the First Amendment. Both men were sentenced for indeterminate terms of at least one year, and the Attorney General has already stated that he hopes to start proceedings against them all over again at the end of their year terms.

In a statement issued just before he was jailed, De Gregory said, "The state has shown once more that it is stronger than the individual. But it has also demonstrated that it is powerless to compel an individual to commit an indecent act. I still refuse to become an informer for Mr. Wyman—to help him slander people I know to be completely innocent of any wrongdoing. I go to jail with a clear conscience."

The De Gregory Defense Committee is working to let people know about New Hampshire's contempt for civil liberty that has put these men in jail, and to raise funds for appealing the little-publicized De Gregory case to the higher courts. If you would like to help, please contact the committee at the address below.

Priscilla di Giovanni, treasurer
De Gregory Defense Committee
Box 103, Hanover Street Station
Boston 13, Mass.

Migratory Labor

Editors:

Herbert Hill's fine study of migrant farm labor [Dissent, Summer 1960] calls to mind a trip which I took into northern Michigan during the summer harvest of 1958.

I carefully planned the trip by visiting a State unemployment office in Detroit. There were dozens of men lined up for the same purpose, most of whom were young, unemployed Negroes. The secretaries gave us elaborate maps and charts which described when and where the various fruits and vegetables would be harvested. Wages rates were quoted, but this was piece-work and who knew what 2.5 cents per pound for green beans meant? (Actually, I received 1.7 cents when I picked or the equivalent of 60 cents an hour for back-breaking work.)

Most of the unemployed workers who went up north became field hands for the first time in their lives. It is perhaps ironical that the young Negroes went further north to confront the type of

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life which their parents had fled from in the south. Conditions in these northern areas were not unlike those which Mr. Hill portrayed in his article. In fact, the attitudes of the northern residents toward the Mexican and Negro migrants are quite similar to the rural, southern white mentality. The migrants were kept "in their place"—in dilapidated chicken coops and leaky tents.

The workers from Detroit posed new problems for the farmers. I heard several complaints about the surly Detroit pickers. Unlike the typical migrants, the city men had come up alone, leaving their families behind. Fights were frequent. The Detroiters griped more than the regulars. The auto shops in Detroit are not exactly the Earthly Paradise, but they *do* provide the workers with some vague notion of a decent wage, and there *is* the UAW. Since the city men were inexperienced at picking, they earned even less than the lowest. They were shocked by the housing conditions, and most of them drove back south after a few days, more broke than when they had started.

I happened to be in the farm labor Office at Traverse City when a group of Detroiters walked in. The office was just closing. The agent told the men that the nearest job was thirty miles away. He drew a complicated map showing them how to get there. The men asked if there were any Negroes in Traverse City who might put them up for the night. The agent said that there was only one family. Since there were two carloads of men, they decided to drive on to the farm. I have seldom seen such bitter and lonely people. It was not that they were so poor. In the next few days they would see people who were really poverty-stricken. These men were just not used to *this* type of run-around. Maybe it would have been better if the State agents had not been so helpful.

In the brochure which the secretary had given us in Detroit, it stated that the farm labor offices facilitated the hiring of thousands of migrant workers every summer. That may well be, but once the people are hired, what then? So far, the State has merely expedited exploitation.

JONATHAN SCHWARTZ

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